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Résumé Court
Le secteur humanitaire a fortement évolué ces dernières années. Il est poussé à plus de transpa-
rence et doit rendre des comptes aux donateurs. Dans ce contexte, notre étude vise à expliciter,
mesurer et améliorer l’une des principales caractéristiques des chaines logistiques humani-
taires : leur capacité à répondre rapidement et adéquatement aux changements à court terme.
Cette capacité, l’agilité, est fortement influencée par la manière dont le réseau logistique est
conçu et dimensionné. Notre seconde problématique consiste donc à assurer un niveau déter-
miné d’agilité aux chaînes logistiques humanitaires en les aidant à mieux positionner leurs
ressources. L’objectif est de montrer que l’on peut obtenir ce niveau de service en maximisant
l’efficience du réseau. Nous avons donc quantifié, en terme de coûts, l’impact de plusieurs
décisions stratégiques comme le niveau de service, la proximité des fournisseurs et le degré de
centralisation du réseau.
Short Abstract
A push for increased professionalism during disaster relief operations has been reinforced
over the last decade. The uncertainties humanitarian organisations have to cope with and the
vital importance of their success has incited them to develop their ability to respond quickly
and adequately to short-term changes. This agility capability is becoming highly prized by
the private sector. Starting from a framework of supply chain agility, this thesis analyses
humanitarian methods and defines an agility maturity model aiming to measure and improve
the agility capability of a supply chain. As agility often depends on the adequate balance
between delivery capacity and needs, our second problem statement aims to design a logistics
network that can operate under high levels of uncertainty so that for a given level of service in
terms of agility, efficiency is maximized. Our study quantifies the impact on costs of various
decisions, such as network design, supply strategy or level of service.
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Introduction
Motivations and background
The humanitarian sector has been confronted with many changes over the last ten years. On
the one hand, the crisis profile is evolving toward more small- and medium-sized disasters, so
there are more operations all over the world. On the other hand, donors are pledging millions
in donations in an economic context that imposes rationalisation (see figure 1). Therefore,
they are asking for more accountability and transparency and have less tolerance for the
fire-fighting mentality that characterised most humanitarian operations in the past. As a
consequence, disaster relief needs more structure; it has to become more results-oriented to
avoid direct friction with the private sector. The first step of our work consists in the formal
characterisation of humanitarian supply chains in order to comprehend their specificities and
needs.
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Figure 1: Natural disasters, facts and trends
Humanitarian organisations often have to quickly implement complex supply chains under
high levels of uncertainty regarding demand and supply as well as the environment, thus
becoming specialists at being agile. Starting from a framework of supply chain agility, the
second part of this thesis analyses humanitarian methods and defines an agility maturity
model aimed at measuring, improving and transferring the agility capabilities of humanitarian
or commercial supply chains.
Working on the clarification of what exactly enables humanitarians to be reactive and effective
would benefit both the private sector and humanitarians. Indeed, many authors agree on the
importance of agility. Kidd goes even as far as asserting that agility is “the future business
system that will replace the mass production businesses of today” [Kid95]. Having a logical,
ix
objective, robust and reproducible method for assessing supply chain agility is therefore
becoming of prime importance for both commercial and humanitarian sectors. First of all, it
would enable and encourage internal reflection. Secondly, it would provide organisations with
a common discussion tool that can be used to offer proof of their competitive advantage. This
is obviously true for the private sector, but it is also valid for humanitarians, who could use
this approach as evidence of their good agility level.
Such a tool would also provide supply chain managers with effective ways of collaborating
with other stakeholders, thus facilitating benchmarking and cross-learning. Eventually, it
would lead to better measurement of performance levels, improved management skills and
abilities, and increased facilitation of knowledge management, which is not only a path toward
self-improvement, but also a requirement for meeting donors’ expectations.
As agility often depends on the adequate balance between delivery capacity and needs, our
second problem statement aims to design a humanitarian logistics network so that for a given
level of service in terms of agility, efficiency is maximised. The third part of this thesis therefore
quantifies the impact on costs of various decisions, such as network centrality, supply strategy
or level of service.
For this purpose, we have developed a mixed integer linear programme to give the best
locations for positioning humanitarian resources, namely relief items and material means of
transportation such as vehicles. The objective function of the programme is to minimise the
costs of the response. The effectiveness and responsiveness of the response are considered
as constraints. In other words, the programme determines which supply chain design would
enable an organization to meet its targeted level of service at a lesser cost. The practical result
for organizations is a quantified analysis for knowing how many warehouses should be opened,
why and where. We also conducted a sensitivity analysis of various parameters in order to
clarify which decisions impact the costs of the response. We therefore varied the inputs and
constraints of the model to analyse the difference between a centralised or a decentralised
network, between global or local supply strategies, and to quantify the effects of a high level of
service in terms of costs.
These runs were made at a regional level; that is to say, we divided the world into 21 regions,
each one being approximately the same size as Australia. Once we knew which regions should
host a warehouse, we jumped to a local level and used a principal component analysis to
define relevant indicators, such as accessibility, telecommunications, corruption and the level
of security. These indicators were then weighted following a design of experiment and used to
find the best location, this time at a country-wide level. This local analysis was driven by field
specificities, as no humanitarian organisation would willingly build a warehouse in an unsafe
or inaccessible area.
Working on the configuration and dimensioning of a logistics network under demand, supply
and environmental uncertainties would benefit both humanitarians and the private sector.
The increased volatility of demand, supply and the environment are becoming a common
concern for most business lines, from the fashion industry to humanitarian aid. This thesis
proposes a method for designing a supply chain under such uncertain conditions. For hu-
manitarians it would provide an optimisation of their stock location and as a result, a fast
and adequate response at a lesser cost. This is an area of research that many humanitarian
organisations, such as the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent So-
cieties (IFRC), World Vision International or the French Red Cross recognise as one of their
major issues. We have therefore designed our study on the basis of input and discussions with
humanitarian practitioners. Our model fits the specifications given by the IFRC and provides a
x
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specific, quantified analysis of the impact of their choices with regard to the level of service or
local capacity building on their level of efficiency. We therefore give some recommendations,
aiming to help the IFRC define its logistics strategy.
This research has allowed us to analyse the trend toward decentralisation taken recently by
humanitarians, helping them go one step further by better positioning their resources and
measuring the impacts of this new supply chain design on their agility and efficiency.
These reflections on the decentralisation of a supply chain, its motivations and the importance
of each decision’s variables are of prime importance in our globalised world, for any line of
business. All in all, this thesis analyses and develops areas where humanitarian workers and
their corporate counterparts could mutually benefit from each others’ expertise.
Research Objectives
1. Characterise humanitarian supply chains in order to make their specificities and needs
explicit.
2. Provide a clear framework of supply chain agility and a model to assess it in an objective,
robust and reproducible way.
3. Characterise the supply network problem of humanitarian organisations or any private
company working under high levels of uncertainty regarding demand, supply and
environment. We propose an optimisation model to quantitatively analyse the impact
of various strategic choices on operations efficiency.
xi
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Humanitarian Supply Chains
Context, Particularities and Research Statements
Purpose: No relief operation is similar to another. The nature, the number and the incentives
of stakeholders vary tremendously from one operation to another. Add to that the long travel
distances and the magnitude of the needs and you have a glimpse of all the factors which
exacerbate the complexity of humanitarian operations and drain the logistical capacity of
the agencies on the ground. The aim of this first part is to analyse the main features of
humanitarian supply chains, and to evaluate their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and
threats.
Design/methodology/approach: The methods used for this research are case study research
and literature review.
Findings: We provide an overview of what a humanitarian supply chain is. We analyse its
particularities and their consequences on the management of the supply chain. The literature
is reviewed in order to define and position our research questions.
Research implications: This part constitutes a first step to better define the needs of human-
itarian supply chains and thus define the research objectives that will be developed in the
second and third parts of this thesis.
1

1
Disaster Management: facts and recent
changes
Disasters are crises, either natural or man-made, that local governments cannot face with their
own resources. They may result from a wide range of crises, from earthquakes to droughts,
conflicts or industrial accidents. Some may cause hundreds of thousands of deaths; others
may have an impact on only a limited number of people. Some may affect a population for
only a couple of weeks, such as in the case of heat waves, whereas others may last for years.
The crisis in Darfur is an example of those which seem to last forever. Table 1.1 summarizes
the main types of disasters.
Each of these disaster types requires a specific response. The relief operations deployed after a
disaster vary according to the location of the crisis, its intensity, its nature, the stakeholders
involved and many other elements. All these factors have an impact on the design and
implementation of humanitarian supply chains. Yet we agree with Chandes and Paché that "it
would be tempting, but dangerous and inefficient, to think that each natural or man-made
disaster is unique, and therefore calls for a customized response from which no general lesson
will be learned for future events. [...] Beyond the objective differences between these situations,
it is essential to determine their similarities so as to accelerate the mobilization of resources
and actors."[CP10]
Still, it is very difficult to study each and every disaster. The generalisation induced would
make our findings too general to be of any use. We have therefore limited the scope of our study
to natural disasters only. By excluding man-made disasters, we have reduced the complexity of
the study. It decreases the proportion of disasters that take place in a politically volatile climate
Table 1.1: Explaining Disasters - From [Was06b]
Natural Man-Made
Sudden-onset Earthquakes, Hurricanes,
Tornadoes, etc.
Terrorist attacks, Coups d’état,
Chemical leaks, etc.
Slow-onset Famine, Drought, Poverty, etc. Political crises, Refugee crises
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Table 1.2: Disaster Classification - From [Sch+08]
Disaster
Subgroup
Definition Main Disaster Type
Geophysical Events originating from solid earth Earthquakes,
Volcanoes, Mass
movement (dry)
Meteorological Events caused by short-lived/small-to-meso scale
atmospheric processes (in the spectrum from minutes
to days)
Storms
Hydrological Events caused by deviations in the normal water cycle
and/or overflow of bodies of water caused by wind
set-up
Flood, Mass
movement (wet)
Climatological Events caused by long-lived/meso-to-macro scale
processes (in the spectrum from intra-seasonal to
multi-decadal climate variability)
Extreme
temperature,
Drought, Wildfire
Biological Disasters caused by the exposure of living organisms to
germs and toxic substances
Epidemics, Insect
infestations, Animal
stampedes
and therefore have an exceedingly uncertain environment. Table 1.2 provides a classification of
natural disasters. This section clarifies and categorises the diversity of scenarios that may occur.
To that end, we compare five disasters of similar nature and intensity, but which nevertheless
present huge differences. One relief operation, the response to the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake,
will then be further detailed in order to illustrate what a humanitarian operation is and how a
humanitarian supply chain is designed and run.
With around 450 to 500 natural disasters a year, there are many examples available for analysing
and comparing relief operations. To illustrate our study, we will therefore refer to past disasters.
In the interest of being consistent as well as to helping readers’ understanding, we will refer to
the same disasters and add layers to our comparisons throughout this thesis.
In the context of international relief efforts, many factors influence the sequence of events.
In order to compare only what is comparable and to analyse the influence of these factors,
we have selected disasters of a similar nature and intensity. A comparison of the deadliest
earthquake per year since 2004 will therefore appear as a guiding thread throughout this thesis
(see table 1.3 on the facing page).
1.1 Guiding thread 1 - How and why disaster management differs from
one crisis to another
As you can see in table 1.3, the category "deadliest earthquake per year" may still be too
broad. The death toll depends on many factors, from the magnitude of the earthquake to its
geographical location, the weather conditions, and the population density and vulnerability
around the epicenter.
To provide a better comparison of each operation, we have therefore summarised the context in
which the earthquakes took place, adding basic elements such as the season and the distance
4
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Table 1.3: Guiding thread 1 - Deadliest earthquakes by year, short comparison
Sources :
Magnitudes, depths, fatalities, distances, time/season :[USG]
Number of Affected, Damage: [EM-]
International Aid : [UNO05b]
2010 Haiti
(after 3months)
2008
Sichuan
2006 Java
(Indonesia)
2005
Pakistan
2004 Indian
Ocean
Magnitude (Mw) 7.0 7.9 6.3 7.6 9.1
Depth (km) 13 km 19 km 10 km 26 km 30 km
N° Killed 222,570 87,587 5,749 80,361 227,898
N° Affected 2,090,877
displaced
45,976,596 3,177,923 5,284,622 2,431,613
Distance to
nearest big city
25 km from
Port-au-Prince
80km from
Chengdu
20 km from
Yogyakarta
105km from
Islamabad
250 km from
Banda Aceh
Time/Season Tuesday, 04:53
PM January
Monday,
02:28 PM
May
Saturday,
05:53 AM
May
Saturday,
08:50 AM
October
Sunday,
07:58 AM
December
Damage (million
US$)
>8000 492 3100 6200 9391
International Aid
(million US$)
Appeal 1500,
50% pledged
310 133 1171 7000
to the nearest big city in table 1.3. The following paragraphs illustrate the major elements that
have had an impact on the relief operations deployed to respond to these earthquakes.
1.1.1 Haiti 2010 - Population density and vulnerability
The impact of a disaster depends not only on the nature and the intensity of the disaster, but
also on its location. The same earthquake around San Francisco, where buildings are built
with specific materials and local resources are prepared to respond, will not have the same
impact as one that strikes a poor, unprepared country such as Haiti or a region such as the
high mountains of Pakistan during winter. It also depends on the population density. The
earthquake in Haiti, for example, occurred less than 25 kilometres from the capital, thus caus-
ing major damage to vital infrastructure, such as hospitals, seaports and airports, roads and
communications systems. Means of action were also cruelly lacking. The number of machines
capable of digging on the island was so desperately low that people had to search through the
rubble bare-handed, thus limiting the number of people rescued. Infrastructure and means
of action were therefore either damaged or missing. Local capacity and leadership were also
adversely affected. Among the dead were aid workers. At least 85 United Nations personnel
working with MINUSTAH1 were killed, among them the Mission Chief and his deputy [BBC10].
As for the local government, although it survived the destruction of the presidential palace and
the national assembly building, its leadership and coordination capacities were overwhelmed
by the magnitude of the disaster. A local journalist at the time remarked that the Haitian
president “has waited for nine days before officially speaking to the country. Like Godot, we
were waiting for him and we are still waiting” [Val10]. This lack of local capacity caused many
1United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
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difficulties during the first days of the humanitarian response. In this regard, the response to
the 2008 Sichuan earthquake was entirely different.
1.1.2 Sichuan 2008 - Local capacity and cause-effect chain
Many actors join forces both before and during relief operations. INGOs2, UN Agencies, local
NGOs3, local governments, the military, external governments and many others are involved
in disaster management. The presence of a local authority able and willing to act as a central
coordinator is a primary element for shaping relief operations. The presence of an army, local
or not, also affects the collaborative networks, as does the presence of such local capacity
as a UN Resident Coordinator or trained volunteers. To provide assistance after the 2008
earthquake, humanitarian organisations had to get the government’s approval. Relief efforts
were coordinated by local authorities, and the army participated actively and extensively in
operations. "China has mobilized more than 130,000 army and paramilitary troops to the
disaster area" (IFRC Operations update n° 5 22 May 2008). The strength and leadership of the
local government therefore had a deep impact on relief operations in China.
Another element affected the operations in the Sichuan province: heavy rain increased the
possibility of floods and landslides in earthquake-damaged areas. It threatened 700,000 people
with the possible rupture of lakes caused by earthquake landslides (Reliefweb, operations
update 27 May 2008). Combined with rocks and mudslides on the roads, the bad weather also
held up rescue, medical and other disaster relief teams, especially in remote and rural areas.
Disease control also proved challenging with a lack of staff and equipment for environmental
disinfection. (IFRC Operations update n° 5 22 May 2008)
1.1.3 Pakistan 2005 - Environmental complexity: no roads, no trucks...
Thus, the complexity of the environment hindered relief operations in Sichuan. This is often
the case during humanitarian relief efforts. A disaster that affects many small villages in high
mountains at the beginning of the winter season, like the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, is a real
challenge to respond to. No truck can navigate the long-distance footpaths of those high
mountains. In this specific case, finding adequate and available transportation for reaching
victims was not an easy task. The end-to-end supply chain is much, much longer and more
expensive to activate in such a difficult context.
In the case of the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, roads were blocked by landslides and bad weather,
and survivors had "as little as three weeks to get shelter before the Himalayan winter sets in
with heavy snows and freezing temperatures, closing roads and stranding remote villages"
(Qayum, 2005). The only means of transportation at the disposal of humanitarian workers
for delivering relief items to victims were... donkeys. To increase their delivery capacity,
humanitarian workers brought donkeys from lower regions to complement their "vehicle
fleet", but with limited results as the donkeys were subject to vertigo.
1.1.4 Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 - Human resources: many stakeholders, many
incentives, many difficulties
Many stakeholders with various incentives can be involved in operations. And the bigger the
disaster, the higher the number of NGOs that will have sufficient funding to participate in the
2International Non-Governmental Organization
3Non-Governmental Organization
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humanitarian response. . . and the more difficult coordination will be. The 2004 Indian Ocean
Tsunami is one example of the chaos that can happen when self-regulation does not take place.
Many factors, from the magnitude of the disaster to the presence of many Western tourists
“generated massive media attention which in turn prompted an inordinate public response
to donate money as people felt a moral obligation to help. There was also an unprecedented
wave of governments’ attention which was not necessarily free of a political agenda[. . . ] Due to
the lack of adequate regulation and the presence of too many players chaos ensued in Sumatra
after the tsunami” [Was06b]. Here again, the presence of a local authority able and willing to
act as central coordinator is one of the main elements which shapes relief operations.
1.2 Yogyakarta earthquake 2006
The previous paragraphs briefly describe the main specificities of the biggest earthquakes in
recent years, and their impacts on relief operations. We will now provide a deeper analysis of
one of them: the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake. This specific disaster was chosen as it was the
first operation conducted by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies (IFRC) with its newly decentralised supply chain. It was also sufficiently "small"
to allow a case study analysis and it happened less than a year before the beginning of our
research work, which gave a perfect time-frame for conducting interviews.The situation was
stable enough to allow humanitarian workers to spare some time for interviews, but not too
old, so it remained clear and fresh in their memories.
1.2.1 Methodology: Case Study Research
To better understand humanitarian supply chains, we designed and conducted case study
research. Indeed, “the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and
meaningful characteristics of real life events – such as individual life cycles, organisational
and managerial processes, neighbourhood change, international relations and the maturation
of industries” [Yin02]. Data was collected through documents, archival records and interviews
of practitioners working in various regions (Europe, the Middle-East or Africa) and at different
organisational levels (headquarters, regional logistics centers or in the field).
1.2.2 Designing the case study
On November 1st, 2006, the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) received the
prestigious European Supply Chain Excellence Award, joining the ranks of past years’ winners
such as Coca-Cola, Johnson & Johnson, Glaxo SmithKline and Marks & Spencer. In acknowl-
edgement of their success in decentralising their entire supply chain, the IFRC was recognised
both as overall winner and best-in-class for the public & non-profit sector category. As they
announced the results of their deliberation, the panel judges delivered high praise for the
IFRC’s performance:
“For scale, responsiveness and performance, (the IFRC) are outstanding: all the more so when
you realize that they exist to operate in precisely the places where normal supply chains have
broken down; that they have only moral rather than legal charges over their sources of supply
and funding; and that despite being a global brand with relatively little direct control over its
local operations, it has successfully transformed its supply chain to meet even better the
demands that the world places on it.”
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Figure 1.1: IFRC new supply chain, from [Cuc07]
RLU = Regional Logistic Unit.
NS = National Society. The local national society is acting on the disaster site, but other national societies may give a hand and
act as donor (relief items, funds or human resources)
Because they had already understood the importance of logistics in relief operations, because
they had already reflected on their organisation and developed a clear logistics strategy, and
because they agreed to share their knowledge, thoughts and questions, we targeted them for
this case study research. At that time, the most recent major relief operation was the response
to the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake, the deadliest earthquake in 2006, which we therefore chose
to illustrate how a humanitarian supply chain is set up. The following sections detail our
findings. The case study is further detailed in [CGW10] and analysed in [GWC10].
1.2.3 Yogyakarta : first operation with IFRC’s decentralized supply chain
In November 2005, the IFRC4’s logistics department, under the direction of Bernard Chomilier
and then his successor Birgitte Stalder-Olsen, had decided to decentralize the agency’s opera-
tional capacity by creating three Regional Logistics Units (RLU) in Kuala Lumpur (KL), Panama
and Dubai. In the event of a disaster, National Societies (NSs)5 would be able to call on their
area’s RLU for help (see figure 1.1). The RLU6 would then provide assistance in managing the
supply chain of relief items through rationalized mobilization and procurement of resources,
inventory management, warehousing and fleet support.
In the early hours of May 27th, 2006, the newly established RLU in Kuala Lumpur received
its first call to arms as an earthquake hit the Indonesian island of Java with a magnitude of
6.3 on the Richter scale. The province of Yogyakarta bore the brunt of the disaster, suffering
4International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
5National Societies. For information, NSsare local NGOs, like the French Red Cross. Present in 186 countries,
NSs comprise most of the more than 97 million Red Cross workers, the world’s biggest volunteer force.
6Regional Logistics Units
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18/06/2006 - 26/06/2006
Figure 1.2: Sequence of operations during IFRC’s response to Yogyakarta earthquake
6,000 deaths and injuring 36,000 people, while leaving 600,000 homeless and reducing most
buildings to rubble. “Yogyakarta’s hospitals are already overstretched,” Palang Merah Indonesia
(PMI, the Indonesian Red Cross) reported. “The electricity and telephone lines have been
cut. All of the gas stations are closed, the roads are damaged and two bridges were almost
displaced from their concrete bases. Yogyakarta International Airport is out of operation and
flights must be redirected either to the Solo airport near Surakarta (60km NE) or to Semarang
(120km N).”
A Hectic Four Days
Created in 1863, PMI7 had a long history of disaster response. The most recent example of this
only dated back to the previous month when Mont Merapi, a volcano 70km from Yogyakarta,
had erupted. Expecting a larger explosion, PMI had prepositioned stock to respond to the
disaster. Leftover stock could then be distributed immediately following the earthquake,
providing 1,000 families with essential goods for their survival. Further goods, leftover from
the tsunamis which had hit the country in 2004 and 2005, as well as two logisticians, were also
deployed from the city of Medan at the onset of the earthquake. “We had already made the
invitations to tender for similar equipment for the Tsunami Operation,” explained Isabelle
Séchaud, an IFRC field logistics officer. “We just extended the contract rather than repeat an
invitation to tender, which would have taken much more time.”[Sec07]
Very rapidly, news of the earthquake spread. The IFRC sent two logistics delegates to assist
PMI, until the arrival of a full logistics Emergency Relief Unit (ERU). PMI and the two logistics
delegates found themselves struggling to organize the reception of in-kind donations from all
over the world. Although they were in need of many items, such as survival kits, unsolicited
7Palang Merah Indonesia (PMI, the Indonesian Red Cross)
9
Humanitarian Supply Chains — Context, Particularities and Research Statements
donations from other IFRC National Societies as well as from bilateral donors created too
much pressure on the local chapter.
In addition to this, while the military raced to complete repairs on the nearest airport, all
goods had to be redirected to the Solo airport, 60km away. But when Yogyakarta International
Airport reopened, as they got off the plane the ERU8 had to juggle its already overstretched
team to cover both sites. “By the end of the first day, it was already apparent that there were
insufficient resources to cover two airports effectively” explained ERU leader Justin Cuckow.
He even had to call the IFRC’s Geneva headquarters in panic at 2 o’clock in the morning,asking
for additional resources. Later on, an advisory had been sent out to stop use of Solo airport
and they had managed to get the situation under control. “Several flights that had already
been contracted landed at Solo airport, however, which stretched the team significantly,”
Justin added. “Two pipelines, through the Geneva office and at the local level, plus unsolicited
donations, made the initial understanding difficult,” he concluded.
At this stage, the RLU9 in Kuala Lumpur, which should have reconciled these two pipelines,
was not yet fully operational. They had no central warehouse and no available stock, and were
still training their staff while attempting to provide support to PMI. The regional purchasing
system which the RLU was to manage was not fully in place yet; they had as yet established
no regional framework agreements for procurement apart from the previously existing global
ones created by Geneva and the procurement approval process was still managed entirely
there.
However, as the scale of the required disaster response remained relatively small, PMI together
with the ERU, Geneva Head Quarters and the RLU in Kuala Lumpur were able to get the opera-
tions under control within four days. Within the week following the disaster, the availability of
stock, presence of technical staff and the use of sophisticated Humanitarian Logistics Software
(HLS) were a clear demonstration of their achievements, which were probably on a par with
what would have been expected had the RLU been fully operational from the outset. (see
fig 1.2 on the preceding page)
Stabilizing the Supply Chain: the Next Ten Days
By June 2nd, the Kuala Lumpur RLU was in a better position to provide support to the local
operations as the situation in the field stabilized. The RLU progressively took the lead in
coordinating the logistics aspect of the relationship with donors, which had previously been
shared between Geneva headquarters and the local level. Because the RLU was close to the
field of operations and could communicate more easily with donors in the same time zone,
they were able to limit the number of unsolicited donations by orienting donors as to which
needs were still unmet.
Furthermore, the RLU was put in charge of centralizing information about the relief items
before they arrived in Yogyakarta. Before, this task was under the direction of the IFRC’s
logistics department in Geneva. Because they were so far away from the disaster area and
had limited resources dedicated to this, Justin said, “paperwork was unsurprisingly weak.
Before the ERU’s arrival, PMI delivery notes were used. They were incomplete and tracking
this documentation proved very difficult”. As the RLU took over this function and replaced
the delivery notes with IFRC airway bills, documentation and tracking improved considerably.
8Emergency Relief Unit, pre-trained teams of experts in specific domains, such as Logistics, Water and Sanitation,
IT and Communication...
9Regional Logistics Units
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They also merged the two pipelines going through Geneva and the local level, which provided
better visibility on arrivals and enabled better planning in function of the availability of goods.
While PMI10’s warehouse was used for storage throughout the first week of operations, it
was too small and the team was constantly worried that it would collapse after having been
damaged in the earthquake. After June 2nd, the ERU acquired 1,600m2 of warehousing
and progressively took over PMI’s inventory. The smaller warehouse was emptied of all but
unsolicited donations while medical supplies were stored in a third dedicated warehouse.
Having a central warehouse from which they could send relief items directly to distribution
sites improved clarity and also allowed the RLU11 to harmonize tracking and documentation.
Although the benefits of the new approach became clear after each entity appointed a contact
person to liaise with the others, it was not initially well received, in particular by PMI. The
support role of the RLU was not clear to them, and at first PMI perceived that the RLU had
appropriated its prerogatives and mandate. However as time went on, Justin said, staff in
the field “recognized a coordinated strategy and the clear management structure in place,
as well as excellent cooperation from PMI despite some gaps in staffing”. Coordination was
eventually perfected, as “all sectoral coordinators were included in the development of the
appeal to donors and suitable priority from the outset was given to early recovery,” Justin
concluded. From Geneva’s point of view, the RLU was a success as well, but with a slight
damper: the information flows and decision-making process sometimes bypassed them. “In
Kuala Lumpur, some people reported to the Pan American Disaster Relief Unit (PADRU) team
leader in Panama (which had already been responding to regional disasters before the RLU
system was in place), but not to Birgitte” [Sec07]
1.3 Guiding thread 2 - Lessons learnt from past operations
1.3.1 Lessons learnt from Yogyakarta
Faster, better, cheaper
Although the Yogyakarta earthquake was very different from the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004
or the Pakistan earthquake in 2005, a comparison between the IFRC’s performance following
the three disasters clearly demonstrates the benefits of the decentralized supply chain through
the Kuala Lumpur RLU. It is clear that having local operational capacity such as stock, human
resources and infrastructure in place prior to the crisis was invaluable, as was the presence of
a local coordinator to manage the pipeline of relief items. This may not always work, however.
A look at the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, for example, shows that local capacity in terms of
relief items and human resources was in place before the disaster. Yet these resources were
located so close to the disaster site that they were destroyed during the tremor. Having local
warehouses is also far from sufficient. The items stored must match the needs. In Haiti, for
example, shelters and hospitals were set up quickly to look after the victims. As these structures
are needed in almost every disaster response, a great deal of work has been done to improve
their deployment. MSF (Doctors Without Borders) has even developed inflatable hospitals to
facilitate their transport and installation [Wor10]. Yet in Haiti, there were practically no means
of action, such as mechanical diggers or shovels to extract people remaining under the rubble.
10local National Society
11Regional Logistics Unit
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Table 1 – Service 
Indonesia Tsunami 
100,000 families  
Pakistan EQ 
95,000 families 
Yogyakarta EQ 
65,000 families 
Families receiving partial package by 2 months 28,021 29,229 53,112 
Families receiving full package by 2 months 0 0 42,911 
Average number of families served per day 445 555 613 
% goods delivered from the region 13% 68% 100% 
 
Table 2 – Speed Indonesia Tsunami Pakistan EQ Yogyakarta EQ 
Days to activate end to end supply chain  18 10 3 
Order lead time (requisition to delivery) in days  30 23 16 
% of appeal items mobilized & delivered at 2 months 55% 38% 74% 
Average distance of relief items (km)  to families 11,805 2,962 1,617 
 
Table 3 - Cost  Indonesia Tsunami Pakistan EQ Yogyakarta EQ 
Operations total costs at 8 months  Not available 55,944,027 10,505,962 
% logistics cost (items + transport + storage value)  - 86% 87% 
Cost to deliver relief package per family at 2 months  - 824 142 
Cost to deliver relief package per family at 8 months - 450 142 
 
Figure 1.3: Comparison of the responses to Yogyakarta, Pakistan and Indian Ocean earth-
quakes, from [Cuc07]
Coming back to Yogyakarta, the decentralized supply chain did result in faster service. Ac-
cording to a study made by an external consultant [Cuc07], the end-to-end supply chain was
activated three times faster than in the Pakistan operations and almost six times faster than
for the tsunami response.
The decentralized supply chain also resulted in better service. In the tsunami operations or
the Pakistan earthquake, after two months the IFRC had only managed to provide partial
relief packages to approximately 30% of the families affected. In the Yogyakarta earthquake
operations, however, after two months the IFRC had provided at least partial packages to 80%
of affected families. In addition to this, all the goods provided were delivered from the region,
whereas in the Indian Ocean tsunami this was only the case for 13% of relief items and 68% of
those in Pakistan.
The cost of the Yogyakarta operations was also substantially lower. The IFRC declared that
“if we had used the Pakistan supply chain setup to respond to the Yogyakarta earthquake, it
would have cost around 18 million CHF (a little over €12million) rather than 9 million CHF (a
little over €6million) – or we would have been able to assist less than half the families than was
actually achieved”.(See figure 1.3)
Room for Improvement
Although this was good news for the IFRC, they were well aware that there was still room for
improvement within the new supply chain.
Regarding knowledge management, for example, the development of the Humanitarian Lo-
gistics Software (HLS) and the Disaster Management and Information System (DMIS) clearly
improved timeliness and visibility of relief operations. Indeed, until these became operational,
12
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“each operation was managed with a separate database and record keeping. The Humanitarian
Logistics Software had therefore proved its worth in Yogyakarta by tracking relief items as
they went through the pipeline. Yet, its use could be optimized in future disaster responses:
“consolidation is needed, but this is really difficult,” Isabelle confirmed. For example, she
further illustrated, items used in the Indian Ocean tsunami had a specific tracking number,
but when they were redeployed to Yogyakarta the HLS12 system gave them a new one [Sec07].
As to redeploying items from one disaster to another, the IFRC13 also found that they had
developed no clear stock replenishment strategy. Justin pointed out that when items from the
Indian Ocean tsunami stocks were sent to Yogyakarta, there was no agreement on whether
these items should be replaced or not, and if so, at what point and how.
Finally, the RLU’s tracking system no longer traced the items once they had gone from the
RLU14 warehouse and had been turned over to PMI15 and the ERU16 for distribution.
Although the decentralized supply chain was clearly a success, it was not always clear how
to tackle these remaining issues, nor what the implications might be. The wide range of
responsibilities delegated to the Logistics Department had completely transformed the IFRC’s
hierarchy and reporting system. Local staff were now left to face important questions such
as “who are our stakeholders and how do we report to them? Who’s doing what and how do
we link?” While the relationship between National Societies and the RLUs was by now well
defined, the National Societies lacked a macro vision of the organisation’s structure. Clearly,
there was a need for the IFRC to work on updated job descriptions.
At the same time, the RLUs empowered the local level, which could potentially pose a threat
in terms of standardization and coordination: “The difficulty lies in avoiding ending up with
three small federations,” said Birgitte. “As things stand at the moment, Geneva has to be
available nearly 24h/24h in order to keep a handle on the situation” [Ols07]
Communications were also a problem, as “they are not read and understood correctly because
they are not tailor-made,” Birgitte explained. “The RLUs are establishing a monthly report,
but it is only the beginning, they are currently working on it. Geneva also insists regularly
on the importance of communication and timely exchange of information, and multiplies
workshops on this theme.” Given these issues, and despite the positive effects of the RLUs,
to what extent did the IFRC want to increase their role and importance? While in 2006 the
RLUs were authorized to make purchases up to 200,000CHF (€135,000), the goal by 2007 was to
double that figure in order to allow better coordination with suppliers. The range of products
managed exclusively through Geneva, such as health products, was also to be further limited.
And in a second step, the IFRC was considering whether more RLUs would be needed in the
long run.
A lot of work still remained for the IFRC if they wanted to garner the full benefit from their new
decentralized supply chain. However, after the success of the Yogyakarta response and even
before the IFRC received the European Supply Chain Excellence Award, it was evident to all
that they had already taken a giant step forward.
12Humanitarian Logistics Software
13International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
14Regional Logistics Unit
15local National Society
16Emergency Response Unit
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1.4 Latest changes in disaster management
1.4.1 Evolution of disaster management at IFRC
The IFRC had first started to seriously reconsider its traditional supply chain processes in
November 1998, when Hurricane Mitch hit Honduras, making it the second deadliest Atlantic
hurricane in history. In responding to this crisis, the IFRC took two weeks to start coordinating
relief contributions from its National Societies and other donors. As a result, basic supplies
were distributed weeks after the hurricane struck and long after other humanitarian organi-
sations had started distributing their own relief items. This event proved to be a catalyst for
change within the IFRC, creating both external and internal pressure for the organisation to
rethink its supply chain processes. How could they improve the timeliness and relevance of
reporting from the field, despite time pressure and a lack of communications infrastructure?
Recognizing the vital importance of logistics
To respond to these issues, in 2002 the IFRC decided to restructure their vertical divisions,
give the logistics function a more important place within the organisation, and build its
preparedness activities. An IFRC team restructured the Federation into six divisions rather
than four. The six new divisions were: Programme Coordination, Disaster Management and
Coordination, Knowledge Sharing, Monitoring and Evaluation, Advocacy and Communication.
Within each division, a clear distinction was drawn between disaster preparedness and disaster
response.
Throughout the organisation, a more important emphasis was placed both on preparedness
and on logistics. The IFRC decided to build its preparedness activities around five pillars:
Human Resources, Knowledge Management, Operations and Process management, Financial
Resources and the Community. This in turn led it to develop a number of standardized tools
and processes which could be deployed rapidly in the event of a disaster, such as special
guidelines for acceptance of in-kind donations or frame agreements with international and
local suppliers on key relief items.
This was also when the IFRC created a Logistics and Resource Mobilization Department
(LRMD), which was an important first step in recognizing the role played by logistics and
supply chain management in the humanitarian sector, and in disaster relief operations in
particular.
An important second step consists in redesigning the supply chain. In IFRC’s case, the focus has
been made on the decentralization of operational capacity. The following sections illustrate
the drivers of the IFRC. The third part of this thesis, dedicated to the design of supply chain
under humanitarians’ specific conditions will provide a deeper analysis on the motivations to
pre-position resources on a local level.
External push for change
The IFRC’s traditional donors, be they governments, individuals or institutions, look to it for
transparency, effectiveness and efficiency. In the event of a disaster, large numbers of people
must be reached as fast as possible; according to humanitarian standards local communities
are estimated to be self-reliant only for 48 h, after which humanitarian organisations must be
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operational on the ground [TW09]. In fact, they must be operational as soon as beneficiaries’
needs arise, given the urgent, even life-threatening nature of these needs. Given their limited
resources, humanitarian organisations which depend on donations must provide cost effective
interventions as well as rapid ones. Finally, they must provide a high quality of intervention,
accessing the maximum number of beneficiaries while responding to as many of their needs as
possible. Clearly, the IFRC’s operations in Honduras had not lived up to this responsibility. Bad
press coverage of the IFRC’s intervention during one disaster could have negative repercussions
on donations for future operations. In particular, the IFRC was under pressure to demonstrate
good performance in comparison to other humanitarian organisations. Failing this, donors
could decide to provide disaster relief assistance through other humanitarian organisations
rather than supporting the IFRC. National governments might even decide to bypass the
non-profit sector and decide to funnel aid on a bilateral basis directly to the governments of
affected countries. Concerned by its poor performance, it was at this point that the IFRC had
decided to take a closer look at its humanitarian supply chain.
Internal push for change
The pressure for the IFRC to reform following Hurricane Mitch was reinforced internally as
well as externally, ensuring that the process would not lose its momentum. If donors were
dissatisfied with the IFRC’s response to the hurricane, the National Societies were even more
so, and expressed their disappointment by sending no fewer than 22 reports to the IFRC on
its performance in Honduras. In the event of a natural or man-made disaster in their home
country, NSs17 need to be able to call on the IFRC to assist them in their operations through a
range of support mechanisms. In particular, the IFRC is supposed to help NSs to coordinate
the supply chain for donations of relief items from other NSs and donors worldwide. The
NSs argued, however, that in the Hurricane Mitch operations the whole range of support
instruments that the Federation was supposed to provide had failed them. Support teams,
technical staff and relief delegates had been deployed too late, no supplies had been pre-
positioned and it had taken weeks before the IFRC was in a position to coordinate appeals for
goods or incoming donations. As a Federation of 186 National Societies, the IFRC is far from a
commercial ‘command and control’ supply chain model. Each NS has its own priorities and
all are autonomous and responsible to their own national stakeholders. When the Honduras
operations demonstrated the inadequacy of the IFRC’s supply chain, NSs pressured the Feder-
ation to reduce the concentration of power within the Geneva headquarters and restructure
the supply chain closer to the individual countries and regions by building more capacity at
the local level. This internal push for change met with a positive reaction and full support
from Didier Cherpitel, the IFRC’s Secretary General from 1999 to 2003, and later on from his
successor Markku Niskala.
Launching the New and Improved Decentralized Supply Chain
The IFRC made a big step toward improvement in 1999 when they decided to create the Pan
American Disaster Response Unit (PADRU) to pilot the idea of developing a decentralized
operational capacity for disaster preparedness and response. By 2001, PADRU was engaged
in assisting National Societies throughout Latin America and the Caribbean in responding to
floods, earthquakes and hurricanes. Its role was to “provide support to National Societies in
17National Societies
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coordination with the regional delegations through coordination, personnel, logistical support
and leadership, as appropriate”. This proved at times to be a delicate task. Convincing a
National Society to sign off on pre-determined agreements was not a straightforward job for
PADRU staff. “We always have to remember that NSs are independent organisations. They
may or may not follow our advice,” an operation manager pointed out.
The idea of decentralizing the IFRC’s operational capacity through multiple Regional Logistics
Units modeled on PADRU18 was already being circulated within the organisation by 2003.
On the one hand, the idea was risky as it implied great changes and a number of challenges
could be foreseen. The pool of IFRC knowledge on supply chain management was in Geneva.
Standardization was already difficult, so what would happen with a decentralized system?
Furthermore, the relationship with stakeholders was built in Geneva. Delocalizing them might
endanger these partnerships. On the other hand, the initial experience with PADRU had had
demonstrable results. Implementing a decentralized supply chain could be an opportunity to
“combine the knowledge and professional strengths of Geneva with local understanding of the
field”. Weighing the pros and the cons, the IFRC decided take up the challenge.
The 2005 Logistics Conference in Dubai served as a launching platform for the IFRC’s decentral-
ized supply chain plan. There, the IFRC logistics department committed to a program of work
centered around two main goals, “to improve customer services by getting nearer to the field”
and “ to try to reduce the fact that National Societies still enter the supply chain as parallel
systems” [Ols07]. Concretely, Birgitte’s team was to set up three Regional Logistics Units as
well as a set of tools and processes to enable better coordination and a quicker response, at a
cheaper price.
Once this process was set up, the logistics department would then assume responsibility for the
overall strategy, management and funding for all global logistics activities. Some specialized
areas would however remain under the control of central management in Geneva.
As for the 3 RLUs, they would be tasked with delivering mobilization, procurement, stock,
warehousing and fleet services within their respective geographical region. The goal was that
each RLU should be able to feed 5,000 families within 48h and a further 15,000 families within
14 days. Together, these RLUs should have the capacity to respond to the needs of 34,000
families in the event of a disaster.
Lessons learned
This 10-year retrospective of the changes in disaster management within the IFRC illustrates
the validity of supply chain principles within the context of humanitarian operations. De-
centralization, pre-positioning and pooling of relief items, for example, resulted in dramatic
improvements in the IFRC’s performance in disaster operations, in particular during the
Yogyakarta earthquake in 2006. However this case study also demonstrates the difficulty of
implementing an improved supply chain design within humanitarian organisations, given
conditions of uncertain command and control, multiple decision centers within a federative
context of 186 independent members, and precarious funding. The change process must be
supported by standardized items and processes, traceability through adapted information
systems, and the right set of skills among staff.
The evolution of the IFRC’s supply chain provides some valuable insights as to how global
supply chain excellence can be attained within the complex and uncertain context of hu-
manitarian organisations through an application of fundamental supply chain principles.
18the Pan American Disaster Response Unit
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However, there are undoubtedly both organisational and operational limitations to this type
of application, which further research could explore.
On the one hand, it is not clear whether the supply chain restructuring process around a de-
centralized model would be appropriate in all organisational contexts within the humanitarian
sector. The IFRC is somewhat unique insofar as it is a very large organisation which operates
on a global scale through a very specific federative arrangement grouping independent NSs.
Not all humanitarian organisations would have the resources to either justify or implement
a decentralized supply chain. This specific problem will be explored in the third part of this
thesis.
On the other hand, whereas a great improvement in terms of effectiveness and responsiveness
was clear in the specific context of Yogyakarta, the various factors involved in this achievement
are not all explicit. What is the exact role of the decentralization of the supply chain is this
success ? What are the methods, the processes that have reinforced IFRC’s ability to respond
quickly and adequately to disasters ? This will be studied in the second part of this thesis.
1.4.2 Humanitarian Reform in 2005
Figure 1.4: Humanitarian Reform
Social Innovation Centre6
The context of humanitarian aid has strongly evolved
over the past ten years. The change is obvious in
the IFRC, as we have seen in the previous sections.
Other humanitarian stakeholders have also consid-
erably changed the way they work during and be-
tween disasters. The following sections provide an
overview of recent changes in disaster management
that have been implemented by other major human-
itarian stakeholders, such as UN agencies.
In 2005, The United Nations Emergency Relief Coor-
dinator, Jan Egeland, asked four independent consul-
tants to identify the factors that have hindered the
speed and effectiveness of humanitarian responses in the past and to propose appropriate
steps to improve the timeliness and impact of future humanitarian interventions [UNO05a].
Their main findings are summarised in table 1.4. This lead to the 2005 Humanitarian Reform.
Its aims are as follows:
• Strengthening of response capacity: the Cluster Approach
The response is organised by sector or area of activity, each one having its cluster leads
well-identified on a global level. At the beginning, eleven sectors were defined, such as
Camp Coordination and Logistics, as well as Agriculture, Education and Early Recovery.
For each emergency, different local clusters leads are chosen.
• Better humanitarian financing: the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)
The first part is a cash-flow mechanism. US $50 million are available in total, loaned
to provide quick access to funds instead of waiting for donor pledges to be transferred.
This amount must be reimbursed within 6 months. The second part is a stand-by fund,
up to $450 million, granted for rapid response and under-funded emergencies. CERF is
intended to complement, not substitute, existing funding mechanisms. It cannot fund
preparedness, mitigation or prevention activities. It also funds mainly UN Agencies.
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• Strengthening of the humanitarian coordination system : Resident Coordinators (RCs)
and Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs)
The aim of this system is the creation of a pool of human resources equipped with
the right skills and experience and the development of a Score Card. It is still under
development.
Table 1.4: Weaknesses and threats underlined by the Humanitarian Response Review before
implementation of the 2005 Humanitarian Reform ([UNO05a] and [UNO05b])
Weaknesses Threats
Well-known, long-standing gaps in the response Proliferation of humanitarian actors
Insufficient accountability (particularly for the
response to IDPs19)
The changing role of the UN (more
“outsourcing” to NGOs)
Inconsistent donor policies The competitive funding environment
Limited linkages between UN and non-UN
actors
Increased public scrutiny of humanitarian
action
Erratic coordination, dependence on
personalities
Most of the UN community agree that the reform’s implementation constitutes an improve-
ment, but many others consider many challenges to be remaining. The competitive funding
environment, focussed on the response phase instead of on long-term, more sustainable
improvements, remains a major issue [JH08]. The use of local NGOs and cluster partners is
also far from systematic [UNO05b] and therefore remains a challenge. Change management is
never easy, and in this case, many NGOs, whether local or international, felt disregarded or
decided to bypass this new organisation proposed by the United Nations (see table 3). And
those who accepted this reform still lack a rationalised coordination structure. Clusters were
hampered by many problems. Meetings lacked full attendance, and operational and field staff
were located at hub clusters, while decision-makers, such as the heads of agencies, were in
Islamabad, a problem compounded even further by communication problems between hubs
and clusters [Int06].
Best practices exist, but the management of this knowledge is still dependent on the presence
and training of local capacity. “In Union of Myanmar, a dedicated Information Manager
has been appointed and a web based information management system has been developed,
enabling agencies to search and access relevant information for the response, including
digitalized maps showing operational agencies by geographical area” [BL08]. Yet, many reports
for other emergencies pinpoint the “need for adequate IM20 tools and services to support the
approach” [UNO05b].
1.4.3 Other initiatives to improve management of relief operations
In the field
The diversity of stakeholders and the variability of their presence and strength from one
disaster to another makes it extremely difficult to generalise best practices in terms of disaster
19Internally Displaced People. Those who had to move within their own country to find safety and refuge.
20’Information Management
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Table 1.5: Fieldworkers’ feedback after implementation of Humanitarian Reform ([UNO05b];
[Int06]; [THW08])
PROs Neutral CONs
“At this stage we don’t have
a better way to do things”
Nicholas Palanque,
country director for CARE
International in Chad
“Personally, I still don’t really
know what the practical
difference is between the new
cluster system and the former
system” Jef Imans, head of the
International Rescue
Committee (IRC) in Chad
“The clusters are nothing more
than a way for the UN to control us”
one aid worker at Action Against
Hunger (AAH) in Chad
“I don’t think anyone can
deny that cooperation
between technical
coordinators has
improved” Nicholas
Palanque, country director
for CARE International in
Chad
“It is certainly not a bottom-up
driven process” Christophe
Droeven, head of Catholic
Relief Services (CRS) in Chad
“It’s a lot of work and energy. In the
end you have to make the decision,
is it better to attend the meeting or
actually do our jobs?” Thomas
Merkelbach, head of the
International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) in Chad
response. Fortunately, if we consider only humanitarian organisations offering the same
range of products and services and having a shared initial intent, many initiatives have been
developed to improve the management of relief operations. They realise that "in a world of
scarce resources, although humanitarian action has no price, it obviously has a cost" [CP10],
and an improved management of this cost has an influence on the ability to send relief to a
varying number of operation sites.
Among possible savings, the best logistical coordination plays a significant part, for example in
trying to avoid useless equipment or food redundancies in one place when a few miles further,
both are sorely lacking [CP10]. Such successful collaboration networks on a local level often
include local partners. Because they know the local customs and networks, and because they
are highly knowledgeable about the local environment, locals are in a position to complement
international staff. These implementing partners can be local NGOs or local companies with
an existing network and trained resources.
During the 2006 Lebanon conflict, Agility, a logistics company, was a major stakeholder. "We
had decided that we were going to provide in-kind services in the form of transportation
and warehousing, and also offer the expertise of some experienced operational managers to
humanitarian organisations, since we knew that the logistics landscape of Syria and Lebanon
would be unfamiliar to many humanitarian actors" [THW08]. In such environments, local
knowledge is essential. "The minute something happens, you see, you listen. . . you are used
to working with difficult, uncertain and constantly changing conditions" [THW08]. With a
turnover of 80% per year, international NGOs have limited trained resources. Local imple-
menting partners are therefore often very useful. Yet their presence and strength vary from
one disaster to another. The collaboration networks vary accordingly, which will be further
analysed in section 2.8 on page 27.
In addition to these improvements in terms of organisation and collaboration, more and more
tracking and measurement systems are being used. The Humanitarian Logistics Software used
by the IFRC is one example of the major improvements made recently with the introduction of
standardised tools and procedures. As we illustrated with the Yogyakarta Case Study, having
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such systems in place helps significantly in terms of velocity and visibility.
At a global level
More and more stand-alone initiatives are giving birth to global collaboration networks aimed
at improving the management of disasters. The Global Humanitarian Platform, for example,
was created in 2006 to strengthen partnerships among humanitarian actors. The Red Cross
and the Red Crescent movement, NGOs and UN agencies, are thus meeting once a year to
increase their transparency and complementarities. We can also add more dedicated group
meetings, like the Inter-Agency Procurement Group or the Fleet Forum. These meetings
assemble practitioners to share best practices and align their efforts on key improvement
areas, such as procurement or fleet management. Here again, academics working on those
specific subjects could be helpful. Increasing numbers of partnerships between humanitarian
organisations and private companies are also being developed. Many case studies illustrate
such successful approaches (See [THW08]; [TW05a] [Was06a] and [TW09] among others).
Such collaboration networks are usually formed when stakeholders realise they have much to
learn from each other. This illustrates the fact that donations to humanitarian organisations
can take many forms. It can be financial support or in-kind donations, or even knowledge
transfers. The latter kind of partnership often benefits both sides. TNT21’s involvement with
WFP22 is one example of logistics management (see figure1.5). Roche giving license to use its
licensed process to produce tamiflu23 is another. See [UNO05b] for detailed examples of such
partnerships.
Figure 1.5: TNT / WFP - Moving the World
One example of a successful partnership be-
tween a UN agency and a private company
More recently, partnerships have begun to in-
clude other actors, such as governmental agen-
cies like the Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales
(CNES) and also academic partners. One of
these public-private partnerships is Huma-Nav.
It aims to develop a dedicated service for hu-
manitarian fleet management, allowing part-
ners to share information on mutual experi-
ences and existing initiatives [Was06a]. These
are a few chosen examples of collaboration net-
works involving humanitarian organisations.
Many others exist, including other actors such
as donors or suppliers. “Such partnerships are
interesting, challenging and rewarding. . . but
really difficult sometimes. It is essential to
choose the right partners and find the optimal number of actors” [Wor10].
Reports on lessons learnt or on performance measurement are also becoming more frequent
and illustrate the movement of organisations toward better transparency and accountability,
as well as their achievements in terms of effectiveness. Organisations have also started many
initiatives to better understand and predict humanitarian demand, and in addition to this,
they are sharing their findings with one another. They are also reflecting on the design of their
distribution systems.
21TNT is a Dutch company, working in the business of transferring goods and documents around the world.
22World Food Program
23the most frequently prescribed medicine for flu treatment and flu prevention
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Salient features of humanitarian supply
chains
Introduction - Many characteristics
Various approaches and definitions ([SK02]; [Men+01]; [AC04]) consider Supply Chain Man-
agement (SCM) to be coordinated systems for managing flows. [CE93], for example, define
SCM as “an integrative philosophy to manage the total flow of a distribution channel from the
supplier to the ultimate user”.
Simchi-levi specifies that SCM is “a set of approaches utilized to efficiently integrate suppliers,
warehouses, and stores, so that merchandise is produced and distributed at the right quantities,
to the right locations, and at the right time, in order to minimize system wide costs while
satisfying service level requirements” [SKS03].
If we exclude some unsuitable terms such as “customer” or “store”, the concept of SCM1
explains what humanitarian organisations, suppliers and donors should do to minimise the
impact of crises. This concept, applied to disaster relief, is called the Humanitarian Supply
Chain (HSC).
According to Van Wassenhove, HSCs2 are about 15 years behind their private sector counter-
parts, who long ago realised the importance of using efficient supply chains [Was06b]. He
also explains that humanitarian logisticians have been struggling for recognition and that
humanitarian organisations are just beginning to become conscious of the fact that logis-
tics are crucial. Indeed, although the effectiveness of the supply chain is a critical factor
in the performance of humanitarian relief organisations, this sector has been slow to make
much-needed investments in logistics [ins05].
While the humanitarian world has now become aware of logistics, work in the context of
natural or man-made disasters is very different from logistics in the business context. Several
authors ([Nat91]; [Bea04]; [Ste06]; [KS07]; [Olo07]) have tried to identify the characteristics of
its particular context. We have retained seven different categories:
1Supply Chain Management
2Humanitarian Supply Chains
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1. The humanitarian operation life cycle and the dynamics of operations
2. The humanitarian space
3. The stakeholders
4. The categories of flows managed
5. The funding process
6. The dynamics
7. The uncertainties
2.1 The humanitarian operation life cycle
If we consider a project to be a temporary endeavour undertaken to achieve a particular
aim, then HSC3 operations can be deemed a project. In fact, humanitarian organisations
are responsible for producing relevant output and hence they must be constantly aware of
the project goal (minimising the impact of a crisis), project purpose, and of course, inter-
nal measures for project management efficiency. Concretely, there are two kinds of project
environments for implementing humanitarian logistics operations (see Chapter 1 on page 3):
• Slow-onset disasters:
In this case, the focus is on capacity building, using national staff, cost savings, low
budgets, planning and scheduling, and long time frames.
• Sudden-onset disasters:
In this case, the focus is on providing medical assistance, providing food and non-
food items, launching appeals, globally assessing needs, using international staff, high
budgets and very short time frames.
Several months 1 to 5 days 3 months to 1 year Some weeks
To design the HSC
To manage the HSC
time
Phase 0:
Preparedness
Phase 1:
Immediate 
Response
Phase 2:
Support
Phase 3:
Dismantling
Disaster / Crisis...
Several months 2 to 6 months 1 year to several years Some months
Sudden 
Onset
Slow 
Onset
 
Figure 2.1: Disaster management phases / Humanitarian Operation Life Cycle, from [Tho02]
3Humanitarian Supply Chain
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The Figure 2.1 distinguishes the four different phases that describe the life cycle of a humani-
tarian operation (inspired from ([PB05];[Tho02]): Preparedness, Immediate Response (Ramp
up), Support (Maturity) and Dismantling (Ramp down). The duration of operations varies
according to the function of the project characteristics (sudden- or slow-onset). Despite these
variations, the duration is much less important than in any comparable industrial project. (see
Figure 2.1)
2.2 Humanitarian space
Humanitarian organisations live by their principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.
In other words, they should help everyone in need wherever found; should not influence the
outcome of a conflict with their intervention; and should not favour one group of beneficiaries
over another. These principles define the ’space’, both physically and virtually, in which they
need to be able to operate to do their job effectively [TW09].
These principles add many constraints on humanitarian supply chains, especially when they
operate in politically volatile areas. In case of conflict, for example, the same amount of relief
items has to be distributed to each side, at the same time. The supply chain has to be carefully
designed to enable this simultaneous distribution.
2.3 Stakeholders
The humanitarian distribution channels go through many different stakeholders - called Strate-
gic Humanitarian Units (SHU) - starting from suppliers to beneficiaries (but not consumers or
users). These SHUs are made up of diverse groups of stakeholders: UN agencies such as the
World Food Programme (WFP), international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) such
as World Vision International, smaller non-governmental organisations (NGOs), implement-
ing partners such as local NGOS or private companies, the army, local or not, donors such as
private companies or governments, again, local or not, and, at the end, the beneficiaries.
D
Figure 2.2: Stakeholders and types
of relationship (from Larson, private
communication)
Figure 2.2 gives an overview of their various natures
and interactions.
All these SHUs have more or less of the following prop-
erties:
• Under-resourced, limited skills availability and
high employee turnover (80% annually accord-
ing to [TK05]), which limits institutional mem-
ory and efficiency
• Ineffective leverage of technology (non-robust
equipment, for example) and in particular, infor-
mation systems that are relatively basic. Many
relief logistics departments rely on manual sys-
tems without any Information Technology
• Command and Control lacking
• Several operations are done at the same time
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Donors
2nd Tier 
Suppliers
Common 
Humanitarian funds
1st Tier 
Suppliers
International NGOs
UN Agencies
Local NGOs, National 
Societies (Red Cross), 
Country coordinator (UN) 
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(government)
Beneficiaries
Physical and 
human flows
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Other Implementing Partners 
(private, military)
Information flows
Media flows
Figure 2.3: Overview of flows managed in an HSC, of major stakeholders and their position
within the supply chain
In addition, not all stakeholders have the same incen-
tives or the same way of operating. This will be further
analysed in the following chapters.
2.4 Categories of flows managed
The humanitarian distribution channels manage the traditional categories of flows, but these
present some specificities (see figure 2.3)
• Physical flows are material (food, items, etc.) and human (response teams, etc.)
• Informational flows (order transmission, tracking and coordination of physical flows)
are poorly structured and managed; less than one fourth of logisticians have access to a
proper tracking system [TK05].
• Financial flows are unilateral (from donors to beneficiaries).
Regarding information flows, the role played by the media is incredibly strong in humanitarian
supply chains. It directly impacts the size and the complexity of the relief operations. With
no media coverage, the number and commitment of donors, and therefore the number of
items transiting the supply chain, tends to shrink. On the other hand, over-exposure leads
to overreaction of donors, which creates imbalances between the amount of items sent and
the amount of resources available to manage them. It also often leads to a higher level of
unsolicited items, which get in the way of relief operations and hinder the actual delivery of
aid. In addition, after a disaster, local means of communication are often reduced, with scarce
Internet access for example.
2.5 Funding process
HSCs4 are financed by donors (governments, companies, private industries, etc.) through
a funding process. The funding process is a channel for donations from individual people,
private companies, governments or donor organisations to the beneficiaries through several
SHUs5.
4Humanitarian Supply Chains
5strategic humanitarian unit
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Figure 2.4: Media impact - the bigger the crisis, the wider the media coverage and the resulting
number of donations, which leads to a lack of funding for frequent small disasters
The donations can take various forms. They can be cash or in-kind donations. The latter can
be relief items for means of action, but can also be human resources or knowledge transfers.
Donations can be a long-term engagement, like Moving the World between TNT6 and WFP7
or membership dues, but they can also be sporadic and/or dedicated to a specific operation.
To respond to the Indian Ocean tsunami, for example, NGOs8 raised massive amounts funds
thanks to widespread media coverage and the involvement of telephone companies, for
example. In the latter case, donations could be made by sending an SMS to a specific number,
which is a clear and easy way to involve large numbers of donors.
Contrary to Commercial Supply Chains, financial flows for humanitarian actions are not di-
rectly proportional to or parallel with material flows. The amount, nature and use of donations
depend on donors’ good will, which is sometimes not well-aligned with real needs. For exam-
ple, donors usually focus on disaster response as it is more visual and attractive (see figure
2.4). Although necessary, this does not take into account humanitarian organisations’ need to
build in preparedness. Many practitioners estimate that one dollar invested in preparedness
is worth more than three dollars spent in response. Yet as the results are more difficult to
measure and the return on investment much longer, funding of preparedness activities is still
remarkably low. Another consequence of this funding process is the presence of numerous
underfunded emergencies that NGOs have difficulty responding to as they cannot always
choose the way they spend the resources they receive.
This is a well-known gap in disaster management that has received a lot of attention lately
from various SHUs. The funding of "forgotten" emergencies has been improved thanks to the
reform of the UN’s CERF9 for example (see previous chapter).
2.6 Dynamics
The dynamics of an HSC are very specific because they try to respond to certain vital needs.
These dynamics are exacerbated in the case of sudden-onset disaster, where needs arise
suddenly after the occurrence of the crisis. An HSC does not start with a customer expressing
6Dutch transportation company
7World Food Program
8Non-Governmental Organisations
9United Nation Common Emergency Response Fund
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needs and does not want to maximise profits. Under these conditions, is quite difficult to
apply best practices in terms of planning and scheduling. There is evidence of a frequent lack
of planning in relief supply chains, resulting in inefficiencies. These include the overuse of
expensive and unsafe air charters, failure to pre-plan stocks, congestion at ports caused by
unplanned deliveries, delivery of useless or unwanted items to disaster victims and a lack of
inter-organisational collaboration for information systems [Was06b]. Most of the time, an
SHU10 generally has to:
• Assess needs, urgent and vital, but also uncertain
• Coordinate supply, also urgent and uncertain
• Work under emergency conditions, consider unforeseeable events and work within
extremely short timelines
• Take into consideration the lack of transparency and the volatile climate in which
humanitarian organisations may have to operate
2.7 Uncertainty, complexity - Definitions and importance in our specific
context
This high level of uncertainty in terms of demand, supply and environment bring many con-
straints on managing the HSC. A fundamental characteristic of humanitarian supply chains
is the omnipresence of uncertainty. "In disaster emergency response situations important
attributes of the problem are uncertain (e.g. its nature, scale, time, etc.). The problem environ-
ment is changing rapidly and uncontrollably. There is very little time for making a decision
but information might not be available (or, even if available, might not be reliable)" [AG05].
As for other phases of disaster management, they also have their share of uncertainty. The fact
that humanitarian organisations are linked to their sources of supply and funding by moral
rather than legal agreements increases the risk of supply or funding rupture. As for demand,
though you may have an idea on the most vulnerable places, it is difficult, if not impossible,
to foresee where the next disaster is going to strike. You do not know which stakeholders you
will have to work with, either. [Gas94] also points that "public sector problems are generally
ill-defined, have high behavioral content, and are overlaid with strong political implications",
which increases complexity, and thus uncertainty.
From a more theoretical point of view, according to [DP06], uncertainty has two origins. "It
may arise from randomness (often referred to as "objective uncertainty") due to natural
variability of observations. Or it may be caused by imprecision (often referred to as "subjective
uncertainty") due to a lack of information" [BD05]. Regarding the latter category, to be more
accurate, we have to complement their definition of subjective uncertainty. Indeed, lack of
information is only one of the multiple sources of subjective uncertainty. According to Dubois
and Prade [DP06]; [Bel08], uncertainty comes from imperfect information, which can be
distinguished as:
• Uncertainty, which refers to the truth of information. It characterises its degree of
conformity with reality.
10strategic humanitarian unit
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• Imprecision, which concerns the information’s content and indicates its quantitative
defect of knowledge.
• Incompleteness, when information about some aspects of the problem is lacking.
• Ambiguity, when the information can be interpreted in different ways.
• Conflict, when many sources of information lead to contradictory and incompatible
interpretations.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, humanitarian supply chains are project-oriented. If
we refer to [LDP06], there are four sources of project uncertainty:
• Foreseeable uncertainties, which correspond to the above-mentioned uncertainties.
• Residual risk, or “what is left over after planning for foreseeable uncertainty” [LDP06]
• Complexities
– Detail, or combinatorial complexity, which arises when decision makers must
consider a large number of components or possible combinations in a system
before making a decision [Ste94].
– Dynamic complexity, which arises from the subtle and delayed cause-and-effect
interactions of system agents over time [Ste94].
• Unknown unknowns, “those that do not have a definite formulation, have no stopping
rule that allows one to determine when the problem is solved, where solutions cannot
be fully tested and the problem cannot be generalized, and where there is ambiguity
about problem causes” [LDP06].
Each of these sources is present in the humanitarian world. Every day, in many countries,
humanitarian workers face uncertainties, foreseeable or not, with regard to demand and
supply; they face the complexity of the environment due to the politically volatile climate,
the damage suffered by local infrastructure, the multiplicity of stakeholders having various
incentives, and so on. They also face unknown unknowns, where the situation is so confusing
that the issues are difficult to define.
2.8 Differences with the private sector
If you consider the usual definitions of a supply chain (see section 2 on page 21), you can see
that the notion of "customer" plays a significant role. Yet within humanitarian organisations,
there is actually no consensus about the acceptance and clear understanding of the notion of
customer. A customer, in a commercial supply chain, pays for the product or service he uses.
In the humanitarian world, the end user, or beneficiary, is a different entity than the buyer, or
donor.
Similar comments can be made upstream of the supply chain. Two kinds of suppliers may
be found, the ones that give products or money, or donors, and the ones that are paid by the
organisation to supply what is necessary.
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Another major difference lies in the shelf life of each supply chain. Relief chains are project-
oriented. They have a short shelf life and are set up under specific conditions, thus facing
more uncertainties. They therefore require a high agility level. The actors involved may vary
from one operation to another. Organisations, donors, suppliers, and of course end users, are
linked only episodically, which makes mutual understanding much more difficult to achieve.
As we have seen in this chapter, the categories of flows managed is one of the specificities
of humanitarian operations. A final comparative element is therefore the nature, size and
direction of the flows in each supply chain. There is no closed-loop supply chain, as victims
usually don’t complain or return the products they have received. Human and knowledge
flows are more important in HSCs11, as is the impact of the media. The financial flows are also
much more difficult to manage, as the amount of money received doesn’t always match the
amount of resources needed. (see section 2.5 on page 24)
All these elements make the notion of a supply chain slightly different from one sector to
another. Table 2.1 on the next page summarises these differences and their impacts.
2.9 Difficulties of the HSC - The problem of coordination
Lack of coordination has often been listed as a major weakness of humanitarian operations
[TW03]; [Ste05]); [Ken04] and [Mul02]). This issue has received a lot of attention lately in the
humanitarian field, such as the 2005 humanitarian reform and its major achievement, the
cluster approach. (see section 1.4.2)
This way of operating has shown its limits. According to humanitarian workers, “the coordina-
tion system that has generally been put in place tends to take a ‘silo’ approach to response, with
sectors/clusters looking at issues that then (should) feed into a broader coordination process.
Over the years, as a result, gaps have been identified in the approach – gender, HIV/AIDS, the
elderly, etc. – with guidelines and task forces created to try and fill those gaps. [. . . ] While each
of these gap areas rightly requires a response, the result is a more ‘congested’ coordination
field with a myriad of guidelines and task forces at the global level and numerous meetings at
the field level. This system makes it difficult to ensure that there is an adequate shared analysis
of the overall needs and vulnerabilities to be addressed by humanitarian actors” [VAI08]. Fur-
thermore, as humanitarian supply chains have a short shelf life, a volatile environment and a
wide diversity of stakeholders (see chapter 2 on page 21), coordination can take many forms.
Coordination is difficult to achieve and often listed as a major weakness of humanitarian
supply chains [KS07].[Wor10].
This section is aimed at a better understanding of the difficulties of managing HSCs.
To this end, we will first clarify what we call coordination in a humanitarian context. In-
deed, there is actually no consensus on a definition of coordination that would be applicable
to supply chains in general, much less in the specific context of relief operations. We will
then illustrate and highlight the fundamental barriers and enablers of coordination in relief
operations.
2.9.1 Horizontal coordination
At a local level, we call a collaboration network “the system-wide structure of inter-organisational
coordination during humanitarian operations” [MED03]. [Don96] has identified three cate-
11Humanitarian Supply Chains
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Table 2.1: Main differences between humanitarian and commercial supply chains
Commercial Supply Chain Humanitarian Supply Chain So What?
Supply chain range From supplier’s supplier to
customer’s customer
From donors and suppliers to beneficiaries Production of goods doesn’t apply to
humanitarians. Focus in this thesis is on end
users, not donors.
Customer definition End user = Buyer End user (Beneficiary)6=Buyer (donor)
Shelf life Some years, but tends to shorten Some weeks to some months in total,
mounting and dismantling included.
Project-oriented.
Best practice transfer needs validation of
relevance as per business case, but it fits with the
trend toward shorter life cycles of products
Information flow Generally well-structured. High importance of the media; means of
communication often reduced (no Internet
access in field, etc.)
Visibility is more difficult to achieve for HSC
Human flows People flows + knowledge transfer
Financial flows Bilateral and known Unilateral (from donor to beneficiary) and
uncertain
Actors Known, with aligned incentives Multiplicity in nature, but scarcity in
numbers + misaligned incentives
High level of uncertainty for HSC, so higher level
of agility required. Best practice transfer needs
validation of relevance as per business case.
Supply Suppliers generally known in
advance.
Supplier and/or donor uncertain
Demand Usually forecast / known Uncertainties
Environment More and more volatile Highly volatile and unstable
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Figure 2.5: Horizontal coordination
gories of coordination in this context:
• Coordination by command where there is central coordination; agreement on responsi-
bilities and objectives; and common territorial areas of responsibility.
• Coordination by consensus where organisations have access to compatible or shared
communications equipment, liaison and interagency meetings and pre-mission assess-
ments.
• Coordination by default includes routine contact between desk officers and civilian and
military operations centers.
Figure 2.5 shows a simplified picture of the usual collaboration modes and figure 2.6 illustrates
their use in various phases in the disaster management life cycle.
During relief operations, there are many participants in the field without a clear division of
work [Bym00]. In addition, communication between stakeholders is far from optimal. It is easy
to understand that two stakeholders having different incentives will have difficulties sharing
information.
On the other hand, two stakeholders having the same principle activities should be able to
align their operations in order to ensure a proper distribution of aid. And yet, a survey of
logisticians who participated in the tsunami relief operations showed that “just over half the
logisticians (56%) reported working with other agencies in setting up their supply chains”
[TK05]. All these factors contribute to complexity in the delivery of relief.
Preparedness Response
Ramp Up             Maturity        Ramp Down
Recovery
Disaster
Coordination by consensus
Inter-Agency Procurement Group
Coordination by command
Humanitarian Reform
Coordination 
by default
Haiti…
Coordination  by command
China, Haiti upon arrival of US Army
or 
Coordination by consensus
Coordination
by default
(mostly) Global Level + 
Local field) Level  (mostly) Local (field) Level  +  Global Level
  
Figure 2.6: Disaster phases and collaboration modes usually associated (Inspired by [TW09]
and [Don96]
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Figure 2.7: Local NGOs and smaller stakeholders are sometimes disregarded
The following sections will provide an overall analysis of various barriers and enablers in the
implemention of collaboration networks involving humanitarian organisations. The analysis
is based on case studies and practitioner interviews. The existing literature, mainly the articles
which are case-study oriented and NGO reports, also facilitated this analysis.
2.9.2 Barriers and enablers of horizontal coordination during the response and re-
covery phase
The fact that the nature, the number and the incentives of stakeholders varies from one crisis
to another, whether international NGOs or local implementing partners, is an initial element
limiting the possibility of having a clear collaboration framework to use wherever disaster
strikes. The locals, vital for the distribution of aid, vary widely in their ability and willingness
to partner international aid agencies. They are also often disregarded, as they do not have the
capacity to participate in all coordination meetings. (See figure 2.7)
The actual tools and methods for structuring relief efforts are also far from sufficient for estab-
lishing a clear and systematic process of choosing and implementing the best collaboration
process. Trained human resources and adequate IT12 tools for managing operations, collecting
data and thus enabling humanitarians to better prepare future operations are still lacking,
though these issues have recently received a lot of attention, both by practitioners and by
academics. Table 2.2 summarises the main barriers and enablers of horizontal coordination
during relief efforts.
2.9.3 Barriers and enablers of horizontal coordination during the preparedness phase
Once again, the fact that the nature, the number and the incentives of stakeholders varies
from one crisis to another, whether international NGOs or local implementing partners, limits
the possibility of implementing horizontal coordination processes.
Common humanitarian organisations, though they share the same humanitarian principles,
may be reluctant to partner with each other. The neutrality and impartiality imposed by
the humanitarian space (see [TW09]) has made MSF (among others) refuse to work with
governments, and sometimes also with UN agencies, for example. It is therefore difficult, if
not impossible, for them to have formal coordination processes with hierarchical links that
12Information and Telecommunication
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Table 2.2: Barriers and enablers of the implemention of collaboration networks involving
humanitarian organisations on a local level, inspired from [THW08]; [TW09]; [Wor10]; [Int06]
and [Ste06]
Barriers Enablers
In-country NGOs vary widely in their ability and
willingness to partner UN or international NGO bodies
Most organisations are connected to
one another in principle through their
desire to provide aid effectively
Most organisations are associated with each other only
episodically
General awareness of the aims and
competencies of principal actors
Accurate data for needs assessment, logistics management
and many other critical parts of operations is vital but
typically difficult to obtain
Specific shared IT tools are being
developed to improve data capture
and analysis
All humanitarian organisations are poor in lessons learnt
and need structure to prepare know-how, knowledge
rules/pools, and to clarify what they need in specific fields
Score cards are under development in
most major international NGOs
The humanitarian community has many serious
weaknesses in managing human resources, from
recruitment to training to appraisal
would require them to report to governmental agencies or other humanitarian stakeholders.
Similar issues can also be faced between actors who, at first glance, do not appear to be very
different. The French Red Cross and the IFRC, for example, share the same name, but that
doesn’t mean that they accept clear reporting lines. As for the existing reforms, they are aimed
Table 2.3: Barriers and enablers of the implemention of collaboration networks involving
humanitarian organisations on a global level, inspired from [TW09][Fau09]and [BL08]
Barriers Enablers
Lack of mutual understanding due to the
diversity of actors
Choice of the right ecosystem of actors
Lack of transparency and accountability Incentives for shared information on mutual
experiences and existing initiatives
Insufficient commitment at all levels Involvement of key actors of the value chain
Lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities Development of clear and jointly agreed roles and
responsibilities for encouraging commitment of
actors
Lack of change management Participatory approaches
Lack of funding for activities that have no
direct, visible and dedicated field application
Support of adequate Information Management tools
and services
at creating better humanitarian coordination (see section 1.4.2 on humanitarian reform),
but they encountered many issues during their implementation. Most of the arguments
against them were to underline the top-down approach and the lack of change management
accompanying reform. The design and implementation of coordination processes is also
time-consuming. As preparedness activities, such as this work on coordination processes, lack
visible impact, they also lack funding from donors, which does little to reinforce organisations’
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commitment. Table 2.3 on the preceding page summarises the main barriers and enablers of
horizontal coordination on a global level.
2.9.4 Helping choose an adequate collaboration mode
“Each State has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of the victims of natural
disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory. Hence, the affected State has the
primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination, and implementation of
humanitarian assistance within its territory” [Nat91].
After a disaster in the field, collaboration networks involving humanitarian organisations have
to include local governments. It is their ability and willingness to take the lead or not that
shape the global humanitarian relief effort. Then, the strength of the local capacity comes
into consideration. “If trained resources and adequate means of actions are already ready
to be deployed, they should be and usually are involved from the beginning” [Wor10]. These
are some elements that illustrate the difficulty in having a pre-defined response model to
implement no matter where or what the disaster is.
The responses to the 2008 Sichuan earthquake and to the 2010 Haiti earthquakes could not
have been the same, for example. Whereas the Chinese government controlled the overall
relief effort, the Haitian president “has waited for nine days before officially speaking to
the country. Like Godot, we were waiting for him and we are still waiting” [Val10]. At least
these two humanitarian deployments took place in a relatively safe region. But disasters do
not always occur in the most stable political environments. Remember the 2002 volcanic
eruption in Rwanda: “the Nyiragongo eruption took place within the context of a civil war
that has cost at least 2.5 million lives since 1998. Some UN agencies and NGOs reported that
they were concerned that having the official government endorse particular steps, especially
those related to resettlement, might lead the population to reject them out of hand” [LK07].
Collaboration networks involving humanitarian organisations can therefore take many forms,
depending on the stakeholders involved, their objectives, and the level, local or global, at
which they are implemented. We have drawn up a panorama of various existing collaboration
modes and their applicability, stressing the diverse barriers and enablers to implementation.
The choice of the most appropriate collaboration mode is never easy, but this is especially true
in a context of humanitarian crisis. Figure 2.8 on the following page proposes a clear decision
tree for facilitating this crucial decision, based on practitioner interviews and literature review.
This section details various collaboration modes and their applicability to the context of
disaster management. It illustrates the particularities of the humanitarian sector and the
specific problems they create. Our approach is a first step aimed at a better understanding of
those particularities. It sets the basis for successful applications of research on collaboration
networks in this sector. Yet though we built the models with a great deal of input from
practitioners, there is additional work needed, especially to validate the decision process
proposed in figure 2.8 on the next page.
2.9.5 Vertical coordination
Mobilisation and affectation: balancing
Some humanitarian organisations evolve in several fields at the same time. Thus there are
several projects to manage in parallel. Such organisations have to globally control all these
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Crisis
Local Government able to face the 
crisis ?
Disaster
Local government willing to take 
the lead and act as coordinator ?
Strong local capacity, willing to 
take the lead?
No
No
Yes
No global Humanitarian Relief 
Effort
Yes
Coordination by command by 
local authorities
Yes
No
Coordination by default
Agreement on better way of 
operating
Yes Coordination by consensus
No
Coordination by command by 
the strongest stakeholder
Stronger stakeholder takes the 
lead?
No
Yes
Coordination by default
Coordination by command by 
the strongest stakeholder
Figure 2.8: Decision tree created to facilitate the choice of the most adequate coordination
mode
operations. Because they are under-resourced they have to define priorities in order to properly
dispatch funds and, of course, personnel. This is not always easy. According to [TK05], "in
order to effectively respond to the Tsunami, 88% of large aid agencies surveyed had to pull
their most qualified staff from the ongoing humanitarian operations in Darfur". Globally, this
is a problem of balancing (Figure 2.9 on the facing page).
Coherence and efficiency: synchronisation
Moreover, the same humanitarian organisation can fulfill various SHUs13 in the HSC. A typical
example is the International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) that have headquarters in Geneva,
three Relief Logistics Units (in Panama, Dubai and Kuala Lumpur) and more than 180 National
Societies all over the world. Consequently, when a crisis occurs, several members of the
13strategic humanitarian unit
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Figure 2.9: Balancing component of vertical coordination
Federation operate in a same place. Headquarters has to guarantee the coherence and the
efficiency of the global action of the network on this crisis. Consequently, the SHU must
synchronise its actions in order to be increasingly effective and reactive. Globally, this is a
problem of synchronisation.
Empowerment and best practices: training
The two precedent components of vertical coordination relate to phases 1, 2 and 3 of the life
cycle (see figure 2.1 on page 22 ). But phase 0 could also be included in the vertical coordination.
Indeed, during the preparedness phase, a humanitarian organisation should capitalise on
its past experiences in order to define best practices in terms of supplier selection, business
processes, skill management, etc. According to many humanitarian workers, “the success or
failure of humanitarian response and coordination is too often dependent on ‘personalities’”.
The independent 2007 Cluster Approach Evaluation Report [UNO07] noted that "attributing
everything to personality underplays the degree to which institutions can and do shape the
behaviour, practices, and skills of individuals". But experts note that the potential of this
institutional shaping is hampered by the fact that "the humanitarian community has many
serious weaknesses in managing human resources, from recruitment to training to appraisal"
[VAI08]. The aim of this coordination could be to ensure the use of these best practices during
future operations. Moreover, personnel probably have to learn from each other in order to be
more efficient in the future. Of course, the objective is not standardisation because each crisis
is unique. Globally, this is a problem of training and knowledge management.
Vertical coordination components
To summarise, vertical coordination seems to include three major components (Figure 2.10
on the following page):
1. Balancing: To mobilise and properly allocate the funds and skills to different crises at a
given time.
2. Synchronisation: To guarantee the coherence and efficiency on a relief operation.
3. Training: To facilitate the empowerment between network members and the implemen-
tation of best practices.
According to the framework presented in figure 2.10 on the next page, the vertical coordination
seems to require relevant operational reports, formalised strategies, business processes and
procedures, and probably also an efficient Information System.
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Figure 2.10: Vertical Coordination Framework
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Literature review and research
statements
3.1 A new, attractive area of research
The number of scientific articles dedicated to the study of the humanitarian supply chain,
either general or focussed on a specific issue, was remarkably low five years ago. This has
changed recently with the publication of a substantial number of papers related to disaster
management. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the quantity of publications on humanitarian
supply chains over the past few years. This is only a partial view of the existing literature, as
many articles have been published in journals related to refugees, developmental studies,
health issues and many other specific journals which do not always appear in academic
databases. Neither do NGO reports, which also provide many useful analyses and discussions
on the subject. Finally, military academics provide abundant literature on this issue too, but
little is publicly available.
If we focus on standard available academic databases, the number of articles is becoming
significant. Figure 3.1 on the next page illustrates the growth of academic literature over the
last twelve years. A dedicated journal, the Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain
Management is even forthcoming in 2011. Due to the youth and attractiveness of this new
Table 3.1: A quick scan of the existing literature on humanitarian supply chains/logistics
Database
Key words Science Direct
search within all
content
Science Direct
search within title,
abstract and key words
ISI Web
search within
topic
Springerlink
search within
all content
Humanitarian Supply Chain 665 9 15 447
Humanitarian Logistics 625 17 34 440
Humanitarian Supply Chain
and Logistics
147 7 10 115
Total articles Humanitarian
Supply Chain and/or Logistics
1143 19 39 772
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Figure 3.1: Number of publications per year on humanitarian supply chains / humanitarian
logistics, in Science Direct
area of research, it is difficult to have an exhaustive, up-to-date literature review of the subject.
This chapter will nevertheless provide the reader with an overview of the existing literature on
humanitarian supply chains. The analysis will focus first on research types and contributions,
then on their specific scopes of study.
3.2 Overview of research types, contributions and methodologies
According to [DUT03], three types of research are used in OR/MS: Management sciences,
management consulting and management engineering. In management sciences, “the goal
is to develop new results to contribute to the body of knowledge in the discipline”. As for
management consulting, “the goal is to solve somebody’s practical problems using existing,
standard methods”. Management engineering is between the two, as its goal is “to solve those
practical problems for which it is necessary to adapt existing tools in fundamentally novel
ways.”
According to [AG05], management engineering is by far the most widely used, followed by
management consulting (see figure 3.2). This may be due to the relative youth of this area of
research. If we now sort the articles by disaster contributions, more than half of the research
published is on model development (analytical models for solving and analysing problems or
for estimating outcomes), followed by theory (26.6% of the research tests hypotheses, investi-
gates the behaviour of systems, or provides a framework and advances our understanding of
some phenomena in the field) and application development (15.6%), when a computer tool is
produced or a prototype is developed (see figure 3.2 from [AG05]).
As for research methodologies, according to [AG05] “mathematical programming, including
heuristics, is the most frequently utilized method, followed by probability theory and statistics,
although the use of the latter is much less frequent. Simulation appears third in the list.
Decision theory and multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT - see section 14.2.2 for more details)
are also used in DOM1 research.” As for other methods, such as systems dynamics, constraint
1Disaster Operations Management
38
Literature review and research statements
Preparedness Immediate Response  
+ Support
Dismantling 
Recovery
(a) sorted by research contribution
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Mitigation Preparedness Response Recoveryr aredness Immediate Response  
+ Support
Dismantling 
Recovery
(b) sorted by research types
MC=Management Consulting: “the goal is to solve somebody’s practical problems using existing, standard methods”
ME = Management Engineering: “the goal is to solve those practical problems for which it is necessary to adapt existing tools
in fundamentally novel ways”
MS = Management Science: “the goal is to develop new results to contribute to the body of knowledge in the discipline”
[DUT03]
Figure 3.2: Distribution of research contributions and research types to life cycle stages of
Disaster and Operations Management, from [AG05]
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programming and soft OR techniques, they are extremely rare. [AG05]. Research is underway
to fill this gap. Among others, [Gon08]; [MW09] as well as an article from Besiou, expected at
the end of 2010, are using systems dynamics. Soft OR techniques have also been used recently,
especially Business Process Reengineering [Cha+08]; [CLT09].
3.3 Reviews sorted by scope of study
Two articles have surveyed the existing literature: [KS07] and [AG05]. The first focusses on
papers concerning supply chain issues, whereas the second includes any topic, as long as
articles are related to disaster management and use operations management or operations
research approaches. These literature reviews have different scopes but similar findings.
According to [KS07], “academic literature on humanitarian logistics tends to concentrate on
the preparation phase of disaster relief.” If we refer to [AG05], what Kovacs and Spens call
preparation should be divided into mitigation efforts and preparedness efforts. With this
distinction, the work done to mitigate the effects of potential disaster comes first in the list of
areas studied.
This is aligned with the fact that while funds are abundant for immediate response, the funding
of disaster preparedness, though vital, is often neglected by donors (see section 2.5 on page 24).
Having neither significant funds for working on preparedness nor any pressure from donors
to do so, NGOs dedicate most of their efforts on immediate relief operations, finding and
implementing more effective ways to provide assistance in the first weeks following disasters.
As a result, a tremendous opportunity exists for academics to help in providing efficient
solutions in disaster preparedness and mitigation.
3.3.1 Disaster preparedness
“A successful humanitarian operation mitigates the urgent needs of a population with a sustain-
able reduction of their vulnerability in the shortest amount of time and with the least amount
of resources” [JH08]. Consequently, a successful response to a disaster is not improvised and
must be prepared to be effective. Humanitarians have begun to heed the lessons learnt from
previous disasters and realise that they have to work hard not only during disasters but also
between disasters [UNO05b]. According to Van Wassenhove [Was06b], preparedness consists
of five key elements that have to be in place to produce effective results. These in turn lead to
effective disaster management. They are as follows
1. Knowledge management
Learning from previous disasters by capturing, codifying and transferring knowledge
of logistics operations. See [Int06]; [Kai+03]; [Ben+03] and [JH08]. [Bea99]; [KS05] and
[MEW09], among others)
2. Financial resources
Preparing sufficient financial resources to prepare and initiate operations and ensure
that they run as smoothly as possible. See [JH08]; [Sta+09] and [Ble09] for details.
3. Human resources
Selecting and training people who are capable of planning, coordinating, acting and
intervening where necessary. The problem of human resources in humanitarian opera-
tions is probably the most forsaken one in terms of academic research. Nevertheless,
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many authors, such as ([Nat91]; [TW05a]; [Int06]; [WS03]; [Was06a]) have demonstrated
how crucial this problem is. The shortage of qualified staff and the high level of turnover
often have harmful consequences on the management of crises. However, methods exist
in business management that should be adapted to design relevant skills management
systems for the humanitarian sector.
4. The community
Finding effective ways of collaborating with other key players such as governments,
the military, businesses and other humanitarian organisations is not an easy task. See
[Ben99]; [TW05a] for an application of “organisational design” best practices for human-
itarian relief. [PB05] have detailed the relationships between military and humanitarian
organisations. See also [Ken04]; [Mul02] and [WS03] for details of centralised coordi-
nation around a UN Agency. More recently, [Bal+10]; [CLT10] and [CP10] looked at
collaboration in the context of relief chains and summarised its barriers and enablers.
5. Operations and process management
Recognising logistics as a central role in preparedness. Then setting up goods, agree-
ments and the means needed to move resources quickly. Several papers treat operations
and process management in HSC. They study mainly the improvement of unitary opera-
tions or business processes in a humanitarian context. Examples include transportation
and inventory management ([SMW09]; [Why07] and [AB06], among others); the devel-
opment of flexible technology and software for supporting humanitarian operations
[BH08]; and metrics and performance measurement in a humanitarian context ([Dav06]
and [BB08], among others).
3.3.2 Disaster response
If we refer to [KS07], “the main problem areas of the immediate response phase lie in coor-
dinating supply, the unpredictability of demand, and the last-mile problem of transporting
necessary items to disaster victims.” 40% of the articles focussing on disaster response try
to keep their work applicable for any disaster type (see [SP81]; [SR05] and [BV93] among
many other). 60% studied specific disasters, like earthquakes ([BA04]; [FGR00]; [OEK04]),
floods [Olo10], industrial accidents ([KKM01]; [PF00]; [Gel+09]; [VP04]; [SW97]) or terrorism
([BKW10]; [Cyg03]; [Bra00])
3.3.3 Disaster recovery
Research in organisational behaviour and decision science or any area outside OR/MS is
abundant. As for OR/MS-related articles, there are not many; only 11 articles in 15 years. The
proportion of contributions on recovery in general, compared to those focussing on specific
disasters, is roughly the same as the division on disaster response. 45% of papers concentrated
on recovery in general whereas the remaining 55% focussed on a specific disaster, be it natural
or man-made (see [AG05] for details).
3.4 Publications of NGOs
Those academic publications are not the only references we can find on humanitarian supply
chains. Many organisations also publish internal or public reports to share their findings and
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questions. A large proportion of these reports analyse their past operations, outlining not
only their achievements, but also the issues they faced. Most of these reports are available
on centralised websites, such as ReliefWeb2, Fritz Institute3, ICVA4 and GHA5, or directly
on UN cluster or organisations’ websites. If we consider reports providing an analysis of
relief operations responding to the 2004 tsunami, ReliefWeb centralises 138 reports in total,
35% posted by academics, 40% by NGOs, 20% by INGOs or UN agencies and the rest by
governments. Most of them provide many useful accounts and quantified analyses given by
practitioners.
Another subject often dealt with in NGO reports is the past, present and future of humanitarian
demand ([Pro04]; [IFR07b]). Some provide overviews on “forgotten” emergencies to increase
awareness of donors and media on all the underfunded disasters [IFR07b]. See chapter 11 on
page 103 for an analysis on this specific issue.
3.5 Analysis and conclusion
An increasing number of articles have been published on humanitarian operations, be they
focussed on one phase of the response or more generally. Some have used mathematical
models, others softer methodologies like case studies. A few articles, and more recently a
book, take a general point of view and provide basic knowledge on humanitarian operations
and their specificities. These usually seek to draw the subject to the community’s attention.
They provide an overview of humanitarian supply chains, their issues and challenges, and
propose ways forward. See [Bea04]; [Was06b]; [TW09]; [TK05]; [KS07], among others. Most of
them agree on the fact that “future research in humanitarian logistics would include improved
methods for inventory control, distribution system design, cooperation and coordination, and
performance measurement, under the unique characteristics of the humanitarian relief supply
environment.” [Bea04] They usually emphasise opportunities for improving the management
of humanitarian supply chains, but few of them acknowledge the fact that the opportunity for
improvement also concerns the private sector. The capability of humanitarians to respond
quickly and adequately to changes, though vital for humanitarian organisations, is scarely
analysed nor understood [OG06]. Yet this is an area where both humanitarian and commercial
supply chains would greatly benefit from a clear assessment tool that would help them define
their improvement path.
As discussed in the literature review, humanitarian supply chains are a new area of study. There
are therefore many issues that deserve to be studied. Table 3.2 on the facing page summarises
the main leads for research highlighted by the literature review and summarises the elements
which explain our choice of research objectives.
On the basis of the analysis presented in table 3.2 on the next page, we chose to focus on the
most obvious cross-learning opportunities between humanitarian and commercial supply
chains, that is to say their ability to respond quickly to changes. The work on this ability, called
agility, will be presented in the second part of the thesis. As supply chain agility depends on
the design of the logistics network, the last part of this thesis focusses on the configuration
and design of supply networks compliant with humanitarian specificities. The choice of this
research objective is motivated by its importance for humanitarians as well as for its added
academic value as it appears to be a gap in the current literature.
2http://www.reliefweb.int
3http://www.fritzinstitute.org/
4The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), http://www.icva.ch/
5Global Humanitarian Assistance, www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org
42
Literatu
re
review
an
d
research
statem
en
ts
Table 3.2: Our choice of research objectives
Leads In our
scope?
Reason
General understanding
of HSCs, their
specificities and needs
ok New area of research, with many constraints to take into account.
Many articles use a management consulting approach and use existing tools and techniques without adapting them. This
may impact the validity of their results as they do not always have a clear vision of field realities.
Knowledge
management
ko Significant international projects have been launched on this issue, with dedicated resources. Some articles also published;
no need for us to add another layer to these reflections.
Financial resources ko Not an area where academics can help a lot, as the major barriers are organisations and donors’ incentives.
Human resource issues ko As it is, coordination and communication rely too heavily on personalities. The right people are definitely needed at the
right place, so it is worth working on the idea of building a tool to ensure HR pools in line with needs in term of skills and
quantity. However, this isn’t really an issue related to “industrial systems”, and therefore lacks relevance for this specific
thesis.
The community ok Difficulties collaborating with other humanitarian stakeholders are outlined as one of the major weaknesses of
humanitarian organisations (see chapter 3 on page 37). This point is analysed in section 2.8 on page 27
Operations and process
management
ko Covers a wide range of possibilities, from transportation and inventory management to the development of flexible
technologies and software for supporting operations, and tracking and measuring performance. Many of these applications
are already under study.
Design and
configuration of a
supply network
ok Cross-learning validated: this would improve humanitarians’ efficiency while guaranteeing their speed and effectiveness.
The agility of the private sector could also be improved.
Managing a supply
network
ko Working on inventory management and decision would optimise humanitarians’ efficiency and could benefit the private
sector should they face a high level of uncertainty. This issue requires a dedicated thesis. Karca D. Aral, PhD student from
INSEAD is currently working on this problem.
Needs assessment ko This research proposal has no value added for humanitarians in the current situation. Indeed, at a single organisation level,
they already have formalised tools and methods (see [IFR05b]; [IFR01]; [IFR05a], and [UNO00] among others) What is
needed is a common consolidated needs assessment, but this is more a political issue. Assessments are influenced by how
an organisation works and its vision on the range of activities considered “humanitarian”. As a result, it is not interesting to
develop an overall assessment tool before they align and share their views on the subject.
Best practices in terms
of agility
ok Cross-learning potential validated by literature review and interviews
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3.6 Our problem statements: agility and supply-chain design
This thesis aims to improve the management of both humanitarian and commercial supply
chains by using cross-learning. The idea is thus to find and develop areas where humanitarians
could benefit from their counterparts’ expertise, and vice versa.
If we summarise the main strengths of commercial and humanitarian supply chains, the
cross-learning potentiality becomes obvious. Whereas humanitarian supply chains need
flexibility, effectiveness and responsiveness to enter the arena, commercial supply chains
mainly need efficiency. And if we talk about market winners, the criteria are exactly the
opposite: humanitarians are focussing more and more on efficiency to make the difference,
whereas flexibility, effectiveness and responsiveness are becoming highly prized by the private
sector. (see table 3.3)
Table 3.3: Cross-learning opportunities Inspired by [CT00].
Market Qualifier Market Winner
Market-Driven
Commercial Supply Chains
Lead Time
Cost
Availability
Customer-Driven
Commercial Supply Chains
Cost
Availability
Lead Time
Humanitarian Supply Chains Availability
Lead Time
Cost
The second part of our thesis will therefore focus on supply chain agility. Its analysis of the
various elements, which enable a supply chain to be agile, justifies the choice of our third
research objective. Indeed, agility depends on the adequacy between capacity and needs It
also depends on the local capacity that you can build by establishing and running a local
warehouse. Yet those elements have a cost. It is therefore of prime importance to ensure an
adequate level of service at lesser costs. This is not an easy task, especially when you operate in
highly uncertain conditions and when the stakes of the success are human lives, which should
be priceless. Some work has already been done on supply network design for the private sector.
Our input here will be to quantify the impact on costs of various factors such as the quickness
and amount of the relief aid or the size and location of warehouses. The aim is to facilitate
the choice of the optimal logistics network to implement. (see figure 3.3). This analysis is
developed in the third part of this thesis.
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Figure 3.3: Research Objectives
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Supply Chain Agility
Definition, Assessment and Improvement
Purpose: By constantly working in environments with high degree of uncertainty, humanitar-
ian organizations end up becoming specialists in the implementation of agile systems. Their
counterparts in profit-making organizations have a lot to learn from them in this domain.
Volatility of demand, imbalance between supply and demand, and disruptions are all factors
that affect commercial supply chains and call for a high level of agility. The aims of this part
are twofold: firstly to clearly define the concept of supply chain agility, and secondly to build a
model for assessing the level of agility of a supply chain.
Design/methodology/approach: Three approaches are used in this research: literature review,
case study and symbolic modeling.
Findings: We developed firstly a framework for defining supply chain agility and secondly a
model for assessing and improving the capabilities of humanitarian and commercial supply
chains in terms of agility, based on an analysis of humanitarian approaches.
Research limitations: Our model has been developed thanks to inputs from humanitarian
practitioners and feedbacks from academics. The practical application to various humanitar-
ian relief operations and commercial supply chains is yet to be done.
Originality/value: This thesis contributes significantly to clarifying the notion of supply chain
agility. It also provides a consistent, robust and reproducible method of assessing supply
chain agility, which seems appropriate for both humanitarian and business sectors. Finally,
it is complementary to existent research on humanitarian logistics. It shows that though
humanitarian professionals have a lot to learn from the private sector, the reverse is also true.
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Introduction and Research Questions
One of the particularities of humanitarian logistics is the level of uncertainty they have to
cope with. Every day, in many parts of the world, humanitarian workers are confronted with
various forms of uncertainty. Given that beneficiaries’ needs evolve over time and are really
difficult to forecast, demand and supply vary on a daily basis. Also, there are many cause-
and-effect interactions that affect operations. For example, an earthquake can provoke a
flood if a brimming lake is formed by landslides from the earthquake. Local infrastructure
may also be damaged to the extent that the supply chain network has to be continuously
rethought, along with the reconstruction of roads, airports and other key elements of the
network. Humanitarian logisticians have therefore developed tools and methods to respond
quickly to short term changes, thereby improving the agility of their supply chain.
This high level of agility is more and more required in the private sector. Indeed, “in addition
to the risks of mismatch in supply and demand, disruption is an increasing risk in global
supply chains even for the private sector. With longer paths and shorter clock speeds, there are
more opportunities for disruption and a smaller margin for error if a disruption takes place”
[KW04]. Many examples can be used to illustrate the low responsiveness of most commercial
supply chains. After the earthquake in Taiwan in 1999, the prices of Global semiconductor were
almost doubled, and of the 62 companies based in Asia, only 21% had full business contingency
plans to protect themselves against business interruption [For08]. Demand volatility is also
becoming higher in the private sector. Due to market turbulence, demand in almost every
industrial sector seems to be more volatile than it used to be in the past [CL04]. Consequently,
being able to react quickly to changes is an essential capability for commercial supply chains,
especially in our globalized world where “fierce competition is not based any more on price
alone but also on the “freshness” of the offer: constantly changing assortment, newest fashion
and best opportunity” [KS09].
Cross-learning opportunities between business and humanitarian sectors have been listed
by many authors ([Was06b]; [OG06]). Today, disaster relief is becoming a testing ground
for many researchers in logistics. More often, they propose methods for implementing in
the humanitarian sector the tools that they initially designed for the business sector. Yet, to
date, no work seems to have been done the other way round. In other words, no one has
explicitly identified the best practices that the business sector can borrow and adapt from
humanitarian experts. This thesis aims to fill this gap in line with our belief that the business
and humanitarian sectors can both learn from each other.
From an academic point of view, supply chain agility is becoming a major field of research. It is
highlighted as one of the fundamental characteristics of the best supply chains [Lee04]. Given
the complexity that is linked to a high level of constraints and uncertainty, the humanitarian
sector is an interesting field to study. Moreover, they present a potential added value for both
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Figure 3.4: Our approach step by step
the humanitarian and the private sectors. It is very important for humanitarian organizations
to explicitly establish the best practices found in relief chains, and by so doing, they clarify
their achievements and facilitate the ramification of these best practices. The business sector
could then learn from them in order to improve the agility level of their supply chain. It would
enable them to deal with supply, demand and environment uncertainties, and this capability
is becoming an order-winner for many commercial supply chains.
Many supply chain managers are therefore in search of methods that would enable them to
better assess the level of agility of their supply chain. Unfortunately, in the literature, there
is no unanimously accepted framework and consistent system for defining and measuring
supply chain agility. We can therefore formulate two research questions (RS) as follows:
• RS1: How should supply chain agility be defined?
• RS2: How should supply chain agility be assessed?
Based on the review of literature, we will, in chapter 4 on the facing page, address the first
research question and present our framework in the form of a house that we will refer to as the
“House of supply chain agility”. The second research question will be studied in chapter 5 on
page 57. By analysing the capabilities of the major existing approaches, this study evaluates
the different ways of assessing supply chain agility. A comparative analysis of the main features
of both the humanitarian and the commercial supply chains is done in order to ensure that
our assessment is valid for both sectors. Chapter 6 on page 63 makes explicit humanitarians’
business expertise. This study details various methods developed by humanitarian organisa-
tions in order to ensure the agility of their supply chain. Similar methods recommended by
researchers are also listed. The model in itself, together with its application in the humanitar-
ian sector to illustrate the logic of our approach are presented in chapter 7 on page 67. this
last chapter will present our analysis, conclusions, limitations and perspectives for further
research. Figure 3.4 shows a step-by-step view of our approach.
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How should supply chain agility be
defined?
In the last decade, agility has been one of the key concepts discussed by many authors. We
have therefore reviewed the literature in order to gather its various definitions and dimensions
as it applies to supply chains. In this chapter, we do not intend to provide an exhaustive
literature review but simply a quick scan that is elaborate enough to enable clarify the notion
of supply chain agility and to build a consistent assessment model. Only the conclusions of
our literature review are therefore presented.
4.1 Agility, Resilience, Adaptability : what are the differences ?
Supply chain agility is usually defined as the ability to respond to unanticipated changes
[She04]. As we have seen in section 2.7 on page 26, there are four sources of uncertainty:
foreseeable uncertainties, residual risks (“what is left over after planning for foreseeable
uncertainty”), complexities and unknown unknowns (“those that do not have a definite
formulation, have no stopping rule that allows one to determine when the problem is solved,
where solutions cannot be fully tested and the problem cannot be generalized, and where
there is ambiguity on the causes of the problem”) [LDP06]. Agility would then mean to be able
to respond quickly when confronted with any of these uncertainties.
The focus on agility from the supply chain perspective emerged in the year 2001 and was
first initiated by [HHC01]. According to [Lee04], the main objectives of an agile supply chain
are responding quickly to short-term changes in demand (or supply) and handling external
disruptions smoothly. Sometimes agility could be mistaken for other similar but different
concepts such as adaptability and resilience.
While agility is being able to deal with and take advantage of uncertainty and volatility, adapt-
ability is rather used for more profound medium-term changes. Adaptable supply chains
adjust their design to meet structural shifts in markets and, modify and adapt the supply
network to strategies, products, and technologies [Lee04]. Figure 4.1 on the following page
shows an illustrated difference between agility and adaptability.
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Figure 4.1: Agility vs. Adaptability, in [McC+06]
Table 4.1: Agility vs. Resilience
Supply Chain
Ability
Structural
properties
Deals with Aims at
Agility Flexibility Volatility, Uncertainty Quick satisfaction of
customer
Resilience Robustness Identifiable risk of disruption Business Continuity
As for resilience, it aims to mitigate identifiable risks and ensure continuity in the firm’s
business. [CP04] defined resilience as the ability of a system to return to its original state or
move to a new and more desirable state after being disturbed. Differences between agility and
resilience are depicted in Table 4.1.
4.2 Agility versus leagility
Shortly after the emergence of agility, the concept of leagility appeared. According to Agarwal,
leagile is the combination of the lean and agile paradigms within a total supply chain strategy
by positioning the decoupling point so as to best suit the need for responding to a volatile
demand down stream yet providing level scheduling upstream from the market place [HHC01].
The decoupling point is in the material flow streams to which the customer orders penetrates
([AST06], inspired from [MNT00] [PK03]).
The applicability and relevance of this concept of leagility in the context of humanitarian aid
may be questioned. Table 4.2 on the facing page summarizes the distinguishing attributes
of lean, agile and leagile supply chains. Chapter 2 underlined the major specificity of hu-
manitarian supply chains : the vital importance of the success of operations. Lead time and
availability are therefore of prime importance for beneficiaries, which justifies the focus on
supply chain agility, at least in this first approach. The migration from agility to leagility will
be taken into consideration later, in the third part of this thesis. Indeed, we agree with Van
Hoek that "leagility might work well in operational terms as lean capabilities can contribute
to agile performance and might often be a prerequisite. If the leagility approach is to work,
though, it is required to fit within a purely agile supply chain strategy, rather than a purely lean
approach." [Hoe00]
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Table 4.2: Comparison of lean, agile, and leagile supply chains, from [AST06] and inspired by
[NNB99] ; [MNT00]; [Olh03] ; [BDT04]
Distinguishing attributes Lean supply chain Agile supply chain Leagile supply chain
Market demand Predictable Volatile Volatile and
unpredictable
Product variety Low High Medium
Product life cycle Long Short Short
Customer drivers Cost Lead-time and
availability
Service level
Profit margin Low High Moderate
Dominant costs Physical costs Marketability costs Both
Stock out penalties Long term
contractual
Immediate and
volatile
No place for stock
out
Purchasing policy Buy goods Assign capacity Vendor managed
inventory
Information enrichment Highly desirable Obligatory Essential
Forecast mechanism Algorithmic Consultative Both/either
Typical products Commodities Fashion goods Product as per
customer demand
Lead time compression Essential Essential Desirable
Eliminate muda Essential Desirable Arbitrary
Rapid reconfiguration Desirable Essential Essential
Robustness Arbitrary Essential Desirable
Quality Market qualifier Market qualifier Market qualifier
Cost Market winner Market qualifier Market winner
Lead-time Market qualifier Market qualifier Market qualifier
Service level Market qualifier Market winner Market winner
4.3 Definition of supply chain agility and its performance dimensions
4.3.1 Literature review, definition and historical perspective
To achieve a high level of agility, a supply chain has to acquire some key capabilities. Many
authors have already listed one or more elements associated with agility. Table 4.3 shows
the definitions and details of these capabilities. The aim of this section is to illustrate all the
facets of agility that have to be worked on. The House of Supply Chain Agility (see figure 4.2)
summarizes the main components, which enable the supply chain to be agile. We developed
it based on a thorough literature review on agility.
4.3.2 Key characteristics of agile supply chains
According to [CT00], a key characteristic of an agile organization is flexibility. In other words,
supply chain agility is an externally focused capability that is derived from flexibilities in the
supply chain processes [SGM06]. They thus assert that “procurement/sourcing flexibility”,
“manufacturing flexibility” and “distribution/logistics flexibility” positively impact supply
chain agility”. Manufacturing flexibility is broken down into four competences (machine,
labor, material handling and routing flexibilities) and two capabilities (volume flexibility and
mix flexibility) [ZVL03]. Knowing that internal manufacturing flexibility competencies are
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neither relevant to our focus on supply chains nor appropriate for service providers such as
humanitarians, we will restrict our study to capabilities as pertained to flexibility. We will
therefore adopt and study four flexibility capabilities (product flexibility, mix flexibility, volume
flexibility and delivery flexibility) as they are defined and classified by [Sla05], and summarized
in Table 4.3. There is abundant literature on the notion of agile manufacturing ([YSG99];
[SZ99]; [Gia+03]).
Consequently, flexibility is a requirement that is necessary to achieve supply chain agility. It is
therefore represented as the foundation of the House of Agility. Though a key component, it is
not the only capability needed to achieve supply chain agility. Enhanced responsiveness is
also a major capability of an agile supply chain [SS07]. Two other key ingredients of agility are
visibility and velocity [CLP04]; [CP04]. A complementary capability is mentioned by [Oko+08],
for whom agility in a supply chain is the combination of effectiveness and responsiveness in a
flexible environment.
As shown in Table 4.3 on the next page, our framework will be organized in the following order
and manner: flexibility is broken down into four capabilities (volume, delivery, mix and prod-
uct flexibilities); responsiveness into three capabilities (reactivity, velocity and visibility); and
effectiveness is composed of completeness and reliability. All these enable to provide a quick
and adequate response to short-term changes. The definitions of these capabilities are given
in Table 4.3. It also provides an overall assessment of humanitarian and commercial supply
chains, thus moderating our approach. Indeed, even if humanitarian are a step ahead for most
agility capabilities, some of them are more developed in the private sector. A comparative
analysis of each sector is thus essential to better define the scope of the study and comprehend
the value of our approach. Table 2.1 on page 29, presented in section 2.7 provides some inputs
on the matter.
Based on this discussion, we can define supply chain agility as the ability to respond quickly
and adequately to short-term changes in demand, supply or the environment. It is derived from
the flexibility, responsiveness and effectiveness of the supply chain.
Quick and adequate 
reponse to short term changes
Agility
Complete
ness
Reliability
Visibility
Reactivity
Velocity
E
ffe
c
tiv
e
n
e
s
s
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
iv
e
n
e
s
s
Product 
flexibility
Delivery 
flexibility
Mix Flexibility
Volume 
Flexibility
Flexibility
Figure 4.2: House of Supply Chain Agility
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5
How should supply chain agility be
assessed?
5.1 Why assessing agility?
If we presume that agility is the future business system that will replace the mass production
businesses of today [Kid95], then it will be of prime importance to have a logical, consistent,
robust and reproducible model that will be used to assess supply chain agility. This is true for
the business, as well as for the humanitarian sector where a high level of agility is needed. The
use of a model to assess supply chain agility should:
• Emphasize the vital need of humanitarians for preparedness, and this would consti-
tute an additional argument to motivate their donors to increase funds for disaster
preparedness actions.
• Provide supply chain managers with effective ways of collaborating with other stake-
holders in order not only to enhance benchmarking and cross-organizational learning,
but also to mutually improve the agility capabilities of their supply chains.
• Enable to measure performance, better manage skills and abilities, and facilitate knowl-
edge management, which constitutes a path toward self-improvement.
In this chapter, we will start by studying existing methods of assessing agility capabilities. Then,
we will explain the reasons why we propose a benchmark for humanitarian supply chains
and also discuss the consequences of this study of cross-organizational learning on the scope
of our work. To carry out this benchmark, we have designed a case study. Indeed, “the case
study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real
life events such as individual life cycles, organizational and managerial processes, changes in
the neighbourhood, international relations and the maturation of industries” [Yin02]. This
fits our purpose to assess the agility of supply chains. For this study, we gathered documents,
archival records and twelve semi-directive interviews of practitioners working in various
regions (Europe, Middle-East or Africa) and at different organizational levels (headquarters,
57
Supply Chain Agility — Definition, Assessment and Improvement
regional logistics centers or field workers). Chapter 6 on page 63 summarizes the evidence
collected from the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
(IFRC) ([Sec07]; [Sec08]; [Ols07] [Bus07]; [Jon08]; [Goo08]; [Zub08]; [Ryc07]), “Medecins Sans
Frontières” (MSF) [Lab08] and the French Red Cross [Gre09]. Other organizations such as
Oxfam and the World Food Program were also approached but with more informal interviews.
Finally, we will present our model for assessing supply chain agility, its construction and its
implementation using a real life case study. To build the assessment model, we used a symbolic
modeling approach. A symbolic model is a representation of the performance measure of
a system in terms of its variables. This means that the attributes of the system are linked
by an equation [Pan04]. In chapter 4 on page 51 we presented a list of attributes of supply
chain agility and in chapter 7 on page 67 we will present a list of metrics associated to these
capabilities, as well as a consistent method to evaluate and aggregate them.
5.2 Existing approaches for assessing the capability level of a system
There are two main approaches for assessing the capability level of a system: maturity assess-
ment and performance evaluation. We have looked at the capability maturity model (CMMI®)
used for assessing the maturity level of organizations, the European Quality Award (EQA)
of the European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) used for auditing the quality
competencies of companies and the Supply Chain Operations Reference model (SCOR model)
used for measuring the performance of supply chains.
5.2.1 EFQM : assessment of quality management
The ISO 9000 norm defines quality as “the ability of a set of inherent characteristics of a product,
system or process to fulfill requirements of customers and other interested parties” [AFN08].
Excellence with regards to quality management is rewarded by quality awards, such as the EQA
in Europe. ISO standards and quality awards set quality requirements that an organisation
has to meet to be certified. The EFQM model allows assessments to be made of organisations’
results using four result criteria (Customer Results, People Results, Company Results, Key
Performance Results). It also judges what enables an organisation to achieve these results with
criteria of five factors (Leadership, Policy and Strategy, People, Partnerships and Resources,
and Processes) [EFQ09]. Criteria such as customer results or partnerships and resources are
also essential for achieving agility. And yet, EFQM, in being too general, is far from being
well-adapted to assess agility. Indeed, “the 2004 state of EFQM is not particularly focused on
the capacity of organisations in terms of absorbing environment changes or on organisations
with a project orientation” [MM07]. In its 2010 release though, the EFQM strengthened the
attributes "speed" and "flexibility". It nevertheless remains fairly general and not focused on
agility.
The EFQM model is not suitable for humanitarian organisations or for industrial sectors that
are faced with frequent short-term changes. In both cases, the emphasis on strict procedures
and their documentation may particularly go against agility. For these reasons, EFQM cannot
be used in our specific case.
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5.2.2 CMMI®: assessment of maturity level
As we have seen in the previous paragraph, EFQM is not usable in our specific case. As
for the CMMI®maturity model, it follows a slightly different approach, which may seem
more appropriate for assessing agility levels. Unlike quality standards that are internally
focussed and define a standard that an organisation may achieve or not, maturity models
define levels of maturity that organisations can use to evaluate their processes. The ISO 15504-
7 norm, an assessment of organisational maturity, defines organisational maturity as the
“extent to which an organisation consistently implements processes within a defined scope
that contributes to the achievement of its business goals (current or projected)” [AFN08]. A
maturity model is “a model that contains the essential elements of effective processes for one
or more disciplines and describes an evolutionary improvement path from ad hoc, immature
processes to disciplined, mature processes with improved quality and effectiveness” [Uni06].
Two representations of CMMI®may be used, either staged or continuous. Staged representa-
tion uses maturity levels to measure process improvement. These maturity levels apply to an
organisation’s overall maturity. Sets of pre-defined process areas outline an improvement path
for the organisation. Continuous representation, on the other hand, uses capability levels to
measure process improvements. Improvements are characterised relative to an individual pro-
cess area. Based on its business objectives, an organisation selects the process areas in which
it wants to improve and to what degree. Instead of maturity levels, capability levels ranging
from 0 to 5 are used to measure improvement. This enables an organisation to implement
process improvement in different process areas at different rates, but the path toward overall
maturity improvement may be blurred. For example, an organisation may reach a capability
level of 0 for one process area and a capability level of 3 for another.
Neither EFQM nor CMMI®can readily be used. The design of a specific model for agility capa-
bilities is necessary as CMMI®has more than five hundred pages. This leaves little room for
interpretation and makes it a time-consuming process, and therefore not usable in humanitar-
ian organisations. Moreover, the emphasis on strict procedures and their documentation could
lead to bureaucratic behaviour. It also aims to stabilise processes, which is not a fundamental
characteristic of agile processes.
This thesis provides a model for particular application domains, i.e. organisations that have to
cope with short-term changes in supply, demand or the environment. In our study, the focus
is on supply chains instead of organisations and the highest level characterises a supply chain
that achieves a high level of agility, i.e. that responds quickly and adequately to short-term
changes in demand, supply or environment.
5.2.3 Performance measurement systems - SCOR model
Supply chain performance measurement systems, such as the SCOR model, use a language
of common metrics with associated benchmarks and provide a platform for best-in-class
comparison and inspiration [HSW04]. Some of the performance dimensions in the SCOR
Model are required to achieve supply chain agility but the model cannot be used to assess
agility either, for it focuses on transactional efficiency rather than on the relationship with
customers and suppliers [LGC05].
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Table 5.1: SCOR Performance attributes and level1 metrics [Cou06]
Performance Attributes
Level 1 Metrics Customer-Facing Internal-Facing
Reliability Responsiveness Flexibility Costs Assets
Perfect Order Fulfillment X
Order Fulfillment Cycle Time X
Upside Supply Chain Flexibility X
Upside Supply Chain Adaptability X
Downside Supply Chain Adaptability X
Supply Chain Management Costs X
Cost of Goods Sold X
Cash-to-Cash Cycle Time X
Return on Supply Chain Fixed Assets X
Return on Working Capital X
5.2.4 Conclusion - construction of a specific model, inspired from existing tools
Finally, we believe that our quest to define a specific model for assessing agility represents a real
need that neither quality awards nor actual maturity models (or performance measurement
systems) can satisfy. Our proposition follows a similar approach as maturity models but
the assessment is done on performance dimensions rather than on the completeness of the
process implementation. This is because firstly, stabilized processes are not a fundamental
characteristic of agile processes and secondly, processes are only one of the various areas to
work on. People, products and partners are also elements that impact the capability levels (see
Table 5.1). Actually, to be able to react quickly and adequately to short-term changes, specific
processes are needed, but these processes should be able to move quickly from one stabilized
state to another. Having them stabilized may help, for example, in terms of visibility, but it is
not enough to achieve agility.
5.3 Existing models to assess agility : fuzzy logic
Our review of the literature showed three articles with models to assess the agility of organisa-
tions or supply chains, based on fuzzy logic [JBD08]; [LCT06a] and [Bot09].
Fuzzy logic is the precise logic of imprecision and approximate reasoning [Zad08]. More
specifically, fuzzy logic may be viewed as an attempt at formalisation/mechanisation of two
remarkable human capabilities. First, the capability to converse, reason and make rational
decisions in an environment of imprecision, uncertainty, incompleteness of information, con-
flicting information, partiality of truth and partiality of possibility – in short, in an environment
of imperfect information. And second, the capability to perform a wide variety of physical and
mental tasks without any measurements and any computations [ZK99].
The authors’ main arguments for the use of fuzzy logic instead of any other method is that
they find the attributes linked to agility assessment too qualitative and ambiguous [Lin09].
As a consequence, they propose in their approach to allow the use of subjective descriptions
using linguistic terms, which indeed cannot really be handled effectively using conventional
assessment approaches. Our approach complements theirs as we propose to adapt the metrics
rather than the assessment methods. Our model, with questions that are less open than theirs,
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facilitates the assessment as it limits the cases where interviewees do not know what they
should answer. It also fills one of the limitations expressed by Lin, who recognises that further
research is necessary "to compare the efficiency of different models for measuring agility"
[Lin09].
The final advantage of our approach is also its easy usage. Explaining the results of the
assessment to companies may not be straightforward when we look at the complex algorithm
proposed by [JBD08], for example.
5.4 Conclusion : construction of a specific model, but without
reinventing the wheel
We believe our quest to define a specific agility model meets a real need, that neither Quality
Awards nor actual maturity models or performance measurement frameworks are answering.
Our model follows a similar approach than maturity models. It focuses on assessing supply
chain agility levels. Yet, the assessment is done on performance dimensions instead of the
completeness of process implementation because stabilized processes are not a fundamental
characteristic of agile processes. Indeed, to be able to react quickly and adequately to short
term changes, you need specific processes in place, but you also need to be able to modify
your processes, to jump from one stabilized state to another quickly. Having them stabilized
may help in terms of visibility for example, but it is far from sufficient to achieve agility.
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6
Humanitarian supply chains: the
experience of uncertainties
6.1 Scope of our study
The notions of change and uncertainty that we have previously discussed are closely connected
to that of agility. Uncertainties are omnipresent in the humanitarian world. There are many
occasions where humanitarian supply chains have to develop their agility capabilities and
they often do that successfully. One has to pay close attention to the elements that distinguish
humanitarian supply chains from commercial supply chains in order to transfer the best
practices of the former to the latter. Because of the differences, studies of the agility capabilities
of humanitarian supply chains need to be filtered and adapted before they can be used in
the business sector (see table 2.1 on page 29). First, our study will focus on the whole supply
chain, except the manufacturing part, since it is irrelevant both from a humanitarian point of
view and from an academic perspective (see chapter 4 on page 51 ). Secondly, we focused on
suppliers and end users, but not on donors. We also did not consider the manufacturing part,
thereby focusing on the elements that are common to most supply chains.
Lastly, our study focusses on the assessment of agility and helps to visualise a path toward
improvement. The assessment of the most appropriate level of agility for a given supply chain
is also needed to complement our approach. Indeed, relief chains have a short life cycle and
are set up under specific conditions, thus facing more uncertainties. They therefore require a
high level of agility. Not all commercial supply chains require such agility capabilities [Hun+99].
Consequently, a clarification of the level of agility needed for a given supply chain is required
prior to any cross-learning implementation. Such a study may be inspired from Weber, who
proposes a tool for measuring an organisation’s need for agility [Web02].
6.2 Case Study : Humanitarian methods to achieve supply chain agility
The next step in the development of our assessment model entails creating explicit humani-
tarian methods that enable to achieve supply chain agility. David Kaatrud, former Chief of
Logistics for the United Nations World Food Program (WFP), explains that in comparison to
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the business sector, their “operational settings are typically very different and difficult, and to
get supplies to the most remote areas, we may have to resort to a range of imaginative and
unconventional delivery systems, from air-dropping to using elephants for transport” [TW09].
Many operations abound with examples where humanitarian agility has been demonstrated.
Take the 2002 food crisis in southern Africa, for example. “In the middle of WFP’s operation
to send food to the most affected areas, news broke that the food, mostly donated by the US
Government, was genetically modified. Many African countries refused the food” [TW04].
Demand had changed. With the fear of contamination of their fields, GMO was no longer
an option, even if it meant a delay in getting food supplies. As a consequence, WFP ended
up with tons of food that no longer satisfied demand. They had to deal with the stranded
shipments and find some place to store the cargo while also minimising the wastage caused
by humidity. And all this in addition to the cost of replacing the genetically modified food with
non-genetically modified alternatives.
In the end, the organisation moved quickly and decided to mill the genetically modified food.
However, large-scale milling had not been foreseen and had new implications for the operation.
WFP had to incorporate the milling process with new distribution routes, a bagging process
and storage. This limited the type of transportation that could be used and therefore also
increased costs. However, WFP was able to turn what at first assessment seemed a negative
situation into a positive one. For example, milling the genetically modified maize meant that
they could add much-needed vitamins and minerals to boost the immune systems of those
weakened by HIV. It also had wider implications, as local mills that had stood empty for many
years were reopened, creating employment and encouraging regional purchases which, in
turn, stimulated the economies of African countries [TW09]. This provides a clear example
of a humanitarian organisation managing to respond quickly and adequately to short term
changes.
They also developed specific tools to better monitor their supply chains and enable a quicker
response to changes. The Humanitarian Logistics Software (HLS), for example, enables the
International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) to increase its supply chain visibility. Similar
logistics software, such as HELIOS, the second generation of HLS or SUMA (SUpply MAn-
agement) is in use or under deployment in other agencies, namely Oxfam and World Vision
International for HELIOS and the World Health Organization (WHO) for SUMA. Specific plat-
forms for sharing information have also been developed. ReliefWeb, the website of United
Nations Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC) or Humanitarian Information Centers allow various
stakeholders to use the information given to build their knowledge of the situation and, with
it, take effective action in the field [TW05b].
Short term changes are thus humanitarians’ daily routine. To cope with uncertainties, they
have developed quite a good number of methods. Whereas most of them are widespread
in many organizations, others are not so commonly used. To help humanitarians formalize
those practices and enable the business sector to draw from them, we have designed and
conducted a case study research as earlier explained. The methods used by the IFRC to quickly
respond to changes are shown in table 6.1 on the next page. A reference to the corresponding
methods that are listed in the literature is added. It is inspired from [Lee04]; [HHC01]; [SGM06]
and [LCT06b]. Surprisingly (or perhaps not), majority of the methods found in the literature
are applied in the humanitarian sector. Those that cannot be found have no application for
humanitarian supply chains since they concern agile manufacturing.
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7
Supply chain agility assessment model
7.1 Metrics
7.1.1 Literature review and list of metrics
As we mentioned earlier, humanitarian and commercial supply chains differ on many points.
Therefore, for the transfer of best practices to be relevant, we need to focus on the agility
metrics that are relevant for both supply chains. This leads to a fundamental question: how
can agility capabilities be assessed in a consistent manner?
With reference to chapter 4, the agility of a supply chain is derived from its flexibility, respon-
siveness and effectiveness. Some agility metrics can be found in the literature ([HHC01];
[Sla05]; [Oko+08]; [KMS95]; [ND99]; [SS90]; [KS09]). Unfortunately, most of the metrics listed
are not relevant for humanitarians since they usually focus on the manufacturing part and
deal with the production of goods. We have thus refined the tables such as to list only agility
indicators that are relevant for both sectors, hence dropping the metrics that are used to assess
manufacturing agility (see Table 7.1 on the following page).
7.1.2 Importance of people, process, product and partners
Many elements impact the capability of a supply chain to be agile. Having the right processes
defined and implemented is obviously necessary if a supply chain wants to ensure what
could be called a given level of maturity in terms of agility. Though primordial, processes are
not sufficient to ensure agility. (see section 5.2 on page 58) We have therefore retained four
different categories that have to be worked on:
• Processes = Design and management of supply chains, information systems
• People = Human resources, their presence, training, organisation and team effectiveness
• Products = Innovation, customisation
• Partners = Customer and supplier involvement and agreements
Each of these categories has its associated metrics.
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7.2 Assessment grids
From these metrics, an assessment of the agility capabilities of the supply chain has to be
deduced. For this specific purpose, we used a symbolic modeling approach. The idea is to use
the above metrics to measure each capability. They will enable to qualify the supply chain to a
given level for each capability, using evaluation grids such as the one suggested in Tables 7.2
and 7.3 on page 71. Grids for the evaluation of other capabilities are presented in appendix.
As we can see in those Tables, supply chain agility metrics are linked by equations in order to
enable a consistent assessment of each capability. Supply chain agility can then be deduced
from the previous scores on the basis of the model exposed in Table 7.4 on page 72. The
method used to build these equations is similar to the one used to build the CMMI®Maturity
Model: brainstorming and validation by practitioners. To conduct an overall assessment of
supply chain agility, each capability (flexibility, responsiveness and effectiveness) has to be
evaluated through its evaluation grid. Special care has been taken to keep it as robust and
reproducible as possible.
To illustrate how to use the model, we conducted an assessment of the agility of IFRC’s relief
chain during its response to the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake. The detailed scores of the
responsiveness of IFRC’s supply chain correspond to the darker cells in Table 7.3 on page 71.
The overall assessment is summarized in table 7.4 on page 72. To increase the visibility of
both results and path forward, these results can be presented in the form of a radar graph,
as shown in Figure 7.1 on page 74. On the 0 – 3 scale for the capability levels, we can see
that IFRC scored 3 on velocity, 2 on reactivity and 1 on visibility. Indonesia being used to
natural disasters, its National Society has developed contingency plans and the local delegation
fosters a Regional Disaster Response Team, a trained team of experts with pre-prepared field
equipment, including computers and telecommunications. These teams are deployed from
the region and are therefore more likely to point out local specificities and adequately evaluate
the needs of beneficiaries. They helped increase reactivity. IFRC has also developed units to
respond to specific needs, for example, IT and telecommunications, and referral hospital or
logistics. Dispatching these units definitively contributed to increasing velocity and reactivity
levels. Consequently, IFRC’s velocity and reactivity levels are quite high. Regarding visibility,
IFRC scored only 1 for this specific operation. Actually, following their decentralization process,
they had a system in place to track the location and status of goods at the regional level. Since
it was their first operation with such an organization, the information flow was not optimal.
During the first days of the operation, there was no tracking system in place. They had parallel
pipelines, which hindered visibility and reporting lines were not clearly defined.
7.3 Assessment method
The aim of the evaluation grid proposed in Tables 7.2 on the next page and 7.3 on page 71 is to
assess the velocity, and then responsiveness of supply chains, once a similar table for visibility
and reactivity is filled to complement the assessment grid for velocity. Other similar tables have
been built to assess the overall agility level. To make the best out of it, it should not be used
without a method that should provide organizations with instructions on how to use it, as well
as improvement paths that would enable to achieve higher levels in the grid. The assessment
of supply chain agility starts with the preparation phase, where the person in charge of the
audit selects the participants to be interviewed, selects and prepares the assessment team
and develops the assessment plan. The second phase consists in conducting the assessment.
To do this, interviews, records and documentation are used to gather relevant information
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Agility level 5
Flexibility = 3
Reactivity = 3
Velocity = 3
Effectiveness = 3
Visibility ≥ 2
Agility level 4
Flexibility ≥ 2
Reactivity ≥ 2
Velocity≥ 2
Effectiveness ≥ 2
Visibility ≥ 1
Agility level 3
Flexibility ≥ 2
Reactivity ≥ 1
Velocity≥ 1
Agility level 2
Flexibility ≥ 1
Agility level 1
Flexibility < 1
Table 7.4: Assessment of Supply Chain Agility
Key Improvement Capability Level
Area 0 1 2 3
Volume Flexibility Agility
Delivery Flexibility Maturity Agility
Mix Flexibility 2 Maturity
Product Flexibility Agility 3
Reactivity Maturity
Velocity 1
Reliability Agility Agility
Completeness Maturity Maturity
Visibility 4 5
and generate results. Once the results are validated, the final report can be delivered and
documented. The final step consists then in developing the improvement plan, with the aim
of achieving the desired levels for all capabilities.
Table 7.5: Assessment method
1. Prepare assessment
Familiarize with maturity model
Select participants
Develop assessment plan
Select and prepare assessment team
2. Conduct assessment
Conduct interviews
Study records and documents
Document and verify gathered information
Generate and validate assessment results
3. Finalize assessment
Deliver final report and document assessment (Filled
assessment grids and Radar graph)
4. Plan for improvement
Select and prioritize improvement initiatives
Develop improvement plan
To design the improvement plan, two options are open to the organization. Either it focuses on
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Table 7.6: IFRC Agility Assessment - Summarized results
Key Improvement Capability Level
Area 0 1 2 3
Volume Flexibility X
Delivery Flexibility X
Mix Flexibility X
Product Flexibility X
Reactivity X
Velocity X
Reliability X
Completeness X
Visibility X
the capabilities with the lowest score or it focuses on sets of pre-defined capabilities depending
on its current and desired agility level. The first option enables an organization to implement
process improvement in different process areas at different rates. The capabilities that the
organization wants to focus on are evaluated independently using their specific evaluation grid,
for example, Table 7.3 on page 71 for the assessment of responsiveness. The second option is
illustrated in Figure 7.4. To use it, each capability has to be assessed with its evaluation grid.
The results are then aggregated to qualify the supply chain to a given level of agility. There are
5 levels of overall agility (Ad Hoc, Repeatable, Defined, Managed and Optimized) and 4 levels
for each capability that can be assessed thanks to the metrics defined in the previous section.
A rough correspondence between agility maturity and capability levels is illustrated in Figure
7.4. The improvement path may be either increasing a given capability (depending on the
organization’s strategy) or increasing the overall agility level by targeting a given profile. For
example, an organization that has achieved a capability level of 2 on all dimensions (flexibility,
reactivity and velocity) may want to increase its agility level by working on its reliability and
completeness.
Let us now go back to our previous application – the IFRC solution to the 2006 Yogyakarta
earthquake. Figure 7.1 shows the summarized results of this example.
7.4 Guiding Thread 3 Assessing supply chain agility during Jogjakarta’s
operations
As we can see in the figure, IFRC achieved capability levels of 2 for flexibility, reactivity and
reliability, 3 for velocity and completeness and 1 for visibility. Consequently, its agility level
is ranked 4 (Managed) for this relief operation. A realistic improvement plan should first
be discussed with the IFRC management team in order to validate the desired level. One
recommendation that ensues from these results could be to start by improving the flexibility
of the supply chain thanks to an improvement of their supply chain design. They can also
improve their reactivity by coordinating with other organisations to pool field assessment
reports. Finally, visibility could be increased thanks to the rework of their information system
in order to enable the tracking and spreading of information about nature, number and status
of entities transiting through the end to end supply chain. This would include a tracking
system for the last mile delivery of items.
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Figure 7.1: IFRC Agility Assessment - Radar graph
This is the first application of our model. Further research is underway to use this tool in other
situations. In the case of project-oriented supply chains, as is the case for the humanitarian
and some industrial sectors, the study can be carried out in two ways:
• For a single organization, assess the agility of the supply chain in multiple projects in
order to evaluate the consistency, evolution, min, max and average level of their supply
chain agility.
• For a given type of project, assess the agility of the supply chain of various organizations.
For example, how well did various organizations perform during the 2009 hurricane
season in the Caribbean?
Such a study will enable to identify best practices and gaps, first steps toward self-improvement
and opportunities for the transfer of best practices.
7.5 A practical tool to facilitate the assessment
To facilitate the assessment and the analysis of results, an application in MS Excel has been
developed. This provides a quick and user-friendly utilisation of our model.
Figures 7.2; 7.3 and 7.4 provide a brief overview of its added value.
As you can see in figure 7.4 on page 76, an analysis of the results for one organisation, as well as
a comparison of various organisations, are possible. This figure illustrates some of the possible
dimensions for the analysis. Others are also available, specific to humanitarian organisations,
to private companies or usable by both.
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Figure 7.2: Main page of the tool
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Figure 7.3: Assessment of Reactivity
For each question below, please choose one answer among these propositions.
How often are intermediate and end users assessed ?
return validate
RESPONSIVENESS - Reactivity
QUESTION
Level 0 - No assessement
Level 1 - Intermediate user's needs are assessed on a yearly basis ; no assessement of end user needs
Level 2 - Intermediate user's needs are assessed on a monthly basis; end user needs at least once a year
Level 3 - Evaluation and assessement of all user needs is done on a weekly or daily basis
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Figure 7.4: A few examples of potential analysis and comparisons
(a) Comparison of many organizations - Analysis
Data that concerns only charity organizations
Agility by elpased time before an 
action
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(b) Comparison of many organizations - Agility resultsreturn
Effectiveness Responsivenness Flexibility Agility Exhaustivité CompletenessVelocity Reactivity Visibility Mix product Volume Product Delivery
3 2 2 4 3 2 3 2 1 2 2 2 3
2 2 1 3 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
3 3 3 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 0 1organization3
Organizations compared
IFRC
organization1
organization2
Comparison by key capability
3
22
2
1
33
1
0
1
2
3
Effectiveness
ResponsivennessFlexibility
IFRC organization1 organization2 organization3
0
1
2
3
Effectiveness
Exhaustivité 3 1 3 1
Completeness 2 2 3 2
IFRC organization organization organization
0
1
2
3
Responsivenness
Velocity 3 2 3 2
Reactivity 2 2 3 1
Visibility 1 1 3 0
IFRC organizatio organizatio organizatio
0
1
2
3
Flexibility
Mix product 2 1 3 0
Volume 2 1 3 1
Product 2 1 3 0
Delivery 3 1 3 1
IFRC organization1 organization2 organization3
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Conclusion and Perspectives
As we have shown is this thesis, humanitarians have developed tools and methods to quickly
respond to changes. Yet, especially in the humanitarian context, it is hard, if not impossible, to
extensively develop some of the agility capabilities enumerated in chapter 4 on page 51. Total
visibility, for example, is not easily achievable by humanitarians, for not only there is usually
no single entity responsible for the whole supply chain, but also there are few systems in place
to share information between all the actors of the end-to-end supply chain.
On the other side, given the highly competitive and uncertain business environments in
which they operate, commercial supply chains constantly search for new ways of developing
their agility capabilities in order to improve their competitiveness and profitability. Thus,
supply chain agility is a strategically important capability in many sectors, including the
humanitarian.
The contributions of this part are twofold. First, it provides a framework, represented in the
form of a House of Supply Chain Agility, that enables to understand the notion of supply chain
agility. Secondly, it develops a model for assessing the agility of a supply chain. The expertise of
humanitarians in the field of supply chain agility is used to suggest some systematic methods
used to achieve a high level of agility. We also propose some metrics and a proceeding method
that can be used to evaluate supply chain agility. All this will constitute a basis for future field
research, with the aim of identifying and transferring best practices in supply chain agility. This
work will therefore be followed by field applications for various humanitarian relief operations
as well as for some commercial supply chains.
Finally, by making explicit the performance dimensions of agility, we also underlined areas to
work on, should a supply chain want to improve its agility level. As we have shown, to achieve
a high level of agility, the adequacy between storage and delivery capacity and needs, the
delivery lead times and the percentage of demand fulfilled within acceptable time frame are
vital. So are the number of worldwide storage/distribution facilities and the availability of
adequate transportation modes. All in all, there are 11 out of 24 metrics, that are linked with
how the supply chain is configured (see figure 7.5 on the following page). The last part of this
thesis will therefore focus on the design of logistics networks under high level of uncertainties
regarding supply, demand or environment.
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Quick and adequate 
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Figure 7.5: Why focusing on the design of agile supply chains?
78
IIIPAR
T
Supply Chain Network Design
Purpose: As agility often depends on the adequacy between delivery capacity and needs, this
part aims at designing a logistics network under high levels of uncertainty, so that for a given
level of service in terms of agility, it maximises its efficiency. Our study quantifies the impact
on costs of various decisions, such as network centrality, supply strategy and level of service.
We therefore provide some recommendations, aiming at helping humanitarian organisations
to define their logistics strategy.
Design/methodology/approach: Methods used for this research are mathematical modelling
and literature review.
Findings: Many factors can influence the number and location of warehouses where stock
should be pre-positioned to enable a quick response to disasters at lesser costs. Some re-
gions, such as South-Central Asia can nevertheless be pinpointed as optimal places to hold a
warehouse, whatever the conditions.
Research limitations: We limited our study to the most important issues faced by humanitar-
ian organisations. Many research perspectives, such as the study of specific resources (vehicles,
human resources) are still open. Additional runs to validate the robustness of the model as
well as its sensitivity to data and parameters with more precision are currently underway. A
field validation of those results with humanitarian organisations would also be required.
Originality and value: We have designed our study on the basis of input from and discussions
with humanitarian practitioners. Uncertainties with regards to demand and supply have also
been considered. Local parameters have also been taken into account in order to minimise
environment uncertainties. This quantified analysis about the decentralisation of a supply
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chain, its motivations and the importance of each decision variable are of prime importance
in our globalised world, for any line of business.
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Competitiveness also exists in the humanitarian world. Flexibility, responsiveness and effec-
tiveness are essential in order to respond to the needs of the beneficiaries. They could be
taken as the “order-qualifiers” of humanitarian response. As for “order-winner”, efficiency
is increasingly favoured by donors as a means of ensuring the money they give is used in an
optimum manner. Whereas speed and effectiveness have already received a lot of attention
from humanitarian organisations, efficiency has still to be worked on.
As we have seen previously, 30 to 50% of what enables an organisation to be agile is closely
linked with its supply network. This part will therefore focus on this specific component of
supply chain agility by designing and dimensioning a network aimed at ensuring a desired
level of agility in the most efficient way.
Up until now, humanitarians have on the majority of occasions used existing opportunities as
a means of configuring their logistics networks. They build their stocks where they already
have people working or where a "good spot" has been found; like proximity of an airport
or special agreements with a country with regards to its custom procedures and taxes. By
failing to think a little more about what else is available, they are consequently narrowing
their options and often missing out on better locations. They can also choose a location based
on criteria that may not be the most relevant. Some work has already been done in this area
(WVI GPRN1, CARE USA work with Georgia Tech, FEMA2 studies) but all are tailor made and
few are published, which hinders transfer of best practices. Moreover, they usually focus on
relief items pre-positioning, forgetting human resources and vehicles, and usually maximise
effectiveness, not efficiency.
Our proposition is to help humanitarians to configure their logistic network so that for a given
level of service in terms of reactivity and completeness, they improve their efficiency. This
would be done through a deeper analysis of the optimum locations for their resources to be
held. To optimise the location and dimensioning of resources, we need to:
• Analyse how things are currently done, and why (see chapter 8 on page 83)
• Motivate our approach, by making explicit the drivers for pre-positioning resources on a
local level (see chapter 9 on page 91) and for using OR3 methods to design a logistics
network (see chapter 10 on page 97)
• Model future demand, taking into account changes in disaster trends and other influen-
tial factors like urbanisation (see chapter 11 on page 103)
1World Vision International, Global Pre-positioning Resource Network
2Federal Emergency Management Agency
3Operations Research
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• Make explicit the targets to be met, the constraints and the objective (see chapter 12 on
page 113)
• Analyse the results and the sensitivity of the model (see chapter 13 on page 123)
• Provide a decision-support model to choose within the regions the best country to open
a warehouse (see chapter 14 on page 149)
Many humanitarian organisations have recently reorganised their logistics networks or are
currently in the process of thinking about it. Care USA, World Vision International, the IFRC4,
MSF5 or WFP6 and other UN agencies have expressed their concern with, along with an interest
in, facility location problems. They ask questions such as: “What stock should we hold? How
much and where? How should it be managed and how do we ensure what we think is needed
matches the needs of logistics’ primary stakeholders?” [IFR07b]
These are common questions among the international disaster relief community. This problem
is therefore an interesting one, and worth taking a look at, both because of its impact on agility
and because of its importance for many humanitarian organisations. Our aim is to help NGOs7
to answer those questions by providing a quantified analysis of their logistics network.
As there are already many warehouses in existence all over the world (see chapter 8), we
provide a model, which enables them to answer such questions as "What is the optimal
network configuration (one or two stages)? How many warehouses should we have? Where?
Which size? What would be the impact of various supply strategies on the design of the
network?" We will first provide elements to answer these questions in a situation where we do
not take existing warehouses into account. We will then focus on one existing network and
discuss its design, making explicit the comfort zones, for which the actual network is fine, and
providing input that will help decide if new warehouses should be added, or if existing ones
should be relocated or closed.
For information purposes, IFRC’s8biggest warehouse is no more than 3000m3 and has only
10 employees, so in relocation terms there would be limited social and economic impact.
From an academic point of view, the problems of facility location are a huge area of research.
Humanitarians’ constraints and uncertainties are not only interesting to tackle because of
their complexity, but also because of their potential value for the private sector. They will also
give insights regarding how to deal with supply, demand and environment uncertainties.
The idea is to build a model usable by any organisation; that is easily customised, and takes
into account each organisation’s specificities. As input includes localisation of suppliers for
example, we have based our analysis on the IFRC network.
4International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
5Medecins sans Frontieres - Doctors without Borders
6World Food Program
7Non Governmental Organisations
8International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
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8.1 The United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot
Since 2000, the UNHRD1 has consisted of five warehouses located in South Europe (Brindisi
/ Italy), Western Africa (Accra / Ghana), Western Asia (Dubai / UAE), South Eastern Asia
(Subang / Malaysia) and Central America (Panama City / Panama). Up until now, their largest
warehouse was in Italy, covering 15150m3 in total (open + covered space, including cold
room). Dubai, currently covering 10,000m3, is being relocated to a much bigger place, where
120,000m32 in total will be available to store relief items. They are managed by the WFP3, who
maintain both HRD’s4 Programme and Operational Support Stock.
Many other organisations have signed agreements to link their networks with the UNHRD.
They have specific procedures for both release and stock management. Most of the time,
they maintain their stock in Italy. Various organisations, such as OCHA5, WHO6, INTERSOS7,
UNJLC8, GOAL9, DGCS10 for example maintain program and/or operational stock at Brindisi.
WVI11 is the only organisation, to maintain stock at Brindisi as well as in other depots like
Dubai. Initially, WVI’s global prepositioning network (GPRN12) was independent from UNHRD,
but in the last two last years they have become linked. UNHRD is also managing, under a full
cost recovery system, a stock of Non Food Items and Rapid Response Equipment stored by the
suppliers. The release of this stock is approved by the UNHRD Network Coordinator. There
isn’t anything available to explain the overall decision process in detail, but some criteria have
been given in different UN reports and websites regarding the choice of location: According
1United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot
2figure provided by UNHRD website - http://www.unhrd.org/?page_id=99
3World Food Program
4Humanitarian Response Depot
5Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
6World Health Organisation
7Independent NGO established in 1992 with the active support of Italian Trade Unions
8United Nation Joint Logistics Centre
9International Humanitarian Agency founded in Dublin in 1977
10Directorate General for Development Cooperation (Italian)
11World Vision International
12Global Pre-positioning and Resource Network
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Figure 8.1: United Nations’ Humanitarian Response Depots (UNHRD)
to the UNICEF website, each of the following elements are to be taken into account: ability
to respond to emergencies within 48hrs, quality of infrastructure, effective delivery systems,
sound management, supply base quality, and cost effectiveness. Other UN websites and
reports provide additional criteria (see table 8.1 on the facing page)
They would like to build additional warehouses, mainly in Africa and South East Asia. For
Africa, where aid demand is high and inland transport weak, they intend to open 5 depots. As
for Asia, locations such as Singapore, Beijing, or Tianjin may see a depot opening in the near
future. Some details regarding the choice of their Asian depot can be found in table 14.4
8.2 Situation at the IFRC
8.2.1 Relief Items
In 2006, a budget of CHF6 million (€4million) was approved by IFRC’s management team to
set up 3 RLUs13 so that they could decentralise operational capacity. Three locations were
then chosen for the RLUs. Dubai was to cover Europe and Africa, Kuala Lumpur was chosen to
cover Asia and Australia, and PADRU’s14 Panama location was maintained to cover America.
A number of factors were taken into consideration when making this choice. First of all, these
sites already had extensive IFRC presence, such as the Fleet Base in Dubai, the Asia Pacific
Service in Kuala Lumpur, and PADRU in Panama. Other elements, such as political factors or
the locations’ accessibility to the areas that each RLU would cover also had to be considered.
In Dubai, for example, the RLU would benefit from proximity to Jebel Ali, the world’s largest
man-made harbour and the future site of the world’s largest airport, capable of handling 12
million tons of cargo every year. Finally, the sourcing and supply strategy, pre-positioning
and stocking mechanisms and additional support requirements and availability of National
Society stocks in each region were also taken into account [CGW10].
Since June 2006, the 3 RLUs have been able to deliver mobilisation, procurement, stock,
warehousing and fleet services within their respective geographical region. In Geneva, 14
13Regional Logistics Units
14Pan American Disaster Response Unit
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Table 8.1: Criteria used to choose the location of actual warehouses, according to UN reports
and websites
Depot location Criteria used for the choice of location
all Disaster characteristic data (frequency of occurrence and location)
Brindisi (Italy) Where drought frequently occurs (Africa)
Fixed costs covered by government
Subang (Malaysia) Strong governmental and commercial commitment
Overall quality of human resources
Increasingly well developed infrastructure
Adequate financing
Innovative approach to logistics
Panama Good infrastructure
Excellent communications
Availability of clearing and forwarding agents
Simple custom procedures
Good prospects of obtaining warehousing from government
Proximate to the countries most likely to need assistance
Accra (Ghana) Vicinity of Accra international airport
Able to cover west Africa
Dubai Proximity of Dubai humanitarian city
Able to cover east Africa and south Africa
logisticians have assumed the overall management, strategy and funding responsibilities
for global logistics activities. Some activities such as medical logistics, logistics tools and
standards, global framework agreements and construction contracting also continue to be
managed centrally in Geneva.
These choices for location are still under discussion at IFRC. An internal study indicated that
"the contingency stock15 does not have to be located in Kuala Lumpur. There may, in fact, be
both economic and logistical advantages to holding stock in Singapore" [Dum06].
This is for the warehouses managed by the federation’s RLU, reporting to Geneva. You can also
find sub-regional stocks, this time managed by the 7 zones. Here, the head quarters are not
responsible for management and location. For 2010 and 2011, the IFRC LRMD16 has planned
to work on a better cooperation with heads of zone in terms of stock management for existing
stocks and choice of location for future additional sub-regional warehouses. The main issue is
a political one: not all heads of zone are ready to let Geneva “advise” them.
It is also possible to find local stocks held by national societies, but these are, more often than
not, a part of RLU stocks and/or managed by RLU when dispatched on the field.
8.2.2 Vehicle stocks
As for vehicles, the timing of decentralisation was more or less identical. Until 2005, a unique
global fleet base was available in Dubai. In 2006, they also decentralised their vehicle stock by
15stock pre-positioned in warehouses to enable a quick and massive response to disasters
16IFRC Logistics and resources management Department
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locating 10 to 20 vehicles in each of the 3 RLUS as well as 3 or 4 in some smaller warehouses in
Africa.
The decision to decentralise the vehicle stock was obvious for IFRC staff. “We can fly cars from
Dubai to anywhere in the world, but the question is cost. How to relocate the stocks to be more
efficient in terms of response and costing? How to set up this very initial stock that is required
in our disaster response mandate? Where to locate them and how to manage them? That is
why we are preparing one central stock which is Dubai. At the same time Dubai will be part
of a regional stock, added to Kuala Lumpur and Panama. Because of the nature of disasters,
there are very frequent disasters in Africa which are small or mid-size disasters. That is why
we have decided to locate sub-regional stocks in Africa. This is just for FACT17 teams, to be
able to operate in the first several crucial weeks of the disaster. These sub-regional stocks will
be in Harare, Dakar and Nairobi.” [Zub08]
In terms of cost efficiency, the decision to bring in a dedicated vehicle fleet for each part of
the world, where a disaster relief operation takes place may seem inappropriate. Indeed, to
ship, or at worst, send a vehicle by plane could easily end up costing as much as buying a
brand new vehicle locally could. One alternative solution would then be to buy or rent them
wherever a disaster strikes. This is in fact what some UN agencies are already doing; buying
old military trucks and Jeeps locally at less than one fourth of their price when they need them,
and abandoning them when they leave the operations.[WFP10]
According to IFRC, though, this would not be in line with their safety standards. This is how
they explain their choice of maintaining their own vehicle fleet. “If you look at the concept
of disaster response, we have to be there within 48 hours. We have to be there at the right
time with the right equipment because you don’t have time to waste. What is this car? Is
it in good condition? Can we register it? These are all questions which are not allowed in
disaster situations. That is why we preposition vehicles, we even pre-prepare them with
emergency response capabilities. They have heavy duty bumpers, wind-shields, radios roof
racks, registration plates, so when they are loaded onto the plane for disaster zones, they can
be right away driven off the plane directly into the operation.” [Zub08]
Figure 8.2 on the next page proposes a summary of the existing pre-positioned resources
managed by IFRC headquarters in Geneva.
8.2.3 Human resources
In addition to relief items, vehicles and fixed staff, IFRC disaster management is also based
on pre-trained teams of experts who can be sent to the field as soon as a disaster occurs.
Those ERUs18 are financed by National Societies (NS). They are usually composed of Red Cross
volunteers who have regular work outside the Red Cross movement.
Out of their 35 emergency response teams, 30 are located in Europe, 1 in Japan, 1 in Turkey and
2 in the USA. This is not particularly in line with the localisation of disasters. As a consequence,
to enable better communication on the field with locals, in watsan19 ERU for example, ERU
teams usually include two people from the affected country.
17Field Assessment and Coordination Team
18Emergency Response Units
19Team specialized in issues linked with Water and Sanitation
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Figure 8.2: Available resources at IFRC in 2008
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N
8.3 Aggregated view of existing pre-positioned resources you can find in
various organizations
The two previous sections showed two of the largest existing logistics networks. Other organi-
sations, such as MSF20 or Oxfam have their own network and logistics strategies. MSF has a
fairly centralised network, with a big hub in Bordeaux (France). They have made the decision
not to open new warehouses in other parts of the world, but to extend this one to 11000m3 by
2012. Oxfam, on the other hand, maintains sub-regional stocks were they operate and have
mainly local suppliers. [Wor10]
This diversity in network configurations and the choices for location made by various organi-
sations is illustrated by figure 8.3.
8.4 Scope of our study
Pre-positioning vehicles and human resources is slightly different from pre-positioning relief
items. For vehicles, it is essential that there are spare parts in the right place, in the right
condition and in the right quantities. It is also necessary to have the correct skills in place to
plan and do the maintenance. Finally, it would be essential that everything is sent back to the
warehouse once operations are closed.
As for Human Resources, relocating actual emergency teams could not be done without much
political trouble, as they are usually located in the countries which fund them. Indeed, even
though training, kitting out and sending an emergency team to the field is costly, this expertise
is recognised and visibly linked with the donating country. This visibility would be much more
difficult to achieve if the resources were “foreigners” located in a country close to the disaster.
20Medecins sans Frontiere / Doctors without Borders
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Moreover, according to IFRC [Sec08]; [Jon08], many arguments comfort this course of things.
First, ERUs21 are deployed for big emergencies only, where the main problem is speed, and
not cost. Indeed, on these occasions, there is usually a lot of media coverage, which ensures
sufficient funding from the beginning. In addition, they already have many existing ERUs and
don’t intend to increase their numbers. Should they decide that having well positioned teams
is worth the extra cost involved in increasing the number of ERUs, then they would also have
to accept the inevitable decrease in skill level i.e more teams would mean less deployment for
each. Also to be taken into account is that the relocation of existing ERUs is not possible under
current conditions, as ERU members usually have regular jobs outside IFRC, MoU22 with their
employers only allowing them to leave their jobs when an emergency strikes, for a few weeks
at a time, once or twice a year.
That said, we could still argue that it is possible to pre-position ERU materials, and send only
team members upon emergency. This would dramatically reduce the costs as ERU equipment
is usually both heavy and fragile, including items such as 4x4s and technical equipment. Yet,
ERUs need to train with their material, so it means that they would need two sets of materials.
According to them, it is much easier to have everything in one place and send it together
rather than have it widespread. Studying the pre-positioning of adequate human resources
and means of action with objective tools such as mathematical models would nevertheless
be interesting. First, because it is as vital to have available resources to manage the crisis as
it is to have adequate relief items to distribute. Secondly, because the design of the network
depends on the resources you include in your study. Focusing on relief items without taking
into consideration human resources and means of actions makes the analysis incomplete. Yet,
due to all the above mentioned elements as well as by the necessity to keep this thesis within
an acceptable size, the study of those two elements is considered as future work, outside our
scope. We will nevertheless study the sensitivity of the model to the nature and number of
items to validate our study.
21Emergency Response Units
22Means of Understanding, to precise the conditions under which the ERU team member works for IFRC
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Motivations to decentralize supply chains
As seen in the previous chapter, an increasing number of humanitarian organisations have
successfully opened regional warehouses. They are also thinking about or have already started
to pre-position resources on a local level. Their choice for location, on both a regional and
local level, may be helped by decision-support systems. Our proposition is to use OR1 to help
humanitarians configure their logistics network so that for a given level of service in terms of
agility, they improve their efficiency.
The present chapter explains why the problem of warehouse location for humanitarian or-
ganisations is important. It gathers arguments from practitioners as well as academics on the
need to position humanitarian resources on a local level. It also explains why we choose to
build a specific decision-support system.
9.1 Which motivations to pre-position resources on a local level
9.1.1 Main motivations given by IFRC
IFRC2 Disaster Management’s core project for the years to come consists of developing an
integrated sub-regional stock strategy, identifying optimal stock locations from where support
can be provided and make better use of existing stocks held with other Red Cross / Red
Crescent Societies, the ICRC3 and other partners further increasing our cost effectiveness and
efficiency [IFR07a]. This core project has been defined because IFRC is convinced that having
sub-regional stocks would enable them to “improve customer services by getting nearer to the
field” [Ols07]; [CGW10]
Indeed, it was pointed out that even if RLUs are geographically closer to the regions often struck
by disasters, they are still too far away from the local communities with regards to culture,
knowledge and geographical distance. Hence, some have pointed out that the RLUs become
‘stuck in the middle’ – far away from Geneva as well as the local communities. Establishing
sub-regional warehouses even closer to the disaster prone areas is being discussed [Jah09].
1Operations Research
2International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
3International Committee of the Red Cross, dedicated to disaster relief operations in case of conflicts
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An overall goal is therefore to shorten the response time, even if it lengthens the preparedness
and recovery period [Jah09].
It would also help in terms of visibility. If there is one clear supply chain from supplier to
beneficiaries, the complexity of disaster response would decrease dramatically. Having local
stocks managed by IFRC would reduce the fact that National Societies sometimes enter the
supply chain as parallel systems [Ols07]; [CGW10]. It would therefore improve both visibility
and coordination with national societies and other national NGOs.
In terms of knowledge management, there are many advantages to developing local capacity
by maintaining local stocks. In the current situation, most of the knowledge is lost once
operations are closed. “. . . we build in such a huge infrastructure – people, capacities – and
somehow with the close of the operation, the close of the funding, everything comes down. . .
anything else coming up there, we need to start from scratch. . . We need to build in some
institutional memory, we should have some national staff trained to be able to take over some
responsibilities and retain the experiences. . . .”[Jah09]
Having sub-regional stocks would therefore improve knowledge management and reduce the
impact of high turnover of human resources.
9.1.2 Motivations given by other agencies
Other organisations usually agree on most of IFRC motivations. Short delivery times, reduced
transportation costs and building local capacity are elements, that PAHO4 it enumerates in its
reports for example.
In addition to that, they insist on the fact that, normally, local shipments require less docu-
mentation than international consignments. According to them, it also increases the quality
and predictability of local purchases and supports the local economy [Org01] and increases
local preparedness level (processes, products and partnerships defined) [UNO07], [Org01]
Yet, if many of the advantages in maintaining local stocks are stated, some disadvantages
are nevertheless added. According to PAHO5, local warehouses with local suppliers may be
dangerous as items may not always be available in the quantity and quality needed. It can
also generate competition between organisations for the purchase of a product and can cause
shortages in the local market. Moreover, according to OCHA6, they should pay attention not
to undermine local capacity by developing a parallel network.
To avoid such issues, according to OCHA, humanitarian agencies and their private sector
partners should “work together to engage national and local authorities as much as possible in
their collaborative efforts if appropriate” and “build local skills and resources ensure that their
efforts do not undermine local capacity.” They should “work together to develop partnerships
that are predictable in nature. To this end, long-term partnerships should ideally be developed
in which risk, needs, and support are identified in advance, and all related relationships and
processes are defined in advance for effective partnership implementation. Such long-term
partnerships will allow both parties to continually learn and thus improve the impact of their
relationships on communities affected by humanitarian crises worldwide” [WEFO07].
4Pan American Health Organization
5Pan American Health Organisation
6United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
92
Motivations to decentralize supply chains
9.1.3 Motivations found in the literature
In cases such as ours, where products are more or less universal, one can consider either
centralised or decentralised systems. According to [SKS03], centralised systems are generally
better in terms of safety stock, overhead costs, economies of scale, moreover, they enable
the utilisation of risk pooling. Decentralised systems are better in terms of lead time. As for
transportation costs. . . it depends. Upstream/outbound transportation costs are directly
related to the number of warehouses used (total distance travelled is greater and quantity
discounts are less likely to apply). However, downstream/inbound transportation costs are
likely to fall because the warehouses tend to be much closer to the market areas.
In addition to these elements of performance, if we refer to academics, reflecting on supply
chain design also pushes companies to reflect on Strategy, Strategic Partnering and Procure-
ment Strategies, which are essential questions. “Rethinking your supply chain strategy not
only involves coordinating the different activities in the supply chain, but also deciding what
to make internally and what to buy from outside sources." You can also reflect on “what types
of partnerships can be implemented, and which type should be implemented for a given
situation?” [SKS03].
According to academics, decentralising a logistics network would also decentralise decision
making. If we refer to [Sha00], while centralised decision making is needed to realise efficien-
cies stemming from integration, decentralised decision making is needed for rapid, detailed
execution of operations.
Moreover, “centralized systems allow the sharing of information and, more importantly, the
utilization of this information in ways that reduce the bullwhip effect and improve forecasts.
Finally, they allow the use of coordinated strategies across the entire supply chain – strategies
that reduce system-wide costs and improve service level” [SKS03].
When retailers, manufacturers and distributors have different owners and objectives, it is
recommend “to form partnerships to approach the advantages of a centralized systems.”
[SKS03]
Table 9.1 on the following page summarises all the arguments for and against decentralised
supply chains, from the points of view of both practitioners and academics.
9.2 What we can and cannot take into account
According to PAHO7, some countries have ratified the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations, of 13 February 1946, which includes a series of measures to
expedite the inflow and outflow of humanitarian supplies. Multilateral agreements among
member states of regional pacts, such as the Central American Common Market or the South
American Mercosur, have led to the inclusion, in their customs legislation, of preferential
treatment for such supplies [Org01].
Even taking into account such agreements, it is nevertheless essential "to establish contact
with the customs authorities to learn their procedures and requirements and, if possible,
negotiate special conditions, such as tax exemptions or priority processing of humanitarian
supplies” [Org01]. This should be done during the planning phase, and not during the response
phase as it is sometimes the case.
7Pan American Health Organization
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Motivations to decentralize supply chains
This means that a complete model should include the presence, or not, of international
agreements and therefore the level of ease and costs involved in custom clearance. Yet, the
choice of location by an optimisation model cannot take political negotiations into account,
as we are neither able to gather all existing agreements nor in a position to estimate the
opportunity to add more. We have therefore included an index based on the corruption level
of local authorities, which was the closest indicator we found to describe the willingness of
countries to accept exemption for humanitarian organisations.
For our model to be applicable by humanitarians, we need to take into account some field
specificities, like security, corruption, accessibility and telecommunication means. They are
detailed in chapter 14 on page 149.
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Mathematical models as decision-support
system
10.1 On the need of a specific decision-support system to optimize the
logistic network
Over the last fifteen years, a change towards a recognition of the importance of logistics has
been initiated by major organisations such as the IFRC1 and WFP2. Other “organizations in
the sector are beginning to follow suit and raise the profile and professionalism of logisticians”
[Was06b]
This has lead to the definition of a clear “logistics strategy” for non-profit organisations. Yet,
few or no organisations go as far as using optimisation-based decision-support systems. They
usually limit their searches for locations to countries where they are already established.
This goes against recommendations found in the academic and business world. According to
[SKS03], “a thorough logistics network analysis should consider complex transportation cost
structures, warehouse sizes, manufacturing limitations, inventory turnover ratios, inventory
costs, and service levels. These issues require the use of optimization-based decision-support
systems that can solve large-scale problems efficiently.”
Moreover, having such a system would help in terms of impartiality. “Responses to recent dis-
asters continue to raise issues around the impartiality of humanitarian assistance. Observing
the humanitarian principle of impartiality means that assistance should be given according
to, and be in proportion to, need alone. International humanitarian financing is currently far
from realising the principle of impartiality. The National Audit Office showed in 2003 [DFI03]
that DFID3 had calculated that, since 1997, the per capita level of humanitarian assistance it
had provided in European emergencies had been five times higher than for emergencies in
Africa. The report concluded that it was possible that the discrepancy in resource allocation
was partly attributable to wider strategic considerations” .. source : [DFI03] ref : [Gro06]
1International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
2World Food Program
3Department For International Development (DFID) is a United Kingdom government department
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Table 10.1: Litterature Review
key words ISI
web
Science
Direct
informs MSOM MS OR POM
“facility location” and “disaster” in topic 24 14
Various combinations of “facility location”
“disaster” ‘emergency” “humanitarian”
“supply chain design”
6 1 2 4 1
Humanitarians have also come under increasing pressure to prove to donors, pledging millions
in aid and goods, that they are reaching those in need. This means they must be more result-
oriented as they become more accountable and therefore their operations must be more
transparent [Was06b].
Finally, using OR4 would help to manage the complexity of the problem and to increase
objectivity and impartiality of the decision.
10.2 Existing studies in literature
Table 10.1 summarises the existing articles related to facility location to respond to disaster.
As the total number of articles is too big to provide a detailed analysis of them all, we will
restrict this literature review to the papers and thesis that are either relevant to our study or
representative of existing works ([HM05]; [OEK04]; [AB06]; [Sal10];[Bal08]).
Most of those papers tackle the problem of resources during the response phase, but not
during the preparedness phase. The articles, that take a preparedness point of view, have one
or more of the following particularities:
1. They use only data from past disasters to choose the locations, without considering the
evolution in nature and number of these disasters (they use all past disasters, even those
which happened 100 years ago)
2. They focus on effectiveness maximisation (max coverage)
3. They propose models that can only be implemented on a local point of view.
4. They are too far away from field realities, as they do not take into consideration local
parameters such as security, corruption, accessibility or available telecommunication
means.
5. They focus on relief items pre-positioning and neither validate the sensitivity of their
model to the nature and number of products, nor consider other resources like human
resources and means of action such as vehicles.
Our aim is both to complement those studies and to take into account the specifications asked
by all the humanitarian practitioners that we interviewed. To this end, first, we will propose
4Operations Research
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a study of humanitarian demand, its recent trends and influencing factors. This better fits
with strategic decisions, where outdated data should not be considered. Secondly, we will
not maximise effectiveness, as interviewees, especially at IFRC, insisted that the problem is
not to maximise the coverage because plane deliveries allow them to cover wide distances
quickly. According to them, the idea is more about how to achieve a given level of effectiveness
in the most efficient way. In other words, they would prefer to minimise the costs to meet the
demand in specific time-frames, which is what we propose. Thirdly, we optimise the design of
the global network, taking into account many crises in many parts of the world. We will focus
neither on the management of the network nor on local last mile delivery. We will nevertheless
include some local considerations; to choose the best country once we define which parts
of the world should host a warehouse. Finally, although this thesis only takes into account
relief items, we also analyse the sensitivity of the model to the nature and number of products
considered.
10.3 In our case, how to model the problem ?
10.3.1 Deterministic or Stochastic programming
The usual method of dealing with demand uncertainty is to use a stochastic or robust optimi-
sation model (see table 10.2). Yet, if we refer to [SDR09], the stochastic optimisation model
optimises the random outcome on average. "This is justified when the Law of Large Numbers
can be invoked and we are interested in the long-term performance, irrespective of the fluctu-
ations of specific outcome realizations." In our case, the impact of those "fluctuations" are on
human lives and can be devastating. We therefore aligned with the recommendation provided
by [Sha00], which is to construct multiple scenarios of an uncertain future and optimise a
linear programming model for each scenario. Indeed, "deterministic optimization of a model
of a supply chain planning problem is often the most practical approach. In most planning
situations, the development of points (that is, single) estimates of key parameters is difficult
enough. For such problems, it is not realistic to attempt to develop extensive descriptions of
how the parameters might vary in the future. Although the modeller may sometimes be forced
to acknowledge that a deterministic model is imperfect in its description of the future, the
benefits of using such a model are still substantial."
This choice to use a mixed-integer linear program also enables us to take into account the
IFRC requirement on service level. These constraints to send relief items for 5000 families
within 5 days after the crisis, 15000 families 15 days after the crisis, and the overall demand
after 2 months induce a dependence over time, which is not easy to model with a stochastic
approach.
We use a scenario approach, as it results in more tractable models. It also allows the parameters
to be statistically dependent and thus enabling to model reality, where parameters are usually
dependants and therefore difficult to model. For example, demands are often correlated across
time periods or geographical regions and costs are often correlated among suppliers [Sny06].
Next chapter (ch. 11 on page 103) provides elements to better understand humanitarian
demand and explains how we have used those elements to build our scenarios.
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10.4 Overview - What are we doing exactly?
Our model aims at answering questions that many humanitarian organisations have been
asking themselves recently:
• How many warehouses should we open?
• What is the optimal size of warehouses?
• Where should we position resources to enable a quick and adequate answer to disaster?
• Shall we keep existing warehouses or relocate them?
To answer these questions, we have developed a mixed-integer linear programme. Its inputs
are as follow:
• The "demand", established using a list of past crises, represents an estimated demand
per person in disaster cases and the probabilities of such disasters evolving. We also
impose a given level of service, reflecting the numbers rescued and delays in response-
time. (see section 11.4)
• Costs and delays relating to the purchase of items, running warehouses, delivering items
from suppliers to warehouses, and from warehouses to beneficiaries, by air and by sea.
(see section 12.2)
• The actual locations of suppliers. (see section 12.4)
This last point can, and should, be modified, partly because supply is uncertain in the con-
text of humanitarian aid (see part 1), and also because local warehouses are opened and
operated by humanitarian organisations to build local capacity, which in turn contributes to
strengthening the local supply network.
Various simulations have therefore been run to examine how the availability of local suppliers
changes the outcome of our study. We also compare two further possibilities; the simple,
Table 10.2: deterministic or stochastic approach ?
Situation Problem known as Goal
Certainty deterministic
optimization problems
Risk (uncertain
parameters, but values
known by probability
distribution)
stochastic optimisation
problems
optimize the
expected value of
some objective
function
“Find a solution that will
perform well under any
possible realization of the
random parameters”
“choosing an appropriate
performance measure is
part of the modelling
process”
uncertainty (no
information about
probabilities is known)
robust optimization
problems
(often) optimize
the worst case
performance of
the system
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one-stage logistic network, as exists nowadays in most organisations, compared to a two-stage
logistic network.
This model gives optimal locations on a regional basis. The final choice of the country in which
a warehouse should be built is carried out by a separate analysis (see figure 10.1). Indeed,
for this specific choice, local parameters do exert influence; local customs procedures, safety
and security, accessibility and telecommunication networks, are all significant small-scale
elements. It would not have been relevant, however, to incorporate them in our regional
cost-optimisation model, as regions are sometimes comprised of countries with highly diverse
profiles.
At a regional level, chapter 12 on page 113 details all of the hypotheses employed to build the
MIP5, and explains the model itself. Chapter 13 provides the results and sensitivity analysis.
Chapter 14 on page 149 will then summarise this approach and provide results for the choice
of specific locations within the identified optimal regions.
5Mixed-Integer Program
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Figure 10.1: Overview - What are we doing exactly?
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11.1 What is the demand? How to model it? General thoughts
If we refer to [SKS03], decisions made at the strategic level, which include distribution network
design, have long-lasting effects. This implies that changes in customer demand over the
next few years should be taken into account when designing a network. This chapter explains
the nature of humanitarian demand, how it has evolved over the last decade, and how it is
expected to evolve in the future. This will serve as a basis upon which to build the scenarios
examined by this study.
Uncertainty of demand is an issue that is common to many supply chains. In the case of
humanitarian organisations, this uncertainty is reaching a climax. "Natural disaster risk as-
sessment is a typical issue with imprecision, uncertainty and partial truth. The two basic forms
of uncertainty related to natural disaster risk assessment are randomness caused by inher-
ent stochastic variability and fuzziness due to macroscopic grad and incomplete knowledge
sample" [HS02].
Nevertheless, according to the current thinking, disaster trends are changing. If we refer
to ([EM-];[IFR07b];[IPC07]), disasters should be more numerous but of smaller scale in the
future. Added to this is urbanisation, which further alters the impacts of disasters. Studies
of the potential impacts of climate change also predict developments in the types of disaster
recorded, their locations, and their intensities. Section 11.2 will analyse data from past disasters
to measure these parameters. It will also provide valuable information regarding seasonality,
in order to design an adaptable network that can anticipate decisions concerning inventory
management. Section 11.3 will then summarise the literature to list the various factors that
may influence future humanitarian demand. Finally, section 11.4 will explain how these
elements have been included in the simulations.
11.2 Past disasters and trends
The imprecision of the data regarding delivery costs and times, and the size of the model,
mean that it is unable to optimise locations on a small scale. For the purposes of this study, the
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world has been sub-divided into 21 regions (see previous chapter), consisting of groupings of
countries that are geographically close. These regions constitute the "customers", or potential
beneficiaries. In order to better define the nature and quantity of items that are potentially
required in those regions, data from past disasters has been analysed. Figure 11.1 provides a
factorial analysis of the correspondences that exist between regions and disaster types.
11.2.1 Profile of regions
As can be seen in figure 11.1, regions exhibiting similar disaster types are geographically close.
African countries are more subject to epidemics, whereas in Asia there is a greater risk of being
affected by earthquakes of floods. Australia, New Zealand, the Caribbean and North America
are most affected by storms.
Figure 11.1: Cluster of regions
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La dépendance est très significative. chi2 = 1401,50, ddl = 240, 1-p = >99,99%. 
Les cases encadrées en bleu (rose) sont celles pour lesquelles l'effectif réel est nettement supérieur (inférieur) à l'effectif théorique. 
Attention, 173 (63.4%) cases ont un effectif théorique inférieur à 5, les règles du chi2 ne sont pas réellement applicables. 
Les valeurs du tableau sont les contributions de chaque case au chi-deux.  
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This analysis confirms the relevance of a geographical pooling of countries, in order to reduce
the size of the model. Furthermore, the analysis provides information regarding the nature
of the products that should be stored at the various warehouses, pertinent to their locations.
Medical treatments created in response to epidemics, for example, could be maintained in
Africa when safety, financial corruption and climatic conditions allow. Similarly, South-Central
Asia, which is often subject to floods and earthquakes, should host a warehouse with resources
more suited to enabling a rapid response to these kinds of disasters, such as tents and shelter
kits.
11.2.2 Seasonality
A rapid, adequate, humanitarian response also demands that relevant items should be sent
into the field in appropriate quantities within a reasonable time-frame. Having resources
pre-positioned to facilitate rapid disaster-response is a first step. The second step is to ensure
that sufficient capacity exists to respond to another crisis if it occurs soon afterwards.
Studying the seasonality of disasters provides an indication of the periods when high contin-
gency stock is crucial, as many disasters may occur at the same time.
Figure 11.2 on the next page illustrates the increased seasonality of disasters. Whereas numbers
previously affected were roughly constant throughout the year, they now seem highly seasonal,
with June becoming a particularly busy period.
Nevertheless, this apparent trend of increasing seasonality in the occurrence of disasters is
open to discussion. Indeed, the present, detailed study of the disaster database indicates
that, on average, 5% of disasters affect 90% of the total number of people who are affected
by disasters each year. This is in line with the recent assertions of other analysts. "The time
trends for the human and economic impact of natural disasters are highly influenced by the
occurrence of “mega-disasters” affecting tens of millions of people and/or causing billion of
dollars worth of economic damage. These exceptional events lead to a high variation from
one year to the next in the disaster impact figures. This great variability makes it difficult to
identify clear trends in the human and economic impacts of disasters over time." [Sch+08].
Even so, this heterogeneous situation, comprised of many small disasters in combination with
some really big disasters and comparatively few medium-size disasters, is changing. A trend
toward more frequent medium-size disasters affecting between 10,000 and 1,000,000 people
is clearly visible. This trend is illustrated in figure 11.3, showing disasters of the past decade
compared against figures from earlier disasters. This trend is often cited by humanitarian
organisations as the key element that has made them realize their logistics network should be
re-thought, to ensure that they can respond to such medium-sized disasters in the future.
11.2.3 Disaster intensity, types and location
Figures of past disasters show that the overall number of disasters per year is unchanged over
the last decade, as are the total numbers affected. Looking in more detail at these figures and
distinguishing the numbers and impacts on the basis of disaster type, it is clear that floods
and storms are definitely the most frequent disasters, and the deadliest. This predominance of
hydrological disaster is true for small and medium disasters, (affecting less than 1, 000, 000
people), more than for large ones. The trend illustrated in figure 11.4 on page 107 indicates
that the increase in medium-size disasters is especially evident in the number of floods.
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Figure 11.2: Seasonality
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Figure 11.3: Evolution of the number of crisis per disaster sizes
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Figure 11.4: Evolution per type of crisis, distinguished between big and small disasters
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Figure 11.5: Evolution per region, distinguished between big and small disasters
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Turning now to examine the regions in which disasters strike, while South-Eastern Asia is
increasingly prone to both large and small disasters, other parts of Asia, from South-Central
Asia to Eastern Asia, are increasingly affected by small and medium-sized disasters. (see figure
11.5). Having said this, it must also be underlined that - in terms of total numbers of crises -
the geographical location of disasters has remained roughly constant over the years. (Previous
analyses were based on the numbers of individuals affected).
Figure 11.6 provides information on the number of crises and their impacts per region, but
provides a map representation in order to better understand their geographical distribution.
The higher vulnerability of Asian regions for example, becomes obvious. It is also evident that
many regions are affected by a high number of crises, even though the number of individuals
affected by these crises remains quite low. Consequently, a model that focuses only on the
numbers affected, without taking disaster-frequency into account, would completely overlook
107
Supply Chain Network Design
Figure 11.6: Geographical repartition of crisis
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western Africa or the Caribbean, for example.
In view of these considerations, the optimisation model has been built in a way that takes into
account both the impact and the frequency of disasters. (see section 11.4 on page 111)
11.3 Influencing factors
The previous section has provided a rough analysis of the data available on past disasters, but
many studies have shown that various factors can influence the observed trends. A review of
past disasters is thus necessary, but on its own , it is insufficient for optimising stock locations.
This section will analyse the available literature regarding factors that are considered likely to
become highly influential on demand in the future. These factors include social and economic
vulnerabilities, urbanisation rates and climate change.
11.3.1 Country vulnerability
A huge study on this specific subject was funded by the UNDP1 in 2004. One of its results is a
list of the factors influencing disaster impact (see figure 11.7 on the facing page)
11.3.2 Urbanization
Reports from many organisations underline the dangers linked to urbanisation. According to
the UNDP2 itself, the growth of informal settlements and inner city slums, whether fuelled by
1United Nations Development Programme
2United Nations Development Programme
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Figure 11.7: Estimating the vulnerability of countries, from [Pro04]
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Figure 11.8: Key hotspots for Latin America, from [Mag+07]; [IPC07]
international migration or internal migration from smaller urban settlements or the country-
side, has led to the growth of unstable living environments. These settlements are often located
in ravines, on steep slopes, along flood plains or adjacent to noxious or dangerous industrial
or transport facilities.” This rush for growth can trigger haphazard urban development that
increases the risks of large-scale fatalities during such a disaster. For example, once again
according to UNDP, the earthquakes that occurred in the Alto Mayo, Peru in 1990 and 1991, at
Limon, Costa Rica in 1991 and in the Atrato Medio, Colombia in 1992, exposed new patterns
of risk through urbanisation in regions that had a prior history of seismic activity, but which
had never previously experienced earthquake disasters of this type [Pro04].
11.3.3 Climate change
In 2007, the IPCC3 published a number of reports on climate change and its predicted future
impacts. Global reports as well as detailed national and regional assessments were provided.
Figure 11.8 presents their conclusions for Central and South America. The IPCC reports also
provide additional, detailed figures and maps. Table 11.1 summarises global trends. According
to these reports, there is a high probability that we will be confronted with major changes in
future humanitarian demand. Heavy precipitations are expected to occur more frequently, for
example, which will correspondingly increase the risk of disastrous floods.
While the reality of global warming may still be a subject of debate among some people,
humanitarians are willing to prepare for any scenario. For them, "the main question is not if
3Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
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Table 11.1: Examples of possible impacts of climate change due to changes in extreme weather
and climate events, based on projections to the mid- to late 21st century using the IPCC Special
Report on Emission
Phenomenona and direction of trend Likelihood of future trends based on
projections for 21st century
Over most land areas, warmer and fewer cold days and
nights, warmer and more frequent hot days and nights
Virtually certain (>99% probability of
occurrence)
Warm spells/heat waves. Frequency increases over most
land areas
Very likely (90 to 99% probability)
Heavy precipitation events. Frequency increases over most
areas
Very likely (90 to 99% probability)
Area affected by drought increases (Extreme high sea level
depends on average sea level and on regional weather
systems. It is defined as the highest 1% of hourly values of
observed sea level at a station for a given reference period)
Likely (66 to 90% probability)
Intense tropical cyclone activity increases Likely (66 to 90% probability)
Increased incidence of extreme high sea level (excludes
tsunamis)
Likely (66 to 90% probability)
but how to address the risks of climate change. While some impacts can already be seen, or
projected fairly accurately, many others will appear as surprises, or only become apparent once
climate change progresses. Climate change thus not only raises the risks but also increases the
uncertainties” [IFR07b].
As for its impact upon humanitarian demand, for example, "deforestation may increase flood
and landslide hazard in some contexts and destruction of coastal mangroves may increase
cyclone hazard. Changing natural hazard risks related to climate change will alter disaster
risk patterns. Of hydro-meteorological hazards potentially affected by climate change, floods,
storms and droughts present the most widespread direct risk to human assets. Flooding and
landslides, pushed by heavier rainfall, and by surging sea levels in coastal areas, may become
increasingly common. Hazard events such as flooding or temperature increase in highland
areas can extend the range of vector-born diseases such as malaria” [Pro04].
11.4 Building the estimations to be used as entry data for our
optimization model
Future humanitarian demand, though highly uncertain, can be predicted. Trends highlighted
by data of past disasters, combined with known influencing factors, provide a fairly complete
vision of potential future disasters, but it is difficult to incorporate this information within
a quantitative model. "In fact, the probabilistic method effectively ignores fuzziness of risk
assessment with incomplete data sets. As a result, it is impossible to accurately estimate the
risks of natural disasters within a specified error range" [ZH05].
The previous sections have clearly shown, however, that "influencing factors" - such as global
warming - should not impact significantly upon short or middle-term perspectives. As an
example, results of IPCC studies are given for the second half of the 21st-century. It has also
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been shown that disaster types and locations, the two most important considerations when
establishing warehouse locations, have not changed significantly over the past decade.
The data recorded from recent, past disasters was therefore chosen for a first analysis. The
most crucial information on which our model is based is a list of the past 300 to 1000 disasters,
(the number being dependent upon the parameter analysed). These lists include the disaster
types, their locations, and the numbers of individuals affected in each case.
In order to use this data for providing numerical inputs, three time-frames were defined for
the optimisation, with a specific number of rescued individuals set as the target for each of the
time-frames. For example, following IFRC’s specifications, for a disaster affecting a population
of 200,000 people, the network should be able to provide assistance to 25,000 persons within
5 days, 75,000 persons within 15 days and the totality of the victims within 2 months. Other
organisations have similar requirements; the WVI for example sends items to "sustain up to
2,000 people for seven days. The second phase involves sending family survival kits, which
can support up to 5,000 people for 30 days" [KS07].
If two crises happen within the same time-frame, even if they are not in the same region, then
the model aggregates the demands of each crisis. This consolidated matrix of demand is then
used as input to find the best warehouse locations. Results will subsequently be discussed
and validated over a longer period, by comparing network design and costs - based on actual
demand - to costs of a demand modified according to these factors.
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Our optimization model - Hypothesis,
Notations and Model
Humanitarian organisations have to respond to natural crises by sending assistance very
quickly as soon as a disaster occurs, usually by providing shelter, medical aid and/or food
to victims. In order to improve their responsiveness immediately following a disaster, many
improvements need to be made during the preparatory phase, i.e. before the disaster occurs.
Working on the configuration of such humanitarian logistics networks helps improve aid
effectiveness by creating better-prepared humanitarian organisations.
A swift response-time is of course vital for victims, but it is also essential for the organisations’
media image. Advanced stockpiling of a variety of resources is therefore crucial for a fast
and adequate response. The aim of this study is to identify how the logistics network of
a humanitarian organisation might best be configured. Both the location and the size of
warehouses will be studied.
The hypothesis on which our model is based has been defined according to information
provided by the IFRC. The objective is to satisfy, at the lowest possible cost, the whole of the
demand within given delays. In other words, the aim of the study is to help humanitarians
configure their logistics networks so that for a given level of service - in terms of responsive-
ness and effectiveness - they improve their efficiency. In addition to this objective of cost
minimisation, other criteria have an influence on the choice of locations that are selected
for warehouses. Some, for example, will be preferred for practical reasons, such as security,
accessibility, corruption-risk and the presence of telecommunications infrastructures. It is also
important to take into account any existing warehouses, to determine whether they should be
maintained or relocated.
This chapter will explain the hypotheses that were used to create the model. It will therefore
make explicit the constraints and objectives that were employed to design the best logistics
network for the highly uncertain conditions in which humanitarians work.
Some explanation is necessary regarding how limits were imposed upon the numbers of
affected individuals to be rescued within given time frames. Populations affected by an
epidemic in West Africa and a storm in North America will not need the same products. It
is therefore necessary to explain how the disaster type - and its location - will impact upon
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Figure 12.1: Map of Regions
the types of aid product that must be delivered in response. Further detail will then follow
regarding the character and location of the suppliers of such products, and examining how the
number, size and location of warehouses are chosen.
12.1 End users and Products
We have chosen the Em-dat regional definition; 21 regions distributed as shown in Fig 12.1.
The network should be able to send given quantities of a variety of products to a region affected
by a disaster. To judge whether aid is sent quickly enough after a disaster, a number of targets
has been imposed in order to estimate the numbers rescued within different time frames. Such
targets are used by many humanitarian organisations, from the IFRC to the WVI. According to
the IFRC, their targeted level of service is to rescue 25,000 individuals within 5 days, 75,000
individuals within 15 days, and the total number affected within 2 months.
Of course, for disasters involving fewer than 75,000 individuals, the total affected population
should be rescued within 15 days, or within 5 days in cases where less than 25,000 individuals
are affected. These values have been employed to study the IFRC network, and have been
altered to gauge their impact upon operations costs, warehouse locations and network size.
The parameters employed are as described in table 12.1.
As explained in the previous chapter, the demand base is built on the number, type, location
and impact of the disasters that occurred during the past 3 years. In cases where two or more
disasters occur on the same day, the model aggregates the individual events within the same
scenario, in order to provide the best number and locations of warehouses necessary for
responding to all of these disasters. From January 2006 to December 2008, 1062 natural crises
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Table 12.1: Parameters to build the estimation of demand per product
Notation Definition Value for IFRC
NbRescuedAtTime1 Targeted number of people to rescue before Time1 5000 families or
25000 affected
Time1 Time allotted to set up operations and rescue a
given number of affected (NbRescuedAtTime1)
5days
NbRescuedAtTime2 Targeted number of people to rescue before Time2 25000 families or
75000 affected
Time2 Time allotted to set up operations and rescue a
given number of affected (NbRescuedAtTime2)
15days
NbAff Total number of affected by the disaster, but also
the targeted number of rescued before Time3
Time 3 Time allotted to rescue the total number of people
affected by the disaster
2months
nbT Duration of operations.
nbT>Time3 to allow replenishment of contingency
stock and possibility of late delivery.
affecting more than 100 people occurred, with 1 to 26 disasters occurring during the same day.
After this first aggregation, we therefore had 557 scenarios for our detailed studies.
Two additional sets of data are then used to validate the robustness of the resulting proposal
from a longer-term perspective. For this reason, the database of past disasters has been
modified to take into account foreseeable changes that can be predicted by observed trends.
(see section 13.5).
For each of the 557 scenarios of the initial data base, as well as for the modified scenarios,
a demand Dp c t is built to give, for each product, region and time, the number of items that
should be sent to affected regions within the various time frames. Algorithm 1 explains how to
build Dp c t for crises starting at a given date t0. The demand is indicated for each day, starting
at t0 and finishing at t0 + nbT, where nbT is the total duration of relief operations.
Those crises that occur between t0 + 1 and t0 + nbT have not been incorporated. This was firstly
because it was hoped that the model could consider both short and long-term demand, in
response to one or more crises occurring simultaneously. Long term projection becomes more
difficult if demand changes every morning. Secondly, as a disaster by - definition -cannot
be accurately foreseen, the model should not be able to plan deliveries for a crisis that is
supposed to occur unexpectedly. Furthermore, no single organisation will respond to every
crisis, so that if one aid provider is already involved in operations when a new crisis occurs,
other organisations can step in.
Let us consider the demand in kitchen kits, for example. One kitchen Set in dimensioned for a
family of 5 persons. If we follow IFRC specifications, for an earthquake in South-Central Asia
(c=14), the demand in kitchen kits (p=7) will be :
D[7][14][t ]= [ 0 0 0 0 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000
... 5000 5000 5000 5000 25000 25000 25000 25000 ... NbAff/5
]
It is assumed that aid demands are confined to requests for 8 items. Table 12.2 lists the specific
parameters of the products studied. Only the quantities change in response to the crisis
intensity, type and location. Weights of products may vary, from 0.14kg for jerry cans to 1133kg
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Algorithm 1: Construction of the demand per products, region and time to respond to
all crisis starting at t0
Input:
• Disaster-List, a list of past disasters, detailing for each Crisisi the starting date (TimeCrisis[i]),
the type (TypeCrisis[i] = earthquake, flood , etc.), the region affected (Region[i]) and the total
number of people affected (NbAff[i]).
• Needs[p][CrisisType][c], which details which products (p ∈ [0..7], from cholera kits to mosquito
nets) are needed for each crisis type and region c. For example, Cholera kits are needed for an
epidemic in Western Africa, but not for a Storm in Northern America.
Output: D[p][c][t] which gives the cumulated number of each products p to send to regions c at
times t (t ∈ [t0..t0+50] in our study, which represents one and a half month of relief
operations to respond to all crisis occurring at a given time t0)
initialisation : nbAffTot = 0 ; for each p, c and time, D[p][c][time] = 0;
foreach Crisis i within Disaster-list do
if TimeCrisis[i]=t0 then
Region c = Region[i];
nbAffTot = +=nbAff[i];
foreach Product p do
if NbAff[i ] ≥ NbRescuedAtTime2 then
foreach time t ∈ [t0 +Time1.. t0 + Time2] do
D[p][c][time] = += nbRescuedAtTime1 * Needs[p][crisisType][c];
foreach time t ∈ [t0 + Time2.. t0 + Time3] do
D[p][c][time] = += nbRescuedAtTime2 * Needs[p][crisisType][c];
foreach time t ∈ [t0 + Time3.. t0+ nbT] do
D[p][c][time] = += NbAff[i ]* Needs[p][crisisType][c;;
else if NbAff[i ] ≥ NbRescuedAtTime1 then
foreach time t ∈ [t0 +Time1.. t0 + Time2] do
D[p][c][time] = += nbRescuedAtTime1 * Needs[p][crisisType][c];
foreach time t ∈ [t0 + Time2.. t0+ nbT] do
D[p][c][time] = += NbAff[i ]* Needs[p][crisisType][c];
else
foreach time t ∈ [t0 + Time1.. t0+ nbT] do
D[p][c][time] = += NbAff[i ]* Needs[p][crisisType][c];
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for medical kits. These products and their measurements are based on the recommendations
of the IFRC, which considers them the most important resources for pre-positioning.
Table 12.2: List of products
Description Purchase Cost Weight Volume Packaging
(CHF) (() (kg) (m3) (nb beneficiaries per pack)
Woollen blankets 4 3 2 0,008 20
Plastic sheeting 150 109 55 0,18 40
Interagency
Emergency Health kit
10935 7982 1133 5,85 10000
Cholera kits 2855 2084 1078 4,45 1200
Mosquito nets 5 4 4 0,0017 2
Hygienic parcels 4 3 0,44 0,01 5
Kitchen kits 19 14 4,7 0,022 5
Jerrycans (foldable) 3 2 0,14 0,00042 2
12.2 Suppliers
The actual suppliers are already known, as is a list of countries in which the suppliers of each
item are located.
Each supplier cannot furnish all of the products. For example, in the UK, there are suppliers
of plastic sheeting (P1) and jerry cans (P7), but not of other products. But if the crisis occurs
in Africa, then the British Red Cross is usually a product donor. In this case, therefore, any
region may receive P1 and P7 from England, but for all other products, supply is only possible
in response to disasters affecting Africa.
At this level, our hypothesis presumes that the suppliers stocks are unlimited and can meet
any demands from the warehouses. No specific constraints have been considered regarding
the handling of these products. To better fit with reality, restrictions could have been placed
on the locations of warehouses, so that medicines would not be stored in countries that that
are too hot or too humid, for example. As we are initially locating warehouses on a regional
level, however, this cannot be taken into account by the model.
What can and should be considered, however, is the location of future suppliers. Indeed,
as we explained in chapter 9, if humanitarian organisations choose to decentralise their
logistics networks, then this facilitates fast and adequate responses, in addition to building
local capacities and strengthening local economies.
In this regard, however, humanitarians differ in their opinions. Whereas Oxfam, for example,
has built a strong network of local suppliers and has close to 100% of its relief items produced
in Africa, World Vision International regards the potential for local supply in Africa as - limited,
especially when compared to the much greater opportunities available in Asia. (source =
practitioners interviews)
The potential for local supply will therefore require additional study, in order to determine the
impacts that changes in supply strategy might exert upon the design of the network.
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12.3 Potential warehouses
As we explained in the Introduction, our mixed-integer linear programme locates the optimum
number and location of regions that are capable of hosting a warehouse. Exact locations will
then be decided by a multi-criteria analysis in chapter 14.
The definitions of regions correspond to those chosen for end users, that is to say 21 regions
distributed as shown in Fig 12.1 on page 114. In the model described here, limits can be
imposed upon the number of products that may be transited or stocked by a warehouse each
day. This will therefore demonstrate how the size of warehouses impacts upon the results.
It is also possible to choose the size of the initial, contingency stock, in order to study its
influence upon the costs and the effectiveness of the responses.
12.4 Objective function and constraints
Our objective is thus to maintain a given level of service, in terms of effectiveness and re-
sponsiveness, but at a reduced cost. Satisfaction of demand is therefore a constraint, and
minimisation of costs is the objective.
Consideration is also given to the delivery times and costs, firstly between the suppliers
and the warehouses, then between the warehouses and the clients. In addition, two means
of transportation are possible, either by air or by sea. Air transportation, faster but more
expensive than boat, is usually deployed during the first days of response. Transportation by
ship often proceeds in parallel, but arrives later due to the longer delivery times.
The costs of delivery from suppliers to warehouses and then to final beneficiaries are not equal.
Indeed, our interviews of humanitarian practitioners revealed that the costs of deliveries to
an affected region may be as much as 4 or 5 times higher than standard rates, because of the
lack of local delivery capacity and the competitiveness between organisations for the use of
these scarce resources. Rates have been evaluated by cross-checking available databases from
various transporters and validated by discussion with logisticians from MSF1, WFP, the French
Red Cross and international companies such as Nissan.
Purchase costs, as provided by IFRC emergency catalogues, as well as the fixed and variable
costs of running the warehouse, have also been accounted for. These calculations were based
on information regarding the average salary per hour and the GDP in the various regions.
As well as these real costs, a per diem penalty cost has been added to products that are not
delivered on time. This ‘stock-out’ cost can be varied, in order to demonstrate its impact upon
the outcome of the model. A high value of 1000 ( per day and per product has been chosen,
in order to ensure a high level of service.
As the construction of demand Dp c t is detailed in this chapter and serves as input for this
model, it must also be considered as a parameter.
12.5 Notations and model
12.5.1 Variables, parameters and indices
Table 12.3 on the facing page provides an overview of all the notations we use.
1Médecins Sans Frontière / Doctors without Borders
118
Our optimization model - Hypothesis, Notations and Model
Table 12.3: Variables, parameters and indices
Notation Nature Definition
Indices
p p ∈ [0..7] product
s s ∈ [0..28] supplier
w w∈ [0..20] warehouse
c c ∈ [0..20] "customer", i.e. affected region
t t ∈ [0..nbT] time
Parameters
coef double coefficient to enable the modification of IFRC contingency stock, to
visualise its impact on outputs
CostFw double Fixed costs to run the warehouse
CostVw double Variable costs to run the warehouse
Dp c t double Demand of each product to rescue the affected region c at time t
DCBDp w c double Delivery cost in boat to deliver product p from potential warehouse w to
customer c (Downstream potential warehouse)
DCBUp s w double Delivery cost in boat to deliver product p from supplier s to potential
warehouse w (Upstream potential warehouse)
DCPDp w c double Delivery cost in plane to deliver product p from potential warehouse w
to customer c (Downstream potential warehouse)
DCPUp s w double Delivery cost in plane to deliver product p from supplier s to potential
warehouse w (Upstream potential warehouse)
dimp double to take into account to packaging of products (20 blankets per parcel for
example)
DTBDw c double Delivery time in boat to deliver a product from potential warehouse w
to customer c (Downstream potential warehouse)
DTBUs w double Delivery time in boat to deliver a product from supplier s to potential
warehouse w (Upstream potential warehouse)
DTPDw c double Delivery time in plane to deliver a product from potential warehouse w
to customer c (Downstream potential warehouse)
DTPUs w double Delivery time in plane to deliver a product from supplier s to potential
warehouse w (Upstream potential warehouse)
M double initially used in constraint (15.7) without physical signification. Can
also be used to limit the warehouse size, i.e. maximum number of
products which can be in a warehouse in the same day
nbAffTot integer Total number of Affected
nbT integer Duration of operations
QSp w double IFRC Contingency stocks. Corresponds to a quantity of products p to
keep in stock at warehouse w prior to disasters in order to enable an
immediate response (5days)
S double Penalty costs, per day and per product not delivered on time
Variables
QBDp w c t double Quantity of products p delivered at time t to customer c from w in boat
QBUp s w t double Quantity of products p delivered at time t to warehouse w in boat
QFp t c double Quantity of products p delivered at time t to the region c
QPp t w double Quantity in stock of products p in w at time t
QPDp w c t double Quantity of products p delivered at time t to customer c from w in plane
QPUp s w t double Quantity delivered from supplier to warehouse w in plane
Stockoutp c t double Quantity of products p which were not delivered to customer c at time t
WChw boolean WChw=1 if the warehouse w should be opened ; WChw=0 otherwise
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12.5.2 Objective function
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Where
• Line 1 represents transportation costs by air, from supplier to warehouse and from
warehouse to customer.
• Line 2 represents transportation costs by boat, from supplier to warehouse and from
warehouse to customer.
• Line 3 represents the fixed costs of maintaining a functioning warehouse.
• Line 4 represents the variable costs incurred in running the warehouse. It is propor-
tional to the quantity of products; the greater the number of products handled by the
warehouse, the greater the number of employees required.
• Line 5 represents the penalty cost incurred if products are not delivered on time.
12.5.3 Constraints
Definition of the cumulated quantities of products delivered to the affected regions
For each affected country, for each of the products studied, and each time t, the cumulated
demand at t is the sum of all items that have arrived by plane or by boat, from any of the
opened warehouses, from the moment the disaster struck until the time t.
∀p,c, t = 0
QFpc 0 =∑w QPDpwc 0+∑w QBDpwc 0 (12.2)
∀p,c, t ≥ 1
QFpct =QFpc (t−1)+∑w QPDpwct +∑w QBDpwct (12.3)
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Satisfaction of the demand
The quantity of products delivered should be equal to the demand. It may be slightly higher, if
the total number affected is not a multiple of the packaging of product. It may also be lower as
a consequence of stock-out.
∀p,c, t
QFpct ≥Dpct −Stockoutpct (12.4)
Products can go via a warehouse only if it is opened
If a warehouse w is not opened, then W C hw = 0, as the quantity of products delivered to or
sent from this warehouse w is null, whatever the means of transport.
If w is open, then W C hw = 1, and products can be delivered to or sent from this warehouse
w. M has no physical signification. Its value is chosen high enough to enable the needed
quantity of product to transit within the warehouse w. If the chosen value is too low, it acts like
a constraint on the size of the warehouse (in which case, the total number of items allowed to
transit through the warehouse has an upper bound, M)
∀w ∑
p
∑
t
∑
c (QPDpwct +QBDpwct )≤M ×nb A f f Tot ×W C hw (12.5)
In our model, from one scenario to another, the quantity of products transiting may vary from
102 to 1011, depending on the total number affected. Our first attempt was to chooseM = 1011,
in line with the maximum quantity of products which may be needed in the case of a large
disaster. With this value, products were transited through closed warehouses. This is due to
the fact that, for our programming language (java), everything below 10−5 was considered as
0. 105 is thus considered negligible compared to 1011. Yet to have tens of thousands of items
transiting many parts of the world without a warehouse officially open is unacceptable.
A reference was therefore added to the numbers affected, so that the left-hand side of the
equation remains constant throughout the scenarios, and allowing a value to be chosen for M
that fits whatever quantity of products is transiting the opened warehouses.
Inventory balance
At t=0, the contingency stock QSpw is maintained in every opened warehouse.
For everyt > 0, the items in the warehouses are the same as the previous day, plus new items re-
ceived from suppliers, minus items dispatched to the affected region. the f our var i ablesQPDpwct ,
QBDpwct , QPUpsw t and QBUpsw t are quantities delivered. So the quantities, which leave
the warehouse at t, are delivered at (t +DT PDpwc ) for air deliveries and (t +DT BDpwc ) for
deliveries by sea.
∀p, w, t = 0
QPpw0 = QSpw ×W C hw∀p, w, t ≥ 1
QPpw t = QPpw(t−1)+
∑
s
QPUpsw t ( if t>DT PUwc )+
∑
s
QBUpsw t ( if t>DT BUwc )
−∑
c
QPDpwc(t+DT PDpwc )−
∑
c
QBDpwc(t+DT PDpwc ) (12.6)
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Rebuilding contingency stock after the end of operations
The contingency stock may be used to quickly send items to the affected regions. It should be
rebuilt at the end of relief operations in order to ensure that the victims of future disasters can
again be rescued with sufficient haste.
∀p, w
QPpwnbT =QSpw ×W C hw (12.7)
No reception before delivery times
Delivery from one region to another takes time. No product can arrive before this delivery
time.
∀p, s, w, t ≤DT PUsw
QPUpsw t = 0 (12.8)
∀p, s, w, t ≤DT BUsw
QBUpsw t = 0 (12.9)
∀p, s, w, t ≤DT PDwc
QPUpwct = 0 (12.10)
∀p, s, w, t ≤DT BDwc
QBUpwct = 0 (12.11)
Taking into account existing IFRC network
IFRC has three regional warehouses already opened, in Panama (c=2), Kuala Lumpur (c=15)
and Dubai (c=19). If these are to be taken into account, then constraint 14.13 is added.
W C h2 = 1
W C h15 = 1
W C h19 = 1 (12.12)
Should we want to limit the number of warehouses to open
If limits are to be placed on the number of warehouses opened, then constraint 14.14. is added.
In this example, no more than 4 different warehouses are to be used in any given scenario.∑
w
W C hw ≤ 4 (12.13)
Additional remarks
We also decreased the total number of variables per scenario. Indeed, from one scenario to
another, the list of region affected differ, and so does the list of product needed and so on. We
therefore added a function which, for each indices, reduces the range of possible values to the
ones really used.
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Analysis
Our application focuses on the lists of products and suppliers defined by the IFRC. While
this model can be readily applied to other agencies with different data and parameters, the
conclusions presented here are only valid for this one, specific application. Indeed, the same
study would differ for MSF, for example, which supplies medical treatments that often demand
special storage and transport; criteria that are not accounted for by this model. MSF also
have more limited opportunities for local sourcing, as manufacture of patented medicines is
often confined to specific countries or regions. Simulations for UNHRN1 and World Vision are
on-going.
Data values employed can be found in the appendix. As described briefly in previous chapters,
most of this information derives from interviews and public databases. Transportation costs
and times have been based on quotes provided by a major U.S. transportation company, inde-
pendently validated by discussions with practitioners from MSF and two private companies
[Wor10]. Fixed and Variable costs have been calculated on the basis of regional average salaries
and GNI/GDP2. Information regarding purchase costs and the locations of suppliers has come
from our interviews and the IFRC website. Initial values of certain parameters, such as the
required level of service and the size of the contingency stock, also derive from discussions
with IFRC.
Figure 13.1 on the next page details all the questions that will be discussed in this chapter.
The Analysis is divided into two parts :
1. Practical answers to organisations’ questions regarding the design of their logistics
networks. These include answers to questions such as how many stages should a
network have? How many warehouses should be maintained, where should they be
located and what size should they be? How many items should be kept in stock by each
warehouse to enable a swift response?
2. Sensitivity analysis, both to strategic decisions impacting available choices and to vari-
ous parameters used in our model.
1the UN humanitarian response network
2Gross National Income/Gross Domestic Product
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Figure 13.1: Overall view of our research questions
Which locations?
Real Costs
Stockout Costs
Which level of service?
How robust is the model if we modify stockout costs? 
Sensitivity from one year to another, 
impact of future demand
Which locations?
For what scenarios are we at the right place?
If we add/relocate/close warehouses, where? Impact?
Choice of number and location of warehouses to enable 
a quick and adequate answer at lesser costs
Network Design
Which configuration?
Taking into account existing networksWithout taking into account existing networks
Which size?
Choice of the size of warehouses and contingency stocks
Comparison between one stage and two stage networks
Sensitivity analysis
Data Parameters
Design of the logistics network 
– where, what, how much and why –
Which supply strategy?
Local or global suppliers
Which scenarios?
What impact has the required level of service on outputs?
Which Products
All emergency items 
or only those with no specific storage conditions?
How robust is the model if we modify costs? 
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The answers to the above questions depend upon many decisions and parameters. If there is
an intention to use local suppliers and so develop local networks in each warehouse, then the
costs and delays involved in sending resources to the affected regions will differ from those of
an organisation that employs global suppliers. The range of items supplied is a further major
variable, because the locations of their suppliers influence how a network design evolves.
Furthermore, some of these input parameters, such as transportation costs, may be fixed by
external organisations without consultation or dialogue, whilst others may evolve through
mutual interests. In addition, agreements with national governments and other agencies to
maintain stock levels at specific locations may influence the costs of operating in individual
countries. How sensitive will the model prove to all of these cost variations? This question will
be addressed in section 13.5.4 on page 142.
In the context of cost-evaluation, our model includes a "stock-out cost" that accrues if the
demand is not satisfied on time. A high figure has been deliberately chosen to reduce the
risk of delay. The “level of service” targets of the IFRC have also been employed to define
satisfactory levels of response within 5 and 15 days. Sections 13.5.5 on page 143 and 13.5.6 on
page 144 will clarify the impacts of these various choices in terms of levels of service. Finally,
section 13.5.2 on page 140 will analyse the impact of foreseeable changes in disasters nature,
number, intensity and location on the design of the logistics network.
13.1 Which network configuration and supply strategy?
13.1.1 Impact on costs and level of service
Many configurations are possible. The logistics network can have one, two or more stages.
Most humanitarian networks actually have only one stage (see case n°1, figure 13.2). If addi-
tional warehouses are added on a local level, they can function in the same way as existing
regional warehouses (case n°2a, figure 13.2), with global suppliers sending items directly to
small, local warehouses, or an additional level can be added to the network, in which case
regional units act as suppliers for local warehouses (cases n°3a and 3b, figure 13.2). Cases 1b
and 2b are variants of cases 1 and 2, but they include the possibility of adopting local suppliers.
Each case has its advantages and weaknesses (see chapter 9). Table 13.1 compares available
options in terms of costs and level of service. For each case, there is one run of the program per
scenario. The costs of the response of each scenario is then summed to get the "Total costs"
over one year. "Possible savings" are then calculated to visualize the consequence of a change
in the configuration of the network. The cost to respond to crisis with the existing network
(Case 1a) serves as reference. Figures for stock-out are calculated on the same basis : one run
per scenario. The few scenarios with stock-out are the summed to get the total stock-out.
As expected, for a one-stage network, reworking the configuration can improve both costs and
the level of service (from case 1 to case 2). Case 2 being an optimal network, redesigned for
each scenario, it only provides the lowest possible bound, not the lowest achievable bound.
Still, there is room for improvement, which will be further analysed in the following section.
If we now compare networks with one or two stages, here again we find that results are in line
with common sense. A decentralised network with two stages costs more than a centralized
network. With regard to IFRC specifications for the level of service this additional layer is
unnecessary, as a single stage network is sufficient to ensure the desired levels of service in
every scenario. The impact of these modifications upon level of service targets will be analysed
in section 13.5 on page 139.
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Figure 13.2: Which configuration for the network?
Global Suppliers
v
Global Suppliers
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Global Suppliers
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IFRC - One Stage
With additional warehouses 
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and local suppliers 
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Local Suppliers
Global Suppliers
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Existing Network
and local suppliers 
Global Suppliers
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Global Suppliers
v
With additional warehouses 
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Table 13.1: Comparison of possible options for the configuration of the logistics network
The total is done over one year, for the immediate response to every natural crisis with more than 100
affected
Case 1a Case 2a Case 3a Case 1b Case 2b Case 3b
Global IFRC Suppliers Local Suppliers Supply
by RLU
Hybrid
︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷
Existing
Network
(IFRC )
One stage
optimal
Two stages
optimal
Existing
Network
(IFRC )
One stage
optimal
Total costs (() 11,3E+09( 10,0E+09( 13,4E+09( 10,2E+09( 8,77E+09( 12,9E+09(
Possible savings 0% 12% – 19% 10% 22% – 14%
Percentage of
scenarios with
stock-outs
3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total stock-out
(nb products late
x nb days waiting)
878 605 0 0 0 0 0
These results suggest that, in terms of costs, a configuration with only one stage is more
effective. Consequently, the detailed analysis that follows will only focus on one-stage networks.
The impact of varying the numbers and locations of suppliers will be discussed, and the
influence that these factors exert upon the number, location and size of warehouses will also
be examined.
When the possibility of purchasing supplies locally is introduced, (case 2b), then the costs
are – not surprisingly – lower. Levels of service also appear to improve, but this is because
no limits were set on the presumed capacities of local suppliers. Being nearer, delivery times
from such suppliers are shorter and hence their costs are also reduced. But a situation in
which 100% of supplies are locally sourced may not be relevant in every region. “Frequently,
local availability of specific items is low or unpredictable, or the quantity and quality of locally
available products is not good enough to meet needs efficiently” [Org01] (See chapter 9 on
page 91).
13.1.2 Impact of configuration and supply strategy on number and location of
warehouses needed
With actual suppliers
If there is no possibility of obtaining local supplies, then for crises affecting fewer than 10,000
individuals the Caribbean offers the best locations for maintaining stock.
As these comparatively small crises represent a large proportion of the disaster scenarios
modelled, then because of their frequency, the Caribbean is often found to be the warehouse
area that is most often running (see figure 13.4 on page 129). For small crises of this type,
either with or without the potential for local supply, those locations that are cheapest in terms
of running costs are chosen.
Indeed, as there are few products to deliver and hence lower delivery costs, the sensitivity of
the model regarding fixed costs is higher in such cases, as they represent a higher proportion
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of the total costs. This sensitivity to fixed costs is detailed in section 13.5 on page 139. Apart
from the Caribbean, the principal locations chosen with the actual global suppliers of the
IFRC, (who also supply other international NGOs), are as follows:
1. South-Central Asia (15% of the scenarios)
2. South-East Asia (9,5% of the scenarios)
3. East Africa (9% of the scenarios)
With local suppliers
If there is a possibility of obtaining supplies locally, (in the region where the warehouse is
located), and if the model is allowed to choose the best spot within each scenario, then
the region in which the largest crisis occurs is chosen for 72% of the scenarios. Such local
warehouses need the support of a second warehouse in 16% of cases. The only crises for which
a global warehouse is the preferred option are those of very small size, with fewer than 10,000
individuals affected.
The chosen warehouses are the same than as with global suppliers, though not with the same
proportion, as they are all equally used in this configuration.
With or without the possibility to supply locally, the program chooses the same locations. The
only difference is that, with local suppliers, no one warehouse is used more than another,
whereas with global suppliers, one warehouse (south-central Asia) is preferred. The fact that
the locations chosen are the same, with or without the possibility to supply locally means that
the logistics network built with only global suppliers will still be optimal once the local network
is developed. This is extremely important, due to the fact that the possibility to supply locally
is uncertain in most of the regions. It may exist, but it is difficult to assess if you don’t have
local resources, experience or a network. According to the program, it is possible to choose
your locations first, and then work on you supply strategy and build local capacity. You will
still have your warehouses at the best locations.
The number of warehouses required also tends to fall if local supplies can be arranged. As
total delivery time from supplier to warehouse reduces, correspondingly greater time becomes
available for the warehouse to deliver aid supplies to the affected regions. It thus becomes
possible for warehouses to service disasters at progressively greater distances, without any
reduction in the levels of service.
Figure 13.3: Number of warehouses needed depending on the possibility to supply locally
(a) Without local suppliers
1 warehouse
66%
2 warehouses
17%
3 warehouses
11%
4 warehouses
4%
>4 warehouses
2%
(b) With the possibility to supply locally
1 warehouse
83%
2 warehouses
12%
3 warehouses
2%
4 warehouses
2% >4 warehouses
1%
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Figure 13.4: Location of warehouses depending on the supply strategy
173 runs corresponding to the natural crisis of year 2008
N
Case 2a - locations chosen with actual suppliers
Case 2b - locations chosen with local suppliers
Case 3b - locations chosen IFRC RLUs (Dubai, Panama, Kuala Lumpur) as suppliers
                   RLUs are allowed to send relief items directly to the field
Figure 13.5: Reminder - Location of crisis (number and impact), to enable a comparison with
location of warehouses
N
Location of crisis (frequency)
Location of crisis (total number of in 2006, 2007 and 2008)affected
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With the supply done by the three regional warehouses in Dubai, Panama and Kuala
Lumpur
With regard to locating sub-regional hubs, if we consider running a two-stage network, and
thus impose a restriction that the local hub should be supplied by the three Regional Logistics
Units of the IFRC, then the best regions to add these additional local warehouses would be in
East Africa (in 23% of scenarios), South-Central Asia (22%) and the Caribbean (20%). A similar
result to this last case can be achieved by doubling the capacity of the regional hub in Panama.
This corresponds to case 3b of figure 13.2 on page 126. Figure 13.4 on the previous page
illustrates the impact of supply strategy upon the choice of the location of warehouses. Figure
13.5, provides better comparison between the locations of warehouses and the locations of
crises.
If RLUs3 are not allowed to send relief items to the field to complement those from local
warehouses (case 3a), then these same three warehouses remain the best locations - but in
opposite order. An additional warehouse is also needed in South-Eastern Asia.
13.2 Discussions on network design, without taking existing networks
into consideration
The previous section provided some observations regarding costs, levels of service, the num-
bers of warehouses involved and their locations, as well as noting the influences that derive
from supply strategy. This section will also discuss the best locations for opening a warehouse,
but with other strategic decisions in mind. Natural crises, such as the small to medium-size
disasters which does not always generate a response from INGOs4 do not require identical
logistics networks. Other parameters that may affect the choice of location may include the
presence of existing warehouses and the number of warehouses that are allowed to send relief
items in response to a given crisis.
13.2.1 Number of warehouses needed
In order to respond to the disasters that occurred in 2008 within IFRC specifications (25,000
rescued within 5 days, 75,000 within 15 days and the total number of affected within 2 months),
our model required only one warehouse in 66% of cases (see figure 13.3 on page 128). These
consisted mainly of small to medium-sized crises. The model indicates that, where fewer than
100,000 individuals are affected per annum, a local warehouse is not efficient.
An examination of the correlation between the number of warehouses required, the number
of individuals affected and the number of disasters occurring within a given scenario indicates
that the number of warehouses required is more dependent upon the number of operations
that must be managed in parallel than on the size of the disaster (see table 13.2).
3Regional Logistics Units - IFRC existing network -
4International Non Governemental Organizations
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Table 13.2: Correlations - Without the two biggest disasters
C1 C2 C3 C4
C1 : Number of affected by the disaster 1
C2 : Number of affected regions 0,3 1
C3 : Number of warehouses needed 0,5 0,7 1
C4 : Total real costs 0,97 0,3 0,5 1
Even if it were the case that one warehouse was sufficient for every scenario, and if the program
were allowed to change the warehouse location for each different scenario, it would not address
the question of the optimal number of warehouses required to achieve a rapid and efficient
global response.
Responses were therefore simulated with various network configurations, but in these cases
imposing restrictions on the numbers and locations of warehouses, to allow comparisons
between the various options with the aim of finding the optimal, achievable solution.
The answer to this question depends on the targeted level of service. If we consider that an
immediate response meeting IFRC levels of service for 10% of relief operations is sufficient,
then two warehouses would be optimal. The model recommends locating one warehouse in
the cheapest accessible location, and the other in locations close to the regions in which the
highest numbers of individuals are affected per year, such as South-Central Asia or South-East
Asia.
In order to reduce the frequency of stock-out, a third warehouse in either East or West Africa
will limit the proportion of such scenarios to 3%.
For the number and location of warehouses needed with a higher targeted level of service, see
section 13.5.6 on page 144.
13.2.2 Optimal locations
Locations chosen depending on the number of affected per scenario
A look at disaggregated results shows that at least one of the chosen warehouses is local in
57% of the cases. This percentage is true when only one region is affected in the scenario. It is
also true when two or more regions are affected, in which cases half of the scenarios require at
least one warehouse in one of the affected areas.
In the case of scenarios involving multiple simultaneous disasters, with two or more crises
affecting more than 4,000 individuals, the most efficient solution is to use a warehouse located
somewhere between the affected regions. In cases involving a smaller number, a location with
low running costs is better.
All in all, if a response is expected for every natural crisis affecting more than 100 people, then
the best choices of warehouse location are the Caribbean, (in 31% of scenarios), South-Central
Asia (15%), South-East Asia (9,5%) and East Africa ( 9%). If the intention is to only respond
when more than 100,000 individuals are affected, then the two best locations are South-Central
Asia (19%) and East Asia (17%).
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Figure 13.6: Location of warehouses depending on the decision to respond to all crisis or only
to the bigger ones
173 runs corresponding to the natural crisis of year 2008
N
Locations chosen - all crisis over 100 affected
Locations chosen - crisis over 10 000 affected
Locations chosen - crisis over 100 000 affected
Figure 13.6 illustrates how the number of individuals affected per scenario impacts on ware-
house locations.
And if we limit the number of warehouses allowed per scenario?
Depending on the constraints imposed on the network, the locations chosen may vary slightly.
Figure 13.7 allows us to visualise how the number of warehouses impacts upon the locations
chosen.
More generally, as is shown by a comparison with figure 13.5 on page 129, optimum locations
do not always correspond to regions of higher crisis rates, especially in the case that is con-
strained to use only one warehouse for responding to all of the crises in a scenario. Asian
regions are nevertheless most commonly chosen, as most of the crises also occur in these
areas.
For these single warehouse scenarios, it is again found that the Caribbean is an optimal location
for responding to small crises. South-Central Asia is also chosen as an optimal location in each
case, whatever number of warehouses the scenario permits.
Some changes are nevertheless seen when this constraint on the total number of warehouses
is added and used in parallel. Indeed, West Africa, which did not appear to be a good location
without this limitation, now appears within the top three optimal locations. Its situation,
between Asian and African countries, renders it the “best compromise” when only a limited
number of warehouses can be opened and maintained. This is true when we consider all
of the scenarios, and it is also true when the study is limited to the largest disasters only,
involving more than 100,000 individuals per scenario. (For 9 to 10 % of the scenarios, if only
one warehouse can be used, then it should be situated in West Africa).
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Figure 13.7: Location of warehouses depending on the number of warehouse running in
parallel
173 runs corresponding to the natural crisis of year 2008
N
No constraint on the number of warehouse per scenario
Only one warehouse per scenario
Western Asia, on the contrary, appears to be a poor choice. Most humanitarian organizations
have pre-positioned resources there, attracted by the free zones and the proximity of other aid
organisations. In locating there, however, they have overlooked the fact that transportation
costs are often much higher than the fixed and variable costs associated with running a
warehouse.
This point deserves further discussion. The model presented here did not take into account
any of the negotiated agreements that exist within these countries, nor did it incorporate the
possibilities for decreasing fixed costs by choosing the same location as other NGOs. The
fixed costs used by our model in Western Asia are therefore higher than the real fixed costs
encountered in the free zone - in Dubai for example. Section 13.5.4) provides a detailed
analysis on the impact of fixed costs on the results.
13.3 Network design taking into account existing network
The previous section provided recommendations regarding the optimum design of humani-
tarian supply chains, without taking existing networks into consideration. This section will
work the other way around, providing management recommendations regarding modification
of the existing network, as designed by IFRC.
From section 13.1 on page 125, we can recommend not to add an additional layer to the
network without the possibility to supply locally. According to table 13.1 on page 127, a new
stage supplied by RLUs would increase costs by 14% with no real benefit in terms of level of
service. This section analyses various improvement possibilities.
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13.3.1 Best candidates for the opening of an additional warehouse
Looking at the optimum locations for building additional warehouse(s) to supplement an
existing network, these optimal locations are consistent with previous results. If we are to
complement the three IFRC RLUs5, then the next optimal locations remain South-Central Asia,
followed by East Africa.
With respect to the Caribbean, as there is an existing warehouse situated in Panama, this
becomes a less relevant location, appearing only 6th in the rankings.
Table 13.3 on the facing page compares costs and levels of service between networks with 2, 3 ,
4, 5 or 6 warehouses.
13.3.2 How many additional warehouses to add if the actual network is kept as
such?
As can be seen, opening an additional warehouse in South-Central Asia would be more
effective globally, in terms of both costs and levels of service. Indeed, as many disasters occur
in this region, transportation costs would correspondingly decrease if resources were already
pre-positioned there, especially knowing that some of the global suppliers are also located
in this region. Globally, these savings in transportation costs are higher than the increase in
operating costs incurred through opening this additional warehouse. Opening two additional
warehouses, in South-Central Asia and East Africa would be even better, although close to the
results observed with 4 warehouses.
With the possibility that three warehouses might be added, here again, the network would
improve globally, but not by much. The level of service would only be improved slightly,
without additional costs.
By adding further additional warehouses we only increase global capacity marginally. Instead
of opening new warehouses, one option for improving the network would be to simply increase
the existing contingency stocks. In terms of level of service, three large or six small warehouses
are equivalent, but in terms of overall costs, placing additional locations closer to the field is
more effective.
13.3.3 Modifying the existing network ?
As for the possibility of modifying the existing network, if we close the warehouse in Dubai,
there would be a 5% decrease in costs. This is not a significant saving, especially when we
consider that the level of service is also impacted.
If we relocate all of the warehouses the situation seems better than in the existing network,
both in terms of costs and levels of service. It is not improved, however, when compared to
a network comprised of 5 or 6 warehouses. Relocation, although theoretically possible in
consequence of the small size of actual warehouses, would require additional analysis to be
validated (see section 13.5 on page 139).
Indeed, local networks, both with suppliers and with other organizations, agreements with
governments to decrease fixed costs as in Dubai, and many other elements linked with the
5the three Regional Logistics Units of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
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re localization of human resources have to be taken into consideration. These are tackled in
section 13.5 on page 139.
Warehouse relocations would also mean that the local networks that presently exist around
warehouses would be lost, with correspondingly detrimental impacts upon both costs and
service. In fact, if a comparison is made between the actual network, run using local suppliers,
and a modified network with better locations - but no local supply network - then the best
option is to simply keep the existing warehouses.
13.3.4 Disaggregated results - Where is the actual network sufficient, and where
should it be improved?
Let us now look at disaggregated results.
Figure13.8 illustrates the cost difference between the actual network of the IFRC and an
optimized network, depending on the changes that are decided. This shows that opening one,
two or three additional warehouses would be more expensive in two-thirds of the scenarios,
but would still be justified by the large potential savings generated in cases of large-scale
disasters. Scenarios with higher cost effectiveness involving additional warehouses are those
in which many medium or large-scale disasters strike simultaneously, demanding more relief
items. In such cases, however, the increase in the total capacity of the network has as much
impact on the result as the additional geographical locations. As for relocating all warehouses,
this could decrease costs in more than 90% of the scenarios.
Scenarios with higher cost-effectiveness involving two rather than three warehouses are those
that include one or more very small crises, regardless of their locations. In these cases, where
the aid quantities involved are small, delivery costs are less than the fixed costs associated with
maintaining local stocks. As this happens frequently, a high number of scenarios suggest that
considerable savings would be made if one of the RLU6 were closed. This situation is rectified
if we only consider natural crises affecting populations of more than 100,000 individuals, (see
figure 13.8 on the next page)
Looking now at levels of service, scenarios in which the IFRC network cannot meet expectations
occur when more than six operations are managed simultaneously, with two or more occurring
in the same region. With respect to geographical location, the most difficult regions to reach
on time are Melanesia and most of the African regions, (West, East and Central Africa).
The size of the contingency stock has been modified in order to visualize its impact on the
choice of location. Various weighting factors have been applied to this contingency stock
(QS) as initially defined by the IFRC (QS = items for 75,000 persons). Results have been
obtained for situations in which the number of warehouses is limited to one per scenario, and
no constraints have been applied to the number of warehouses that may be used, or their
potential locations.
As table 13.4 on page 138 makes clear, increasing the size of the contingency stock decreases
costs. Indeed, although maintaining stock is costly, inadequate pre-positioning of items will
mean that supplies will have to travel longer distances. Meeting targeted service levels might
therefore demand the use of expensive modes of delivery.
An increase in the size of the contingency stock also limits the mean number of warehouses
employed per scenario. As might be expected, networks with higher contingency stocks also
offer better levels of service.
6Regional Logistic Unit, the three warehouses of IFRC in Dubai, Kuala Lumpur and Panama
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Figure 13.8: Possible savings between actual IFRC network and optimized network, with
current network plus/less one or more warehouses or with higher contingency stocks
Comparison is done for all scenarios build based on 2008 natural crisis
(a) Total Costs, including stock-out costs, All crisis
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On the other hand, if no contingency stock remains because it has already been assigned to
another relief operation, and stocks were not re-built with appropriate haste, then more than
90% of the scenarios indicate that one or more products will not be delivered on time by the
5th day.
Consequently, in order to ensure that a given level of responsiveness and effectiveness can be
maintained, it is better to have one well-managed warehouse than many small warehouses
possessing no clear strategy for stock replenishment.
Table 13.4: Impact of changes on the size of the contingency stock
Number of warehouses One per scenario No constraint Existing network (IFRC)︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷
Size of contingency stock QSx1 QSx2 QSx1 QSx2 QSx1 QSx2
Total Real Costs (() 11,78E+09 10,32E+09 9,54E+09 9,50E+09 11,26E+09 11,22E+09
Percentage of scenarios
with stock-outs
25% 9% 0% 0% 3% 0,5%
Amount of stock-out
(nb products late x nb
days waiting)
2 866 019 909 931 0 0 878 605 56 808
13.4 Size of contingency stock and size of warehouses
Figure 13.9: Number of warehouses needed
with bigger contingency stock
1 warehouse
73%
2 warehouses
15%
3 warehouses
8%
4 warehouses
2%
>4 warehouses
2%
With regard to the choice of location, the
greatest impact of an increase in contingency
stock can be seen in the Caribbean. Indeed,
with a higher stock, fewer warehouses are
needed: on average, the number of ware-
houses required decreases by 12% (see figure
13.9). This diminution holds true on each oc-
casion involving two or more simultaneous
crises, one of which was too small to justify
a local warehouse, the other too big to allow
the local warehouse to manage another crisis
at the same time. With higher capacity, the
warehouse responding to medium or large-
scale disasters can also handle smaller crises.
The additional location in the Caribbean is
therefore no longer needed.
Size of the warehouse
Unsurprisingly, if limits are placed on the capacities of warehouses then more warehouses
are needed. It is also more expensive to have many medium warehouses than one central
warehouse. Once again, the presence of many warehouses limits potential for scale-economies
and also multiplies the fixed costs, so this result seems logical. In the case of very small
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warehouses with handling capacities of around 10,000 products per day, it seems normal that
the balance between global delivery capacity and needs is much more difficult to achieve. This
explains the amount of stock-out for small warehouses. Furthermore, no constraint was set on
the location of warehouses, only on their capacities. For each scenario, therefore, one local
warehouse is used. If they are compared with results for one warehouse in south-Eastern Asia
for each of these scenarios, the costs are increased and the levels of service are lower.
Table 13.5: Impact of changes on warehouse delivery capacity
Optimal network per scenario Existing network (IFRC)
Maximum number of products
per day
10 000 100 000 free 100 000 500 000
Equivalence in m3 30m3 300m3 300m3 1 500m3
Total Real Costs (without
stock-outs, in ()
5,23E10( 1,32E11( 9,54E09( 2,84E09( 4,2E09(
Percentage of scenarios with
stock-outs
26% 9% 0% 21% 10,3%
Amount of stock-out
(nb products late x nb days
waiting)
1,23E09 7,43E08 0 11,36E08 7,75E08
Mean number of warehouses
used
9 4 1,6 3 3
13.5 Reliability and sensitivity analysis
13.5.1 List of resources to pre-position
These results contain no major surprises. If we consider only 6 products rather than 8, the
costs of the response decrease. The scenarios that result in stock-out when we consider 8
products also present stock-out with only 6 products. Indeed, stock-outs are for large-scale
disasters impacting millions of people, so way above the average number of affected per crisis.
In terms of location, though, only 57% of the scenarios exhibit the same optimal locations
when we change the number of resources to preposition. Indeed, by modifying the list of
resources, the list of suppliers is also modified, as are their locations. Upstream delivery costs
are therefore changed.
In addition, by decreasing the number of resources, there are fewer products to deliver. De-
livery, purchase and variable costs decrease proportionally, but the fixed costs do not. As a
consequence, these fixed costs assume a larger proportion of the total cost of the response,
especially in the case of small crises. According to the model, with fewer resources to deliver,
stock should be maintained in the Caribbean for crises affecting fewer than 5,000 individuals,
whatever the region affected. This dependence on the amount of fixed costs is further analysed
in section 13.5.4.
This analysis shows the high dependence of the network on the number and nature of products
maintained in the warehouses. Regarding the choice of the products that should be stored
in warehouses, particular care was taken to include a dependence both between products
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and regions, (to avoid, for example, the shipment of winter tents to warm regions) and be-
tween products and disasters, (to avoid for example, the shipment of malaria treatments in
response Australian wildfires). This work was limited, however, to the initial list provided by
the IFRC. Other possibilities, such as the storage of diggers in earthquake-prone areas, were
not considered but would certainly be required in many cases.
13.5.2 Sensitivity from one year to another and impact of future demand
Over the three last years, the locations of crises have not altered significantly. The optimal
locations chosen to respond to these crises have been similarly stable (see 13.10 on the next
page).
Figure 13.10 on the facing page illustrates the locations of crisis and warehouses chosen with
IFRC actual suppliers and no constraint on the number of warehouses. The same stability over
the years is observed when we look at the results with local suppliers and when we limit the
number of warehouses.
Looking now at perceived changes in future demand, we have seen evidence in chapter 11
on page 103 that a trend toward more disasters is foreseen in East Asia, South-East Asia and
South-Central Asia. This increase is especially true for small and medium-sized hydrological
disasters.
Our scenario approach allows an evaluation of the network design that is best suited to each
of those cases. According to the model,
• For crises occurring in Eastern Asia affecting fewer than 100,000 individuals the best
location is South-Central Asia. For crises involving up to 2,000,000 individuals, a local
warehouse in Eastern Asia is better. In cases where more than 2,000,000 individuals are
affected, one warehouse is insufficient, and so one should be maintained in Eastern
Asia, a second in South-Central Asia.
• Similar results are obtained for crises occurring in South-East Asia. For small crisis,
affecting fewer than 20,000 individuals, a warehouse in South Central Asia is best. When
up to 1,000,000 individuals are affected, a local warehouse becomes more efficient.
In cases involving more than 1,000,000 individuals two warehouses are needed, in
South-East Asia and South-Central Asia are respectively. Finally, for mega-disasters,
warehouses in South-East Asia, South-Central Asia and Eastern Asia are employed by
the model.
• With respect to disasters in South-Central Asia, a local warehouse is the most efficient in
every case. One additional warehouse in Eastern Asia or South-Eastern Asia is neverthe-
less needed for disasters affecting more than 200,000 individuals.
In conclusion, if more small and medium crises occur in any of these three regions, which
predictions seem to indicate, then a warehouse in South-Central Asia would clearly be recom-
mended.
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Figure 13.10: Evolution of crisis locations and warehouse optimal locations to respond to last
year crisis, sorted by year
Axe y : number of scenarios for which the location is optimal ; Axe x : potential location of warehouses
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13.5.3 Returning to the relative proportions of costs
The contribution of each cost element of the objective function is roughly equivalent in various
cases. The sum of transportation costs is always higher than other contributions. Delivery
costs are lower in the case of optimized networks, both for additional warehouses and for
relocated warehouses (see figure 13.11). This is explained by the fact that the computer model
takes the location of suppliers into account, to propose the optimum locations. Indeed, when
the possibility of local supply is added, delivery costs from suppliers to warehouses decrease.
As for the low proportion of emergency deliveries by air, this is true for those scenarios where
sufficient stock is maintained in warehouses to rescue 25,000 families, (the targeted value at
15 days), and thus enabling the use of cheaper modes of delivery. The proportion changes as
the level of service is increased for the immediate response.
Furthermore, the impact of the 20 biggest disasters on total annual costs is huge. This also
explains why the delivery costs by plane are so small compared to deliveries by boat. With
millions of affected to rescue in two months, so by boat, the proportion of the costs of early
response, by plane, seem low. This is not the case anymore if we limit the total number of
affected to be rescued by one organization (see figure 13.12 on the following page).
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Figure 13.11: Cost contributions
CPU refers to urgent deliveries by planes, from suppliers to warehouses (upstream)
CPD refers to urgent deliveries by planes, from warehouses to beneficiaries (downstream)
CBU refers to deliveries by cheaper but slower means, like boats, from suppliers to warehouses
CBD refers to deliveries by cheaper but slower means, like boats, from warehouses to beneficiaries
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Figure 13.12: Delivery cost when we look at the first days of operations or when we limit the
range of operations
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13.5.4 Fixed Costs
Looking now at the impact of changes in fixed costs upon the outcome of the model, Fig-
ure 13.13 on the next page provides an overview of the variations induced by these modifica-
tions. As the Map indicates, the geographical repartition is more homogeneous. This is due
to the fact that, with lower fixed costs, more warehouses are opened in each of the scenarios.
Indeed, the presence of fixed costs makes many of these warehouses more expensive, so that
the programme centralises the network in few, cheaper places.
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Other features to examine are the influences that agreements held with specific countries
exerts upon the choices of warehouse locations. While an exhaustive study for every region is
impossible because of time constraints, it is nevertheless worthwhile to examine two extreme
situations.
Firstly, the impact of the presence of Dubai’s free zone. Western Asia is not, in fact, a good
location for a warehouse, unless their special agreements - which attract many humanitarian
organizations – are taken into account. Figure 13.13 clearly shows that if the fixed costs
associated with warehouse management can be reduced, then Dubai becomes a much better
option that other regions in which to locate a warehouse.
On the other hand, if we consider the Caribbean, then should the standard of living (and
thus the costs linked to maintaining a warehouse) increase here, then this region looses its
attractiveness in favour of both Central America and Western Africa.
Figure 13.13: Sensitivity analysis on fixed costs
173 runs corresponding to the natural crisis of year 2008
N
With fixed costs
No fixed costs in Dubai
No fixed costs for every region
13.5.5 Stock-out cost
The breaking point, where the model chooses to deliver products over stock-out, is achieved
for a stock-out cost between 300 and 600(. (see table 13.6 on the next page) With IFRC
specifications, and thus adequate contingency stock in the warehouse to assist 15,000 families
within 2 weeks, there is no stock-out in the first days of operations, even with a stock-out cost
chosen at 300(. With a stock-out cost at 300(, the only stock-outs are for the largest disasters,
and here again, stock-out appears only at the end of operations. As for the geographical
location, this mainly concerns Asian regions and East Africa, but this is more because of the
intensity of the disaster than its geographical location, as other crises of small to medium size
are catered for without difficulty.
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Table 13.6: Impact of changes on stock-out costs
Cost of stockout (for each product one
day late)
100 300 600 1000
Total Real Costs (() 9,50E+09 9,51E+09 9,54E+09 9,54E+09
Percentage of scenarios with stockouts 21% 20% 0% 0%
Amount of stockout
(nb products late x nb days waiting)
25 435 883 25 426 981 0 0
13.5.6 Impact of the level of service on costs
Responding to more affected within same time frames (5 and 15 days)
Once again as expected, with sufficient contingency stock in the warehouses to assist 15,000
families within 2 weeks and no constraint on the number of warehouses to open, for an optimal
network redesigned for each scenario, there is no stock-out in the first days of operations, even
if we double the target number of victims requiring rescue within two weeks. The average
number of warehouses needs to increase slightly, however, from 1,6 to 2,2 warehouses per
scenario, together with costs (though only by 2,2%).
When we limit the number of warehouses and look at how the three RLUs7 could manage a
higher demand in the first days of operations, the impact is much more important. First, the
number of scenarios with stock-out increases from 3% to 11%. Secondly, the use of air-planes
becomes massive. As a result, the costs to aid a limited number of affected during the first
days (3,5% of the average demand for the 50 biggest disasters) is higher than 10% of the total
costs just for these first 5 days.
Closing operations earlier or later
Closing the operations later has no impact on costs, as 50 days are sufficient to utilise boat
transportation. Crises with no stock-outs in 50 days obviously have no stock-out in 60 and 70
days either. Furthermore, crises with stock-out in 50 days also have stock-out in 60 days, as the
products that are not delivered on time are only required for the first days of the operations.
Table 13.7: Impact of changes on the targeted end of operations - optimal locations per
scenario
Optimal network per scenario Existing network (IFRC)
Targeted end of operations 20 days 30days 50 days 20 days 50 days
Total Real Costs (() 9,71E+09( 9,543E+09( 9,542E+09( 11,72€+09( 11,26E+09(
Percentage of scenarios with
stock-outs
0% 0% 0% 3% 3%
Amount of stock-out
(nb products late x nb days
waiting)
0 0 0 878 605 878 605
7IFRC Regional Logistics Units
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As for closing operations earlier, in terms of immediate response, there is no impact on the
level of service, as 30 or even 20 days are enough to deliver products by air. Costs are impacted,
however, as more expensive methods of transportation are needed to rescue the targeted
population more quickly (see table 13.7 on the facing page).
The fact that warehouses are able to manage the whole operations in 20 days for most of the
disasters may seem surprising. This is nevertheless normal here because we did not limit
the delivery capacity of warehouses. The analysis with a limited delivery capacity is done
section 13.4 on page 138.
Responding quicker
If we intend responding to the same number of victims, but within 3 and 10 days instead of 5
and 15, the impact is not only visible in terms of costs, but also in the locations chosen. Indeed,
as the required levels of service increase, the model opens warehouses that are progressively
closer to crisis locations. This increases the costs, as these locations are not always the cheapest.
Furthermore, air-transportation is generally essential when the time-frame within which aid
can be delivered is reduced.
Total real costs for an increased reactivity are 1,6% times higher. Stock-out costs are also higher.
When the program is allowed to choose both the number and locations of the warehouses,
one out of eight scenarios will have stock-outs if the desired level of reactivity is increased (see
table 13.8)
A closer look at the scenarios with stock-outs involving a higher reactivity shows that this
additional stock-out is only for the third day. It also occurs only for scenarios in which two or
more disasters are happening at the same time, and each of these scenarios has two or more
warehouses running at the same time. After the third day, except in the case of mega-disasters,
the levels of service targets can be met.
As for locations chosen on the basis of faster responses, South-Central Asia and South-East
Asia should definitely host a warehouse. Warehouses in the Caribbean, Eastern Africa and
Eastern Asia are also amongst those most frequently used.
Table 13.8: Impact of changes on level of service for immediate response
Optimal network per scenario Existing network (IFRC)︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷
Level of service for
immediate response
3 and 10
days
5 and 15
days
3 and 10
days
4 and 10
days
5 and 15
days
Total Real Costs (() 9,70E+09( 9,54E+09( 11,40E09( 11,36E+09( 11,26+09(
Percentage of scenarios
with stock-outs
13% 0% 75% 3% 3%
Amount of stock-out
(nb products late x nb
days waiting)
1 567 344 0 17 667 800 878 605 878 605
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13.6 Management summary
Figure 13.14 provides an overview of the key elements detailed in this chapter. The impact of
strategic decisions with regards to the supply strategy, the local agreements or the choice of
the targeted level of service is summarized.
Figure 13.15 on the next page illustrates the locations, which could be considered as optimal
according to our analysis. Bigger circles correspond to a higher utilization rate.
Figure 13.14: Summary of results
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South America
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Figure 13.15: Overall view of optimal locations
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14
Choice of the country within the region
14.1 Taking into account field realities
The previous chapter provided practical answers on which regions should have a warehouse
depending on various choices, from the size of the contingency stock to the desired level of
responsiveness and effectiveness.
The regions were chosen on the basis of the cheapest spot which facilitated the rescue of
the targeted number of affected in the given time-frames. By doing this, we overlooked
many elements that are also important for the choice of location. Safety, telecommunication
infrastructure and many other criteria should also be taken into consideration for the design
of the network, especially in the case of humanitarian supply networks, where people in need
of relief items may be in warring or barely accessible areas. Yet as these elements vary widely
within a single region, it was not possible to include them in the previous model.
This chapter will therefore focus on the local positioning of warehouses using a multi-criteria
decision analysis (MCDA).
14.2 Choosing the approach
Over the last 50 years, many approaches to help decisions have been developed. They may be
classified as follows [FGE05]:
1. Outranking methods ("French school")
2. Multi-attribute utility and value theories ("American school")
3. Fuzzy set approaches
4. Multi-Objective Mathematical Programming
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14.2.1 Out Ranking Methods
Outranking methods regroup all methods that are based on a pair-based comparison of
actions. Outranking indicates the degree of dominance of one alternative over another [RB98].
The two main examples are ELECTRE and PROMETHEE. For these methods, all the possible
choices are listed, and then all of the participants compare them two by two. For each pair
compared and each decision criterion, each participant says which one of the two possibilities
is the best. The participant expresses his decision in terms of preference (weak or strong) or
indifference. For the ELECTRE method, an alternative may also be vetoed. To decide if an
alternative is better than another, an outranking relation is built using the values provided
by the participants on the one hand, and on the other hand, the relative importance of each
criterion. To validate the assertion that an alternative is better than another, two conditions
must be fulfilled. First, "a sufficient majority of criteria should be in favour of this assertion".
This is called the concordance condition. Secondly, "when the concordance condition holds,
none of the criteria in the minority should oppose too strongly to the assertion".
The results are then analysed differently depending on the problem addressed. Choosing,
ranking or sorting the alternatives is thus possible.
The results are then analysed differently depending on the problem addressed. Choosing,
ranking or sorting the alternatives is thus possible.
14.2.2 Multi Attribute Utility and Value Theories
In these approaches, the choice among various actions is made on the basis of its utility, the
utility being a real number representing the preferability of the considered action. Two major
methods are AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process) and MACBETH (Measuring Attractiveness by a
Categorical Based Evaluation TecHnique).
According to its creator, Saaty, the AHP is "a theory of relative measurement on absolute
scales of both tangible and intangible criteria based both on the judgement of knowledgeable
and expert people and on existing measurements and statistics needed to make a decision"
[FGE05]. This method uses also comparative judgement.
According to Costa, MACBETH is an approach "designed to build a quantitative model of
values, developed in a way that enables facilitators to avoid forcing decision makers to produce
direct numerical representations of their preferences." Participants answer a list of questions,
providing a qualitative judgement about the difference in attractiveness of two stimuli. The
MACBETH method then verifies the consistency of the participant’s answers, and generates a
numerical scale that is representative of the decision maker’s judgments [CC04].
14.2.3 Fuzzy set approach
According to Zimmerman, a classical set "is normally defined as a collection of elements or
objects x ∈ X that can be finite, countable or overcountable. Each element can either belong
to or not belong to a set A, A ⊆ X ." In this case, the statement "x belongs to A" is either true or
false. For a fuzzy set, on the contrary, "the characteristic function allows various degrees of
membership for the elements of a given set” [Zim01].
Fuzzy set methods are therefore used especially when "decision problems take place in a
complex environment where conflicting systems of logic, uncertain and imprecise knowledge,
and possibly vague preferences have to be considered". [FGE05]
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14.2.4 Multi-objective mathematical programming
Mathematical programming is used here to provide an optimum solution to a problem having
two or more objectives. The methods used to solve the problem usually deal with a priori
weighted sums of the objective functions. Other methods exist, which use sequential explo-
rations of solutions, for example [Ben+71].
Roy distinguishes four different classes of approaches [Roy71]:
• Aggregation of multiple objective functions into a unique function defining a complete
preference order
• Progressive definition of preference together with exploration of the feasible set
• Definition of a partial order stronger than the product of the n complete orders associ-
ated with the n objective functions
• Maximum reduction of uncertainty and incomparability
According to Marler, "the selection of a specific method depends on the type of information
that is provided in the problem, the user’s preferences, the solution requirements, and the
availability of software" [MA04].
14.2.5 Our approach : mathematical programming with an aggregating approach
Outranking methods facilitate choosing an alternative when there are many criteria and
many participants in the decision process. These methods are therefore typically used for
group decision-making situations [KKP01], which is not really our case. Furthermore, this
approach "might become very expensive (computationally speaking) when there is a large
number of alternatives" [Coe00]. In our case, we have more than 220 countries, which would
require 25,000 rankings. And even if the ranking was limited to the best locations as defined
by our regional analysis, then we would still have more than 500 comparisons just to study
South-Central Asia, Eastern Africa and the Caribbean.
The difficulty of interpretation of the results is also often listed among the main drawbacks
of outranking methods [KKP01]. Moreover, according to Kangas, "the techniques by which
the preference information is dealt with in calculations are rather complicated and hard to
explain to nonspecialists" [KKP01].
As for the main method used in MAUT, AHP, according to Salomon, one of its major limitations
is "the necessary independence among elements from a hierarchical level" [SM01]. As our data
set is full of interrelated criteria, this method would be difficult to use as such. Furthermore,
AHP also compares pairs, an option that we already set aside.
Regarding the use of MACBETH, it is not justified here as numerous databases are available to
provide a numerical value of each criterion for each country.
Concerning the use of the fuzzy set approach, once again, there are quantitative criteria
available for ranking countries. The percentage of paved roads, the number of ports and
airports or annual cargo traffic are available quantitative data, for example. Though we agree
that some of these values may evolve over time, especially in politically volatile countries, and
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Figure 14.1: Our approach for choosing the best location for opening a warehouse
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would therefore justify the use of such approaches, we chose to provide here a clear vision of
the current situation, which is currently lacking.
The location decision could then be validated using a complementary approach which would
take into account the various kinds of uncertainties (see section 2.7 on page 26) that may affect
the results. This part is considered to be the natural research perspective of our study.
We therefore opted for an approach by multi-objective mathematical programming, which
aggregates the criteria to provide a ranking of various countries. The next section details how
we built a set of four independent criteria to establish a quantitative measurement of each
of the decision criteria listed by humanitarians (accessibility, security, telecommunication
networks and corruption/easy customs procedures).
Section 14.4 on page 155 will then explain how we aggregate these indicators using various
weighting factors and how we avoid the selection of a country which does not satisfy a min-
imum level in one or more of the criteria. The results are then analysed in section 14.5 on
page 159 and compared with the methods used by humanitarians when they chose their actual
warehouse locations. An overview of our approach is illustrated by figure 14.1.
14.3 Selecting the criteria and gathering data
A study of internal and external documentation as well as interviews with humanitarians has
enabled us to list the parameters which should be taken into account in choosing a relevant
location or locations. Table 8.1 on page 85, and in general, section 8.1 on page 83, provide a
detailed list of indicators used by the United Nations in choosing the location of their existing
warehouses. Their approach used practitioners’ local knowledge of the region to give a mark
to the various locations on the basis of their attractiveness for each of the chosen parameters.
While it is useful to draw on the knowledge and experience of field workers, the objectivity and
therefore the reproducibility and robustness of this approach is questionable.
152
Choice of the country within the region
What we propose in this chapter is to use objective public data to help make the choice of the
best location, then compare our results with the ones resulting from the ranking done by the
UN.
We therefore built a database to put together available data on countries. Various sources,
such as the CIA World Factbook, databases from the World Bank Group, Airports Council
International or the Institute for Economics and Peace were used. We also looked at academic
works, like reports from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program on peace agreements and conflic-
t/war related deaths, and of course the EM-DAT from the Université Catholique de Louvain on
disaster lists. Finally, we gathered data from NGO websites such as the data sets provided by
the UNDP, the UNFPA and Transparency International.
With this work, we have 50 criteria objectively marked for each country, provided in appendices,
with up to four available sources to allow cross-checking of the values. As this is a fairly broad
database, especially knowing that most of it is interrelated, we reduced the data with a principal
component analysis. We have them all normalised in order to facilitate the analyses. We also
made sure than for each sub-criteria, the minimum score goes to the worst country, and vice
versa. For example, for the sub criteria "number of civilian victims per inhabitants due to
one-sided conflicts", our indicator is 100 minus the number of victims (once normalised).
Indeed, "the central idea of principal component analysis (PCA) is to reduce the dimensionality
of a data set consisting of a large number of interrelated variables, while retaining as much as
possible of the variation present in the data set. This is achieved by transforming to a new set
of variables, the principal components (PCs), which are uncorrelated, and which are ordered
so that the first few retain most of the variation present in all of the original variables" [Jol02].
To provide a better understanding of the results, we sorted the data set into four main cate-
gories, which correspond to the elements outlined in our study :
• Data related to accessibility and infrastructure
• Data related to telecommunications networks
• Data related to the level of corruption and foreseeable customs difficulties
• Data related to safety and security
For each of these categories, we looked first at the contributions of each country, in order to set
aside those having such a high contribution that it significantly changed the analyse. Indeed,
according to Saporta, usually it is not desirable, especially for the first components, that an
individual contributes excessively because this may cause instability. Removing this individual
sharply changes the results of the analysis. This individual may still be added afterwards if the
high level of contribution wasn’t due to a typing error [Sap90]. For example, for the analysis of
the corruption criteria, countries such as Liberia or Burkina Faso have been taken out.
Then, we looked at other basic elements, such as the contributions of the sub-criteria and
their correlation. This enabled us to retain three to five sub-criteria for each main categories
(accessibility, corruption, security, telecommunication). Table 14.1 illustrates the sub-criteria
before and after this first selection for the sub-criteria linked with corruption. As you can see,
there are 15 pairs correlated by more than 60%, with 6 by more than 80%. There is therefore
no need to keep all these strongly correlated variables. On the contrary, neither the sub-
criteria "perceived corruption index" nor "GDP per capita rank minus HDI rank" nor "political
stability" are correlated with the others. They should therefore be kept for the analysis.
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Figure 14.2: Principal Component Analysis for data related to corruption - Map before looking
at correlations
ICP(corruption)
Human Development Index Value
Life Expectancy at birth (years)
Combined gross enrolment ratio in educ_1
Lie Expectancy index
Education index
GDP index
GDP per capita rank minus HDI rank
employment rate
Political StabilityGlobal Peace Index
Axe 1 (58.89%)
Axe 2 (15.10%)
 
154
Choice of the country within the region
Table 14.1: Correlations table values (in %) for data related to corruption before reduction
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10
C1 Perceived corruption index 100
C2 Human Development Index 54 100
C3 Life expectancy at birth 48 91 100
C4 Combined gross enrolment ratio in
education
49 88 76 100
C5 Education index 42 91 74 90 100
C6 GDP index 55 93 76 78 77 100
C7 GDP per capita rank
minus HDI rank
1 13 26 24 24 -11 100
C8 Employment rate 31 69 66 59 60 63 9 100
C9 Political stability 54 45 34 46 36 50 -4 35 100
C10 Global peace index 41 33 24 37 26 39 -2 26 86 100
Table 14.2: Contributions of sub-criteria to the construction of principal components (PC) for
the corruption criteria
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5
ICP(corruption) 23% 5% 22% 38% 12%
Human Development Index Value 31% 2% 7% 5% 55%
GDP per capita rank minus HDI rank 1% 80% 18% 1% 0%
Political Stability 22% 9% 16% 53% 1%
employment rate 23% 4% 38% 3% 32%
Figure 14.2 on the facing page is the PCA before our study of correlations. Figure 14.3 on the
next page is the PCA after our study of correlations. As can be seen on this figure, 70% of the
variance is represented by axes 1 and 2, which ensures a good representation.
From this point, if we wanted to reduce further the number of sub-criteria used, the next step
would be to look at the contributions of each sub-criteria. If two sub-criteria have exactly
the same contribution, we could remove one of them. Table 14.2 details the contributions
of each sub-criteria, for corruption. In this case, once we remove the sub-criteria strongly
correlated with others, we obtain five sub-criteria. Four of them have a similar contribution :
the perceived corruption index, the human development index, the political stability and the
global peace index.
As five sub-criteria are not too big a number, we will keep them all for our analysis.
The process for each of the three other indicators (corruption, security, accessibility) is exactly
the same. Figures 14.4, 14.6 and 14.5 illustrate the maps obtained after cleaning the data sets.
14.4 Aggregating the parameters
For the security indicator, according to the PCA, three sub-criteria are kept: the number of
one-sided1 acts of violence over 20 years, the political stability of the country and the total
number of affected per natural crisis per number of inhabitants. Indeed, first of all, it would
not be pertinent to set up in a warring country with relief items targeted for natural disaster
1Intentional attacks on civilians by governments and formally organized armed groups
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Figure 14.3: Principal Component Analysis for data related to corruption - Map
ICP(corruption)
GDP per capita rank minus HDI rank
employment rate
Political Stability
Axe 1 (45.16%)
Axe 2 (25.62%)
 
Figure 14.4: Principal Component Analysis for data related to telecommunications - Map
Internet hosts per 1000inhab.
Telephones - mobile cellular per 1000i_1
Telephones - MAIN LINES per 1000inhab
Axe 1 (67.24%)
Axe 2 (17.63%)
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Figure 14.5: Principal Component Analysis for data related to security - Map
Total aff %00 pop
Global Peace Index
"conflicts ""one sided"" over 20ans"
Axe 1 (51.97%)
Axe 2 (32.05%)
 
Figure 14.6: Principal Component Analysis for data related to accessibility - Map
nbaeroports norm
cargo load
MERCHANT LINES norm
Axe 1 (55.14%)
Axe 2 (25.95%)
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victims. Secondly, though it is vital to avoid areas where hostages and other civilians may be
killed, it is also necessary to build a warehouse in an area where it will not collapse because of
a natural disaster.
Other sub-criteria, such as the number of crises, the total number of affected per natural
disasters (but not divided by the number of inhabitants) or the civilians killed over 5 years
were initially in the dataset. They were closely related to the sub-criteria we kept.
For the telecommunications indicator, out of the 11 sub-criteria, many were correlated. The
numbers of main lines in use and the number of Internet users were strongly correlated, as
were the number of subscriptions to mobile phones and the number of Internet users per total
inhabitants for example. As for the accessibility indicator, as expected, the number of parts
and terminal and the number of airports were correlated. We therefore kept only the number
of airports. As for the presence of the country in the ranking of the top international airports,
it was strongly correlated with the cargo load (nearly 90%).
The list of all these sub-criteria, before and after the analysis, is in appendix
The construction of the four criteria (accessibility, telecommunication, corruption, security)
was done by using the principal components as defined by the PCA2. For each of our criteria,
as more than 70% of the variance is expressed by the first two axes, we have taken only these
two components into account. Each component is weighted by the variances it expresses. If
we come back to the first example, the corruption criteria, then the formula for aggregating all
the sub-criteria is as follows:
(0,45+0,26)×Corruption= 0,45×

0,23×Perceived corruption index
+ 0,31×Human development index
+ 0,01×GDP per capita rank minus HDI rank
+ 0,22×Political stability
+ 0,23×Employment rate
+ 0,26×

0,05×Perceived corruption index
+ 0,02×Human development index
+ 0,80×GDP per capita rank minus HDI rank
+ 0,09×Political stability+ 0,04×Employment rate
(14.1)
The corruption criteria can therefore be calculated with the following formula:
Corruption=

0,16×Perceived corruption index
+ 0,20×Human development index
+ 0,30×GDP per capita rank minus HDI rank
+ 0,17×Political stability
+ 0,16×Employment rate
(14.2)
Similarly, for the three others, we have :
2Principal Component Analysis
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Security=

0,32×Number of victims of conflicts "one-sided" over 20 years per inhabitant
+ 0,30×Global peace index
+ 0,38×Annual number of affected per natural crisis per inhabitant
(14.3)
Accessibility=

0,33×Number of airports
+ 0,27×Merchant lines
+ 0,40×Annual cargo load
(14.4)
Telecommunications=

0,28×Telephone main lines per inhabitants
+ 0,36×Telephone mobile cellular per inhabitants
+ 0,36× Internet hosts per inhabitants
(14.5)
To rank the countries on the basis of these four indicators, a short linear programme was
written to help make the decision.
First, some countries which do not meet a minimum level in one of the indicators should
not be considered. Indeed, nobody would willingly maintain stock in a warring country, for
example, even if it apparently had satisfactory infrastructure and telecommunication facilities.
The programme therefore makes sure that the overall score for such countries is null.
In addition , there is a level of uncertainty on the weighting factors applied to each of the
indicators. For some humanitarians, security comes first while others put more importance
on infrastructure and accessibility. We therefore used five sets of weights: one with equal
importance to each indicator, and then four with progressively more weight on one of the
indicators. Table 14.3 on the following page summarises the global results and specifies
whether the country has the same rank for each set of weights or if the weighting factor has an
impact on the ranking.
14.5 Analysis and comparison with other methods
Some details regarding the choice of the Asian depot as documented by the United Nations
can be found in table 14.4 on page 161.
Table 14.5 provides our scores for each of the countries selected by the UN.
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Table 14.4: Comparative Analysis of Potential Sites in SE Asia, from [RPB08]
Max Thailand Cambodia Singapore Malaysia Indonesia
Criteria/Indicators Score Utapao Phnom
Penh
Singapore Subang Batam
Strategic location and
geopolitical situation
10 7 4 10 9 4
2) Level of commitment and
long-term sustainability
10 7 6 8 9 5
3) Storage, office and training
facilities
15 11 10 12 14 6
4) Proximity to roads and railway
network
10 6 4 9 9 3
5) Airport 10 8 6 9 9 7
6) Proximity to sea port 5 3 2 5 5 3
7) Air National Carriers 5 4 2 4 4 4
8) Technical services available 5 4 3 5 5 3
9) Access to military assets 5 5 1 5 5 3
10) Access to national and
international markets
5 5 2 4 5 3
11) Telecom network 5 4 2 5 5 4
12) Customs procedures 5 4 4 4 4 3
13) Financial system 5 4 2 5 5 3
14) Immunities and privileges to
premises and UN Staff
5 5 4 5 5 4
TOTAL 100 76 52 89 91 55
Table 14.5: Our scores for the countries selected by the UN
Countries
Weights Thailand Cambodia Singapore Malaysia Indonesia
All equally weighed 197 97 315 286 198
Telecom 220 101 377 313 208
Accessibility 277 126 384 376 241
Corruption 268 158 406 365 272
Security 220 100 408 376 269
As we can see in table 14.5, though Singapore came first in every cases, the mark of Malaysia
is not much lower. Indonesia comes next on the list, closely followed by Thailand. This, for
example, seems to be in line with some of the IFRC’s questions about their Kuala Lumpur
RLU3. While Kuala Lumpur seemed a good option, an internal report suggested that Singapore
might be a better option. Our ranking confirms this internal analysis, as Indonesia comes only
third in the ranking of South-Eastern Asian countries.
A comparison between tables 14.4 and 14.5 shows that our approach provides close results.
In both rankings, Singapore and Malaysia are considered good options (though not in the
same relative place). The UN method ranked Thailand third, which differs from our ranking,
in which Thailand is fourth because its level of security and telecommunication are fairly low,
though still better than Cambodia.
3Regional Logistics Unit
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As for South-Central Asia, which was the region chosen by our program to respond to most of
the medium and big disasters, the local analysis would recommend the opening of a warehouse
in India, especially when accessibility is given a prime importance.
If we now look at IFRC logistics network, then we see that all of the locations they chose are
ranked within the first quarter of our ranking. They may still improve their logistics network
by opening a new warehouse in Singapore or India. As for the RLU in Panama, it has a similar
profile than the best country of the Caribbean. Indeed, if we look at the scores of the 234
countries, Panama and the Bahamas are 50 and 51st in our ranking. With local agreements
with the government in Panama and many other organizations to collaborate with to decrease
costs, then it is definitely a good option to keep the RLU in Panama. As for Dubai, if it comes
only second (after Cyprus) in the list of the best countries of Western Asia, it is not by much
either. None of their scores are further than 7% from one other. The case in which Cyprus
loses top ranking to the United Arab Emirates is when accessibility is considered to be the
most important indicator. In this specific case, the set of weighting factors has an impact in
the ranking. If the warehouse positionned in Western Asia is to send relief to the most remote
parts of Africa, then a high weight on accessibility is required. In this case, the choice for
location made by the IFRC is justified.
This chapter has provided one way of choosing an adequate location based on local considera-
tions. It complements the previous chapter by taking into account criteria such as the levels of
security, corruption, accessibility and telecommunication. Of course, our initial data set is far
from exhaustive and the resulting indicators only partially represent reality. Furthermore, the
data available were not always up to date. For example, the number of victims of one-sided
violence dates from 1980 to 2000, and so is already 10 years old. Since then, the rates of some
countries may have evolved. This explains the ranking given to Kazakhstan, which in the past
was much more peaceful than it is at the present time. Our main research perspectives on this
local optimisation are both to use the expertise of practitioners to complement the study and
to take into account the various kind of uncertainties of our data set.
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Conclusion
Confronted with an increasing pressure to respond more effectively, more efficiently, and
above all quicker than before, the humanitarian sector seeks ways to meet both affected and
donors expectations. To deliver aid to those in need, organisations have to set up complex
supply chains within a few days. All of this being under higher level of uncertainties than most
of the commercial supply chains. Nobody could have foreseen the devastating impact of the
Haiti earthquake for example. Nobody could even have foreseen its occurrence more than
a few hours in advance. Same for the hurricane Nargis in Myanmar. Demand is unknown,
before, but also after the disaster. The political instability and many other complexity factors
force humanitarian organisations to work on their capacity to react quickly to changes. This
capacity is fundamental for NGOs4. It is also becoming of prime importance in the private
sector, where disruption risks, demand volatility and customers’ expectations have increased
drastically over the last years.
Given these considerations, specificities and needs of humanitarian supply chains have been
analysed in the first part of this thesis. This study, based on case study research and literature
review, outlined nine key elements, which are detailed in chapter 2. The dynamic of operations,
the challenges due to the diversity in nature, number and incentives of stakeholders, the
financing system or the complexity of their environment are among this list of specificities.
Our research objectives have then been motivated by a literature review. Three main elements
have retained our attention:
1. Even if many research perspectives are listed in most of the existing literature, few are
actually studied in depth.
2. Most of the articles use one or more methods without much consideration of their
applicability in the context of relief aid.
3. If many lessons are given by academics to humanitarians, none seeks to make explicit
and consolidate humanitarian experiences.
In this context, the aim of our research is to improve the design and the management of
agile supply chain, especially in the context of relief aid. Defining and measuring the agility
capability of supply chains is thus the main purpose of the second part of this thesis. Chapters 6
on page 63 and 7 on page 67 provide a list of best practices and metrics, which enable to assess
the agility maturity level of a supply chain. Three key performance indicators are assessed:
responsiveness, effectiveness and flexibility. Each of them is composed of of two to four
sub-criteria, which all together are essential to ensure a high agility level.
4Non Governemental Organisations
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Knowing that more than 30% of those metrics are directly linked with the design of the logistics
network, the third part of this thesis focuses on this specific issue. Our objective was to look
after the most efficient solutions, that enable to deliver aid within acceptable time frames.
To carry through this analysis, we have divided the work in three steps. First, we have looked
at past disasters, their trends and forecasts to build realistic scenarios. Secondly, we have
written a MIP5 in order to choose the best locations, on a regional level, depending on various
strategic choices. Chapter 13 on page 123 provide practical answers regarding the design of
the logistics network with and without taking into account existing networks. It also analyses
the sensitivity of the model to various data and parameters.
The main results of this chapter are that one central warehouse in a place, where local agree-
ments with governments or other NGOs decrease fixed costs is the most efficient option both
for small crisis and for really big disasters, to complement the local warehouse when it cannot
meet the demand. As for medium size disasters, locations such as South-Central Asia, South-
Eastern Asia and Eastern Africa are recommended. Depending on the targeted population,
on the targeted level of service, on what is considered "acceptable" time frame, the answers
with regards to the number, size and location of warehouses differ slightly. As the possibility to
supply locally, it impacts costs and level of service, but not the locations chosen as optimal.
The third and final step of our network design is to choose the best location on a local basis.
Indeed, according to humanitarian practitioners, the level of security, of corruption as well as
infrastructures for telecommunication and accessibility are of prime importance. Quantitative
values have been calculated for each country, for each criteria. A principal component analysis
enabled us to build those four criteria from a database of more than 50 sub-criteria gathered
with a review of the literature and the web.
From this study, we can conclude that a warehouse in Singapore or in India would be recom-
mended.
This optimization answers a real need expressed by many humanitarian agencies. We focused
our study on the IFRC6. Other organisations, such as the French Red Cross or World Vision
International also confirmed the relevance of this research problem. Simulations for the
UNHRN7 and World Vision International are on-going.
This study has showed that the use of models and optimization-based decision-support
systems can be used to provide a robust and impartial answer to questions such as "how do we
ensure an adequate and swift response to disaster?" "where should we have advanced stock,
and why?" which parameters impact the decision process?". Our study is a prototype, which
can be improved in many ways. Indeed, we limited our study to most of the well-known issues
faced by humanitarian organizations. Additional discussions with NGOs to validate our results
and their applicability would be needed. Other ways of dealing with uncertainties can also be
compared or added to our models. Indeed, our approach was to look at various questions and
uncertainties and analysis their impact on the response. The use of fuzzy logic or any other
approach to include the uncertainties within the model could complement our study. This is
true for the location part, but it is also true for the overall assessment of agility.
5Mixed-Integer linear Program
6International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
7the UN humanitarian response network
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Résumé des travaux en français
Au cours de ces dix à quinze dernières années, le secteur humanitaire a beaucoup évolué.
D’une part, la nature, la fréquence et l’importance des crises naturelles poussent les orga-
nisations humanitaires à gérer de plus en plus d’opérations en parallèle. D’autre part, les
contraintes dues aux flux financiers restreints et aux exigences accrues des donateurs les
poussent à davantage de professionnalisation et de rationalisation. C’est dans ce contexte de
recherche de performance, de mesure et d’amélioration que se positionnent nos travaux.
En moyenne, chaque année, plus de 210 millions de personnes sont affectées par des catas-
trophes naturelles. Les organisations humanitaires doivent donc souvent mettre en place
des chaînes logistiques complexes et ce dans un environnement excessivement volatile. Ces
chaînes logistiques ont de nombreuses particularités qui les différencient de leurs homologues
habituellement rencontrées dans l’industrie traditionnelle.
Une étude approfondie des chaînes logistiques humanitaires a donc été menée afin de bien
appréhender leurs spécificités, leurs points forts et leurs faiblesses. C’est l’objet de la première
partie de cette thèse. Un résultat important de notre travail porte ainsi sur la caractérisation
formelle de ces chaînes logistiques. En nous appuyant sur une étude de cas présentée au
chapitre 1, plusieurs discussions avec des membres d’ONG ainsi que sur une revue de la
littérature, nous avons ciblé les principales caractéristiques des chaines logistique humani-
taires, leur points forts et leurs faiblesses. Neuf points clés ont ainsi été retenus et détaillés
dans le chapitre 2. La dynamique des opérations humanitaires, les challenges dus au nombre
et à la nature des intervenants, au système de financement sont ainsi listés, de même que
l’impact des médias, la courte durée des opérations ou encore l’objectif même des chaînes
logistiques, mises en place pour sauver des vies, et non pour gagner de l’argent sont ainsi
explicités. Deux des principaux problèmes que rencontrent les humanitaires sont également
détaillés : les nombreuses incertitudes ainsi que les problèmes de coordinations auxquels ils
sont confrontés.
Par une revue de la littérature, nous avons fait ressortir les principaux éléments à étudier, ceux
qui l’ont déjà été ou sont en cours et ceux qui mériteraient d’être poussé plus avant. Trois
éléments ont principalement retenu notre attention.
1. Même si de nombreux points sont soulevés, peu ont vraiment fait l’objet d’une étude
détaillée.
2. La plupart des articles publiés appliquent un outil ou une méthode préexistante sans
trop se soucier de son applicabilité dans le secteur humanitaire.
3. Enfin, si beaucoup de leçons sont données par les académiques aux humanitaires, peu
d’articles cherchent à expliciter et consolider les expériences des humanitaires.
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FIGURE 14.7: Research Objectives
Dans ce contexte, notre étude vise à expliciter, mesurer et améliorer l’une des principales
caractéristiques des chaînes logistiques humanitaires : leur capacité à répondre rapidement et
de manière adéquate aux changements à court terme. Ceci constitue la seconde partie de cette
thèse. Cette capacité, l’agilité, est fortement influencée par la manière dont le réseau logistique
est conçu et dimensionné. Notre seconde problématique, traitée en troisième partie de thèse,
consiste donc à assurer un niveau déterminé d’agilité aux chaînes logistiques humanitaires en
les aidant à mieux positionner leurs ressources. L’objectif est de montrer que l’on peut obtenir
ce niveau en maximisant l’efficience du réseau. Nous avons donc quantifié, en terme de coûts
et de niveau de service, l’impact de plusieurs décisions stratégiques telles que : la proximité
des fournisseurs, le degré de centralisation du réseau ou encore le niveau d’agilité visé par
l’organisation. Ces deux objectifs de recherche sont illustrés par la figure 14.7.
Les organisations humanitaires doivent développer des solutions leur permettant de distri-
buer les secours rapidement après une crise. L’un des principaux points forts des logisticiens
humanitaires est donc leur capacité à répondre rapidement et efficacement à de nombreux
changements à court terme concernant la demande, l’approvisionnement ou l’environne-
ment. C’est ce qu’on appelle l’agilité. Or, cette capacité est une propriété fondamentale que de
nombreuses chaînes logistiques industrielles souhaiteraient acquérir pour réagir de façon per-
tinente aux évolutions constantes de leurs marchés. En effet, de nombreux secteurs industriels
sont confrontés à une volatilité de plus en plus importante de la demande. Ils doivent égale-
ment faire face à de nombreuses autres perturbations internes ou externes. Cette étude peut
donc leur permettre de bénéficier de l’expertise de leurs homologues du secteur humanitaire
et les aidera à développer des outils et méthodes leur permettant de faire face plus rapidement
aux divers changements à court terme. Quant aux humanitaires, cette formalisation doit leur
permettre de mieux assimiler et utiliser des connaissances d’une crise à l’autre. Elle leur servira
également à mieux comprendre ce qu’il leur reste à faire pour augmenter leur niveau d’agilité.
La figure 14.8 résume notre démarche de recherche.
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FIGURE 14.8: Partie II - résumé
Dans la seconde partie de ce manuscrit, nous explicitons les bonnes pratiques qui permettent
aux humanitaires d’atteindre un haut niveau d’agilité. Dans ce but, nous avons effectué une
recherche sous la forme d’une étude de cas ainsi qu’une revue de littérature. Trois dimensions
de performance ont été identifiées : la flexibilité, la capacité de réponse et l’efficacité. Toutes
trois sont composées de deux à quatre éléments qui, ensembles, permettent à une supply
chain d’atteindre un haut niveau d’agilité (c.f. figure 14.9).
Social Innovation Centre
FIGURE 14.9: Maison de l’agilité des chaînes logistiques
L’objectif de cette étude est de fournir un modèle permettant de mesurer l’agilité des chaînes
logistiques de façon objective, robuste et reproductible. Ces caractéristiques sont essentielles
afin de pouvoir utiliser le modèle comme outil de discussion commun facilitant les bench-
marks et permettant de mettre en valeur un avantage concurrentiel reconnu : l’agilité. Le
modèle en lui-même est détaillé dans la partie II (voir chapitre 7) ainsi qu’en appendice. Il
consiste à évaluer une chaine logistique sur chacune de des dimensions de performance
de l’agilité en utilisant des grilles comme la table 14.6. Les cases grises de ce tableau corres-
pondent à notre évaluation pour la réponse de la Fédération Internationale de la Croix Rouge
et du Croissant Rouge (IFRC) à Yogyakarta8.
8C’est le tremblement de terre ayant fait le plus de victimes en 2006 (cf l’étude de cas présentée dans la partie I)
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FIGURE 14.10: Conclusions de l’évaluation de la chaine logistique de l’IFRC à Yogyakarta
Ces scores sont ensuite utilisés pour estimer le niveau global d’agilité de la chaine logistique
et en déduire les possibilités d’amélioration. La figure 14.10 montre un résumé de notre
évaluation de la réponse de l’IFRC à Yogyakarta. Le nombre de métriques nécessaires pour
décrire entièrement chaque dimension de performance varie. Deux métriques suffisent pour
mesurer l’efficacité alors que 16 sont nécessaire pour la flexibilité. Cette inégalité est prise en
compte dans l’élaboration de la note globale pour l’agilité. En effet, un score minimum pour
chacune des dimensions de performance est nécessaire pour chaque niveau d’agilité (voir
chapitre 7).
Cette deuxième partie de la thèse vise donc à clarifier les différents éléments qui permettent
une réponse rapide. Près de 45% de ces éléments sont étroitement liés à la façon dont le réseau
logistique des organisations est conçu et dimensionné. Cela nous a donc conduit à définir
une troisième problématique afin d’aider les humanitaires à mieux appréhender les différents
paramètres qui interviennent lors de la conception de leur réseau logistique. En effet, les
organisations humanitaires répondent aux crises naturelles en envoyant de l’aide sur place.
Pour y arriver, elles mettent en place des stocks avancés de différentes ressources. L’objet
de cette étude est de configurer, puis dimensionner le réseau logistique d’une organisation
humanitaire. La première étape consiste donc à déterminer l’emplacement optimal pour
pré-positionner les ressources. Cette étude est exposée dans la troisième partie du manuscrit.
L’objectif n’est pas d’obtenir un très haut niveau d’agilité coûte que coûte, ce qui serait irréa-
liste compte tenu des ressources souvent limitées des organisations humanitaires. Il s’agit
plutôt de choisir le niveau d’agilité le plus adapté, puis de concevoir la chaîne logistique
qui atteint ce niveau au moindre coût. Notre étude consiste donc non seulement à assurer
un niveau déterminé d’agilité des chaînes logistiques humanitaires en les aidant à mieux
positionner leurs ressources, mais également à montrer que l’on peut obtenir ce niveau en
maximisant leur efficience. La prise en compte de l’efficience est en effet devenue critique
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dans le monde humanitaire. La nature géographiquement distribuée des interventions et
le manque de coordination évident des acteurs de l’humanitaire limitent l’efficience des
interventions. Or le nombre croissant de crises humanitaires et l’apparition de nouvelles
organisations pour y faire face est loin d’être suivi par un accroissement des donations. Les
donateurs sont de plus en plus regardants sur l’utilisation de leurs dons. Ils réclament plus
de garanties et de transparence. Maximiser l’efficience des opérations humanitaires va donc
dans ce sens. Notre objectif est de montrer que pour un même niveau de ressources, il est
possible de secourir un plus grand nombre de victimes. Les chaînes logistiques industrielles,
elles, disposent de méthodes et d’outils qui leur permettent de maîtriser cette composante de
leur performance. La deuxième problématique scientifique est donc d’améliorer l’efficience
des chaînes logistiques humanitaires en les aidant à mieux positionner leurs ressources.
Notre étude est divisée en trois étapes, comme illustré par la figure 14.11. Nous construisons
une demande humanitaire pour une période donnée, puis nous identifions les régions les
plus propices pour maintenir des stocks avancés. Ensuite, nous analysons différents critères
locaux, comme l’accessibilité, la sécurité, les facilités de douane ou encore le réseau telecom.
La première étape de cette étude est de construire un état des lieux des différents réseaux
existant, les localisations choisies ainsi que les différentes motivations qui poussent les hu-
manitaires à décentraliser de plus en plus leurs réseaux. C’est l’objet des chapitres 8 et 9. Une
revue des différentes possibilités que nous avons pour effectuer cette étude est ensuite fournie
dans le chapitre 10.
Pour notre étude, nous avons retenu l’IFRC9 comme sujet. En effet, l’IFRC a fait de cette
problématique une priorité pour 2010. De ce fait, nous avons construit les hypothèses de
notre modèle sur la base des renseignements qu’ils nous ont fourni. Nous avons toutefois fait
en sorte que le modèle construit soit applicable très facilement pour n’importe quelle autre
organisation.
Il nous a également fallu bien comprendre quelle était la demande humanitaire actuelle et
comment elle est susceptible d’évoluer dans le future. C’est l’objet du chapitre 11. Notre
analyse montre que la demande humanitaire ne sera modifiée que pour quelques cas de figure.
L’augmentation du nombre et de l’impact des crises est surtout visible pour les inondations et
les tempêtes dans les régions asiatiques par exemple. La figure 14.12 résume les principaux
éléments de cette étude.
La rapidité de réponse est primordiale, pour les victimes surtout, mais également pour l’image
médiatique de l’organisation. De ce fait, en cas de crise, si l’organisation choisit d’intervenir, il
lui faut pouvoir livrer 5000 familles dans les 48h qui suivent l’évaluation de la demande. Cette
évaluation est publiée généralement 3 jours après la crise. En effet, les premiers jours sont
consacrés à la recherche des corps et monopolisent les moyens humains. Dans notre modèle,
on a donc retenu 5000 familles dans les 5 jours qui suivent la crise, puis 15000 familles dans
les 15 jours et enfin l’ensemble des besoins en 2 mois.
Les hypothèses du modèle d’optimisation régional sont les suivantes. La demande humanitaire
peut être satisfaite en envoyant les produits directement depuis n’importe quel entrepôt
capable de livrer dans les temps si le produit y est en stock. Les livraisons peuvent s’effectuer
par avion ou par bateau, selon l’urgence de la situation. L’avion, plus rapide mais aussi plus
coûteux que le bateau, sera utilisé principalement pendant les premiers jours qui suivent la
crise, de manière à garantir un délai de livraison respectant les contraintes énoncées ci-dessus.
Le transport par bateau prend ensuite le relais dès que les délais de livraisons le permettent.
9Fédération Internationale de la Croix Rouge et du Croissant Rouge
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FIGURE 14.11: Overview - What are we doing exactly ?
Build Demand
Minimize costs 
on a regional 
level
Optimize 
location on a 
local level
Data base on 
past crisis 
Choice of the « level of service »:
How many rescued? 
Within which time frame?
Demand
Choice of the 
« cost » of stockout
- Costs
purchase costs, fixe and variable costs (warehouse)
delivery costs upstream/downstreal by plane and boat
- Delays
delivery time upstream/downstreal by plane and boat
Estimated demand per person in case 
of disaster (which products per 
disaster type and region)
Choice of the size of 
the warehouse and its 
contingency stock
Actual and potential 
location of suppliers 
(per product and region)
Influencing 
factors 
Environmental parameters
(safety, accessibility, 
telecommunication, corruption)
Location, 
number and size 
of warehouses 
(regional level)
Location of 
warehouses 
(local level)
Choice of the weights of 
each environmental 
parameter
Demand 
uncertainty
Supply
uncertainty
Environment 
uncertainty
 
 
 
C
h
a
p
te
r 
1
1
C
h
a
p
te
r 
1
2
C
h
a
p
te
r 
1
3
objectiveData
Parameters
Output
Explanations
171
FIGURE 14.12: Evolution du nombre de victimes de crises naturelles, selon les régions et selon
le type de crise (pour les crises faisant moins de 1 000 000 victimes)
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Il s’agit donc d’une problématique de service, où l’objectif est de satisfaire, au moindre coût,
toute la demande dans les délais impartis. Les coûts à prendre en compte regroupent les
coûts de transports amont et aval, à savoir du fournisseur à l’entrepôt, puis de l’entrepôt au
bénéficiaire final, par bateau ou par avion. Ils prennent également en compte les coûts de
fonctionnement ainsi que les coûts d’ouverture des entrepôts. Nous avons aussi tenu compte
des entrepôts existants.
Si l’on connaît la ou les crises en cours, donc les demandes, le problème de localisation
optimale des entrepôts peut se formuler comme un programme linéaire en variable 0, 1. Ce
programme au stade actuel vise à minimiser les coûts. La satisfaction de la demande est une
contrainte, avec intervention d’un “coût” de pénurie prohibitif si la contrainte ne peut être
respectée. Ce programme utilise la version 110 du solveur CPLEX d’Ilog. Il a été développé
avec l’interface IDE d’Ilog puis converti en java afin de faciliter la construction des scénarios
de crise et le traitement des résultats. Il détermine la (les) régions qui devraient accueillir des
stocks avancés.
Pour chaque scénario (un scénario étant un ensemble de crises naturelle ayant lieu dans le
même laps de temps), le modèle détermine le nombre et la localisation optimale des stocks
avancés. Une étude des résultats obtenus pour les 173 scénarios permet de faire ressortir
les entrepôts les plus souvent choisis et les critères de sélections. Le modèle est ensuite
relancé pour tous ces scénarios, mais en imposant l’ouverture d’un ou plusieurs entrepôts. Les
résultats obtenus sont ensuite comparés, de manière à déterminer quelles sont les principales
possibilités pour concevoir un réseau logistique optimal ou pour améliorer un réseau existant.
Une étude de sensibilité sur les critères demandés est également détaillée afin de déterminer
quelles sont les décisions les plus importantes en termes de coût. Elle permet d’apporter une
vision plus objective sur les questions suivantes :
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1. Pourquoi choisir de décentraliser le réseau logistique humanitaire ?
2. Quels paramètres jouent un rôle important dans la décision ?
3. La décision sera-t-elle également valable d’ici 5 à 10 ans lorsque le réseau de fournisseurs
locaux sera plus développé ?
Le chapitre 13 répond donc à ces différentes questions. Les réponses sont apportées en trois
temps. En premier lieu, nous apportons des éléments de réponses de manière "absolue",
sans tenir compte des réseaux existants. De cette analyse, il ressort qu’il est préférable de se
contenter d’un seul niveau dans le réseau et que le développement du réseau de fournisseurs
locaux peut permettre de gagner environ 15% en termes de coûts par exemple.
Ensuite, nous analysons un réseau existant afin de déterminer quels axes d’améliorations
il est souhaitable de suivre. Ainsi, par exemple, l’IFRC gagnerait à la fois en termes de coût
et en niveau de service avec un, voire deux entrepôts supplémentaires en Asie Sud-Centrale
ou Sud-Est et en Afrique de l’Est. Comme précédemment, le développement du réseau local
impacte le coût et les délais de réponse. Le tableau 14.7 commpare différentes options pour
améliorer le réseau existant à l’IFRC.
Enfin, nous concluons notre analyse en regardant la sensibilité du modèle à quelques para-
mètres clés. Ainsi, si une organisation obtient une réduction de ses coûts fixes grâce à des
accords avec les gouvernements (comme à Dubai) ou en se positionnant sur le même emplace-
ment qu’une autre organisation (comme à Panama), alors ces emplacements sont privilégiés
par le programme (voir figure 14.13)
FIGURE 14.13: Impact des coûts fixes sur la localisation des entrepôts
173 runs corresponding to the natural crisis of year 2008
N
With fixed costs
No fixed costs in Dubai
No fixed costs for every region
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Résumé des travaux en français
La figure 14.14 fournit les principales réponses apportées dans le chapitre 13. Les cercle de
diamètre plus élevés correspondent aux entrepôts ayant un taux d’utilisation plus élevé.
La dernière étape de notre travail d’optimisation consiste à inclure des considérations supplé-
mentaires, cette fois à un niveau local, afin de sélectionner le(s) "meilleur(s)" pays pour établir
un entrepôt. C’est l’objet du chapitre 14.
Dans ce chapitre, nous utilisons plusieurs analyses en composante principale afin de sélection-
ner différents sous-critères et de les agréger pour obtenir une note de référence pour chaque
pays. Quatre critères sont évalués : accessibilité, sécurité, corruption et télécommunications.
De cette étude, on peut conclure qu’un entrepôt en Inde ou à Singapour serait pertinent.
Ce travail d’optimisation correspond à un besoin réel de plusieurs associations humanitaires.
Nous avons ainsi fourni des réponses objectives à quelques questions vitales pour les organi-
sations humanitaires :
• "Comment peut-on assurer une réponse rapide et adéquate aux crises humanitaires ?"
• "Où doit-on positionner nos stocks avancés, en quelle quantité, et pour quelles raisons ?"
• "Quels sont les paramètres qui impactent les processus de décision ?"
Ce travail d’analyse a été mené en prenant soin de bien expliciter et consolider les savoir-
faire des humanitaires. Les modèles proposés, bien que appliqués à une organisation pour
nos travaux, ont été conçu pour être facilement adaptable à d’autres organisations. En effet,
nous avons axé notre étude sur la fédération internationale de la croix rouge et du croissant
rouge. Cependant, d’autres associations, comme la croix rouge Française, ont témoigné leur
vif intérêt pour cette question.
Plusieurs perspectives de recherche découlent de ces travaux. Quelques suites à donner di-
rectes sont à travailler, comme les discussions avec d’autres praticiens pour valider les résultats,
l’application à d’autres organisations (humanitaires ou industrielles), l’intégration d’autres
ressources comme les moyens humains et matériels dans l’étude de configuration de la chaine
logistique, ou encore la comparaison avec d’autres possibilités de prendre en compte les
incertitudes. Plusieurs questions, plus éloignées, méritent également une étude plus appro-
fondie. Ainsi, comme on a pu le voir, les réseaux collaboratifs impliquant les humanitaires
impactent énormément le choix de la configuration du réseau, le coût et le niveau de service
de la réponse. Il est donc primordial de faciliter la mise en place de ces réseaux en développant
par exemple des outils facilitant le traçage et le partage des informations.
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FIGURE 14.14: Résumé des principaux éléments de réponse (chapitre 13)
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Appendices

A
Supply chain agility - Assessment model
The tables to assess supply chain responsiveness is provided in chapter 7 on page 67 (see
tables 7.2 on page 70 and 7.3 on page 71). This appendix complement the assessment model.
It provides the grids to assess the flexibility and effectiveness of supply chains.
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Figure A.1: House of Supply Chain Agility
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Supply chain agility - Assessment model
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B
Warehouse location on a regional level -
Data set
In this appendix, data for the optimization model are provided.
• DTPD - Delivery times by plane, from warehouses to affected regions
• DTBD - Delivery times by boat, from warehouses to affected regions
• DCPD - Delivery costs by plane, from warehouses to affected regions
• DCBD - Delivery costs by boat, from warehouses to affected regions
• DCPU - Delivery times by plane, from suppliers to warehouses
(similar to DCPD, but with "99999" when there is no suppliers in a region, or when a
supplier supplies only specific areas)
• DCBU - Delivery times by boat, from suppliers to warehouses
(similar to DCPD, but with "99999" when there is no suppliers in a region, or when a
supplier supplies only specific areas)
• DTPU - Delivery costs by plane, from suppliers to warehouses (similar to DTPD)
• DTBU - Delivery times by boat, from suppliers to warehouses (similar to DTBD)
• CostA - Purchase costs
• CostV - Variable costs
• CostF - Fixed costs
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Warehouse location on a regional level - Data set
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Purchase Costs (euros)
P1 4
P2 150
P3 10935
P4 2855
P5 5
P6 4
P7 19
P8 3
Variable costs (euros) Fixed costs (euros)
Built with average salary Built with GDP
Australia and New Zeland 0,141 Australia and New Zeland 3390000
Caribbean 0,061 Caribbean 146710
Central America 0,034 Central America 815000
Eastern Africa 0,015 Eastern Africa 352800
Eastern Asia 0,107 Eastern Asia 2567100
Eastern Europe 0,063 Eastern Europe 1506000
Melanesia 0,023 Melanesia 552000
Micronesia 0,026 Micronesia 630000
Middle Africa 0,03 Middle Africa 712200
North Europe 0,15 North Europe 3603000
Northern Africa 0,029 Northern Africa 695000
Northern America 0,178 Northern America 4265000
Polynesia 0,026 Polynesia 630000
South America 0,038 South America 905500
South-central Asia 0,016 South-central Asia 395600
South-eastern Asia 0,061 South-eastern Asia 1474000
Southern Africa 0,029 Southern Africa 700000
Southern Europe 0,075 Southern Europe 1806400
Western Africa 0,006 Western Africa 143800
Western Asia 0,098 Western Asia 2357600
Western Europe 0,186 Western Europe 4461400
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C
Warehouse location on a local level -
Data set
The values of each of those sub-criteria, together with the values of the aggregated criteria are
provided in the following pages.
Corruption
• C1: Perceived corruption index
• C2: Human development index
• C3: Employment rate
• C4: Political stability
• C5: GDP per capita rank minus HDI rank
Security
• C6: Victims of conflicts "one sided" over 20years, per number of inhabitants
• C7: Global peace index
• C8: Total affected per natural disasters per inhabitants
Accessibility
• C9: Number of airports
• C10: Merchant lines
• C11: Annual cargo load
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Telecommunications
• C12: Telephones - main lines per inhabitants
• C13: Telephones - mobile cellular per inhabitants
• C14: Internet hosts per inhabitants
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Corruption Security Accessibility Telecom
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14
Weighting factors 0,16 0,2 0,3 0,17 0,16 0 0,3 0,38 0,3 0,31 0,39 0 0,28 0,36 0,36
Afghanistan 16 0 60 27 0 25 0 7 0 0 5 0 0 2 1 10 0 4
Albania 37 83 88 40 91 71 100 67 0 45 5 19 0 7 9 39 1 17
Algeria 34 77 87 40 58 64 8 51 96 48 21 26 0 14 9 50 0 21
American Samoa 0 0 70 0 0 21 100 0 0 22 5 0 0 2 15 2 11 9
Andorra 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100 66 0 0 0 0 43 50 100 66
Angola 20 50 0 53 36 28 0 61 66 34 16 5 0 7 1 16 0 6
Anguilla 0 0 92 0 0 28 100 0 100 66 0 0 0 0 42 8 5 16
Antigua and Barbuda 0 86 89 0 61 54 100 0 0 22 5 100 0 29 43 79 10 44
Argentina 31 89 92 58 81 74 100 65 89 83 43 36 0 24 23 61 36 41
Armenia 31 80 93 27 84 67 100 51 36 56 5 0 0 2 20 24 3 15
Aruba 0 0 93 100 0 45 100 87 100 96 0 0 0 0 37 63 66 57
Australia 94 100 96 100 83 95 100 95 98 98 100 40 0 43 45 62 100 71
Austria 87 98 96 27 72 79 100 47 95 80 32 3 0 11 40 72 100 73
Azerbaijan 20 78 99 0 69 60 100 0 97 65 5 70 0 21 15 32 0 16
Bahamas 58 88 92 0 66 66 100 0 58 47 37 100 0 39 42 74 0 38
Bahrain 0 93 85 47 61 62 100 65 100 88 0 7 0 2 26 95 1 42
Bangladesh 23 54 98 53 76 65 93 61 0 41 16 32 0 14 1 14 0 5
Barbados 75 92 89 0 78 70 100 0 100 66 5 67 0 20 46 51 0 31
Belarus 22 84 98 53 75 71 100 54 100 84 5 0 0 2 37 44 3 27
Belgium 78 98 94 100 73 90 100 90 100 97 16 62 18 29 43 60 100 70
Belize 31 80 92 0 73 60 100 0 0 22 5 100 0 29 11 24 3 13
Benin 33 47 0 0 65 25 100 0 86 60 5 0 0 2 1 14 0 5
Bermuda 0 0 98 0 0 29 100 0 100 66 5 100 0 29 84 55 9 46
Bhutan 56 63 98 67 57 72 100 78 100 92 0 0 0 0 4 13 5 8
Bolivia 32 75 93 47 73 68 100 62 0 44 16 18 0 10 7 21 3 11
Bosnia-Hercegovenia 34 83 71 53 81 66 0 69 51 31 11 0 0 3 22 32 5 20
Botswana 62 69 93 93 22 71 100 80 54 73 16 0 0 5 7 47 1 20
Brazil 38 83 92 93 76 79 99 61 84 80 100 100 0 60 19 37 18 26
British Virgin Island 0 0 96 0 0 29 100 0 100 66 0 0 0 0 47 20 7 23
Brunei 0 95 96 0 55 57 100 0 100 66 0 6 0 2 20 54 15 31
Bulgaria 39 86 94 86 78 79 100 73 99 90 37 59 0 28 31 83 27 48
Burkina Faso 38 38 23 53 62 40 100 70 93 87 11 0 0 3 1 6 0 3
Myanmar 14 60 91 27 92 61 55 37 64 46 5 19 0 7 1 0 0 0
Burundi 20 39 0 47 76 32 0 37 0 0 5 0 0 2 0 2 0 1
Cambodia 19 59 97 27 76 61 0 52 0 3 5 100 0 29 0 11 0 4
Cameroon 25 53 70 33 60 51 92 54 99 81 27 0 0 9 1 15 0 6
Canada 94 100 94 100 78 94 100 91 100 97 100 100 0 60 61 34 58 50
Cape Verde Is 55 73 79 20 76 63 100 29 55 56 5 6 0 3 16 21 0 12
Cayman Islands 0 0 96 0 0 29 100 0 96 64 5 86 0 25 77 43 37 50
Central African Rep 22 36 92 0 66 49 21 0 98 36 43 0 0 14 0 2 0 1
Chad 17 40 0 20 56 23 0 20 26 3 16 0 0 5 0 6 0 2
Chile 74 90 93 100 83 89 100 81 72 81 21 35 0 16 20 52 19 31
China P Rep 39 79 96 53 79 73 95 62 0 42 53 100 100 85 26 25 4 18
Colombia 41 81 88 67 80 74 0 28 35 10 53 13 0 21 17 46 13 26
Comoros 27 59 80 0 84 54 100 0 0 22 16 100 0 32 3 3 0 2
Zaire/Congo Dem Rep 18 37 0 20 73 26 0 22 93 33 11 1 0 4 0 6 0 2
Congo 20 64 0 33 64 32 0 55 95 45 11 1 0 4 0 21 0 8
Cook Islands 0 0 87 0 0 26 100 0 100 66 0 21 0 6 49 7 69 41
Costa Rica 55 88 94 100 85 86 100 82 48 71 5 1 0 2 33 22 1 18
Cote d’Ivoire 22 45 0 20 54 25 19 50 100 53 43 0 0 14 3 21 0 9
Croatia 47 89 85 67 76 75 34 77 100 67 43 63 0 31 39 68 93 69
Cuba 46 88 98 53 100 80 100 65 0 45 16 9 0 8 9 1 0 3
Cyprus 69 94 96 86 0 74 100 63 100 87 21 100 0 34 56 85 68 71
Czech Rep 56 93 94 93 72 84 100 92 87 92 5 1 0 2 27 78 16 42
Denmark 100 98 98 100 74 95 100 93 100 98 75 100 0 51 50 69 100 75
Djibouti 32 53 41 0 61 38 100 0 0 22 5 0 0 2 2 5 0 3
Dominica 65 82 77 0 73 62 100 0 32 36 0 42 0 11 28 35 0 21
Dominican Rep 32 79 85 53 74 68 100 59 81 78 21 1 0 7 9 35 4 17
Ecuador 22 83 91 27 80 65 100 55 54 65 11 29 0 11 13 44 1 20
Egypt 30 74 91 67 59 68 89 73 100 87 48 53 0 30 13 22 1 12
El Salvador 42 77 94 80 69 75 100 0 0 22 5 0 0 2 15 53 1 24
Equatorial Guinea 18 74 70 53 10 50 100 66 99 88 5 1 0 2 2 22 0 8
Eritrea 28 46 0 0 79 27 100 0 0 22 0 4 0 1 1 1 0 0
Estonia 71 90 94 86 0 73 100 75 100 91 5 23 0 8 37 92 100 80
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C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14
Weighting factors 0,16 0,2 0,3 0,17 0,16 0 0,3 0,38 0,3 0,31 0,39 0 0,28 0,36 0,36
Ethiopia 28 40 0 40 72 31 67 43 0 25 5 7 0 4 1 1 0 1
Falkland Islands (Islas
Malvinas)
0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100 66 0 0 0 0 74 0 11 24
Faroe Islands 0 0 99 0 0 30 100 0 100 66 0 9 0 2 46 63 66 59
Fiji 0 77 92 0 74 55 100 0 75 55 11 7 0 5 11 29 5 15
Finland 97 99 94 100 78 94 100 93 100 98 100 77 0 53 32 71 100 71
France 74 99 93 100 80 90 100 80 99 93 100 100 100 100 54 54 87 66
French Polynesia 0 0 88 0 0 26 100 0 100 66 0 12 0 3 18 38 19 25
Gabon 33 75 79 53 32 59 100 64 92 84 32 2 0 11 2 48 0 18
Gambia The 20 49 0 47 69 32 100 68 94 87 5 4 0 3 4 28 0 11
Gaza Strip 0 0 59 0 0 18 100 0 100 66 0 0 0 0 23 42 0 21
Georgia 42 79 86 13 85 65 27 20 1 3 5 100 0 29 12 34 2 16
Germany 85 97 92 100 73 90 100 91 97 96 100 100 59 83 63 72 100 79
Ghana 42 55 89 73 79 70 100 73 85 84 5 3 0 3 2 20 0 8
Gibraltar 0 0 97 0 0 29 100 0 100 66 0 100 0 27 84 21 26 40
Greece 51 98 92 80 77 82 100 68 99 89 100 100 0 60 56 68 57 61
Greenland 0 0 91 0 0 27 100 0 100 66 0 2 0 1 60 70 93 76
Grenada 0 80 88 0 69 54 100 0 0 22 5 0 100 42 30 31 0 20
Guam 0 0 89 0 0 27 100 0 62 49 11 0 0 3 36 34 0 22
Guatemala 33 72 97 58 62 69 0 52 56 27 5 0 0 2 10 48 4 21
Guernsey 0 0 99 0 0 30 100 0 100 66 0 0 0 0 66 41 1 33
Guinea 17 44 0 58 65 32 91 59 84 76 11 0 0 3 0 1 0 0
Guinea Bissau 20 40 0 0 0 11 100 0 27 34 5 0 0 2 0 12 0 4
Guyana 28 75 0 0 82 33 100 0 0 22 5 6 0 3 14 22 3 13
Haiti 15 54 0 27 79 31 26 51 22 22 5 0 0 2 1 17 0 7
Honduras 28 74 72 53 72 62 90 46 22 44 11 97 0 30 10 33 1 15
Hong Kong (China) 87 97 96 0 63 73 100 0 100 66 5 100 0 29 53 91 44 64
Hungary 55 91 92 86 75 82 100 86 97 94 5 0 0 2 32 68 71 59
Iceland 96 100 98 100 81 96 100 99 100 100 32 2 0 11 59 69 100 78
India 37 63 93 93 67 74 84 40 0 30 100 100 100 100 3 16 1 7
Indonesia 28 75 92 80 80 74 76 66 80 71 48 100 0 43 7 21 1 10
Iran Islam Rep 25 80 88 27 60 61 100 54 0 41 11 59 0 19 35 27 0 20
Iraq 14 0 82 20 0 30 0 0 98 28 11 11 0 6 5 30 0 12
Ireland 83 99 94 93 74 90 100 93 100 97 48 23 0 22 49 72 100 76
Isle of Man 0 0 99 0 0 29 100 0 100 66 0 100 0 27 65 0 2 19
Israel 65 96 94 73 78 83 0 17 100 34 27 9 0 11 41 76 75 66
Italy 52 98 93 100 78 86 100 77 99 92 100 100 0 60 45 82 100 78
Jamaica 33 80 90 80 74 74 100 57 3 43 11 16 0 8 12 54 0 23
Japan 78 99 96 100 83 92 100 97 92 96 100 100 100 100 39 51 100 65
Jersey 0 0 98 0 0 29 100 0 100 66 0 0 0 0 78 56 1 42
Jordan 55 79 87 40 82 71 100 66 85 82 11 17 0 8 9 47 1 20
Kazakhstan 24 83 93 40 71 67 100 58 97 84 11 4 0 5 20 50 1 24
Kenya 23 55 60 40 76 52 100 47 0 38 16 1 0 6 1 18 0 7
Kiribati 33 0 98 0 0 35 100 0 100 66 0 34 0 9 4 0 0 1
Korea Dem P Rep 0 0 0 33 0 6 100 25 54 54 5 100 100 69 5 0 0 1
Korea Rep 60 96 97 58 0 68 100 76 93 89 11 100 0 30 48 55 3 34
Kosovo 0 0 60 0 0 18 100 0 100 66 0 0 0 0 5 16 0 7
Kuwait 46 94 98 67 56 77 100 77 100 92 5 30 0 10 19 65 0 29
Kyrgyzstan 19 72 82 0 85 56 100 0 97 65 0 0 0 0 9 24 4 13
Lao P Dem Rep 22 63 98 58 73 67 71 79 0 39 5 1 0 2 1 13 0 5
Latvia 54 89 95 86 74 82 100 71 100 90 5 17 0 6 28 60 37 43
Lebanon 32 82 91 40 66 67 100 35 97 77 11 26 0 10 17 19 3 13
Lesotho 34 51 55 0 67 43 100 0 0 22 5 0 0 2 2 13 0 5
Liberia 26 38 15 53 72 37 0 57 93 45 5 100 0 29 0 10 0 4
Lybia 0 87 70 58 73 60 100 71 100 90 0 13 0 3 13 44 0 20
Liechtenstein 0 0 99 0 0 29 100 0 100 66 0 0 0 0 56 49 84 63
Lithuania 49 90 95 86 74 82 100 76 100 92 5 36 0 11 22 84 86 67
Luxembourg 89 99 95 100 66 91 100 93 100 98 5 36 80 44 49 76 100 77
Macau 58 0 97 0 0 39 100 0 100 66 5 0 0 2 31 95 0 44
Macedonia FRY 39 83 66 47 79 64 100 61 0 43 11 0 0 3 22 45 7 25
Madagascar 37 55 0 6 87 32 100 63 0 44 11 6 0 5 1 7 0 3
Malawi 30 47 0 53 76 36 100 72 0 47 11 0 0 3 1 5 0 2
Malaysia 55 85 96 73 68 79 100 84 90 90 69 100 100 90 17 56 6 27
Maldives 30 77 0 0 71 32 100 0 77 56 5 23 0 8 8 50 2 21
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Corruption Security Accessibility Telecom
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14
Weighting factors 0,16 0,2 0,3 0,17 0,16 0 0,3 0,38 0,3 0,31 0,39 0 0,28 0,36 0,36
Mali 33 40 70 33 66 51 15 53 43 28 5 0 0 2 1 12 0 5
Malta 0 92 94 0 72 58 100 0 100 66 0 100 0 27 47 56 25 42
Marshall Is 0 0 64 0 0 19 100 0 92 62 0 100 0 27 7 1 0 2
Martinique 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 5 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
Mauritania 30 58 70 40 70 56 100 46 0 38 16 0 0 5 1 24 0 9
Mauritius 59 83 92 0 64 65 100 0 99 65 11 2 0 4 27 45 3 25
Mayotte 0 0 75 0 0 22 100 0 100 66 0 0 0 0 4 14 0 6
Mexico 39 87 96 67 77 77 99 54 64 68 100 43 0 44 17 38 37 32
Micronesia Fed States 0 0 78 0 0 23 100 0 36 38 0 2 0 1 8 15 3 9
Moldova Rep 31 74 98 47 82 71 100 66 0 45 0 31 0 8 24 26 20 23
Monaco 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100 66 0 55 0 15 100 32 100 75
Mongolia 32 74 97 40 79 69 100 59 0 42 5 61 0 18 5 16 0 7
Montenegro 37 85 85 73 79 74 100 61 99 86 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 0
Montserrat 0 0 94 0 0 28 100 0 75 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 11
Morocco 38 67 98 47 62 67 97 70 94 86 53 28 0 25 7 35 3 16
Mozambique 28 38 79 58 66 57 0 73 0 10 11 2 0 4 0 9 0 4
Namibia 14 65 95 73 52 65 100 70 0 46 59 1 0 19 6 23 1 11
Nauru 0 0 10 0 0 3 100 0 100 66 0 0 0 0 13 7 1 7
Nepal 29 55 58 47 84 55 0 61 50 28 5 0 0 2 3 2 1 2
Netherlands 96 99 96 100 76 94 100 81 100 94 32 100 100 78 43 63 100 71
Netherlands Antilles 0 0 83 0 0 25 100 0 100 66 0 100 0 27 35 54 80 58
New Caledonia 0 0 83 0 0 25 100 0 99 65 27 2 0 9 26 48 26 34
New Zealand 100 98 96 100 79 95 100 100 99 100 85 10 0 31 39 62 100 69
Nicaragua 27 72 96 40 76 67 100 67 46 65 5 0 0 2 4 22 4 11
Niger 30 38 0 0 0 13 66 0 0 10 27 0 0 9 0 4 0 2
Nigeria 29 52 0 53 61 34 93 29 98 72 16 54 0 20 1 17 0 6
Niue 0 0 88 0 0 26 100 0 12 27 0 0 0 0 73 17 100 62
Northern Mariana Is 0 0 92 0 0 28 100 0 100 66 5 0 0 2 23 14 0 12
Norway 85 100 97 100 72 92 100 94 100 98 100 100 0 60 41 68 100 72
Oman 59 87 85 53 61 72 100 83 96 93 11 2 0 4 8 46 1 19
Pakistan 27 58 93 20 65 58 98 16 47 47 50 12 0 20 3 31 0 12
Palau 0 0 96 0 0 29 100 0 100 66 0 0 0 0 31 3 0 10
Panama 37 86 94 67 78 76 100 69 83 82 5 100 0 29 14 44 1 20
Papua New Guinea 22 53 98 47 63 62 85 58 68 66 11 17 0 8 1 3 0 1
Paraguay 26 78 95 53 80 70 100 63 62 71 5 18 0 7 6 39 1 16
Peru 39 81 92 66 76 74 36 60 5 21 11 6 0 5 9 32 4 15
Philippines 25 77 93 53 86 70 83 38 0 29 11 100 0 30 4 33 1 13
Poland 49 90 90 93 79 82 100 81 100 93 27 12 0 12 26 65 77 59
Portugal 66 93 92 93 76 86 100 92 91 93 48 93 0 41 37 76 66 62
Puerto Rico 62 0 88 0 0 37 100 0 98 65 11 2 0 4 25 52 0 26
Qatar 0 93 99 77 49 70 100 91 100 97 0 17 0 5 28 93 0 42
Romania 41 85 96 73 73 77 79 75 94 81 27 13 0 12 19 63 37 41
Russia 23 83 94 47 59 66 49 18 91 49 85 100 0 55 30 74 13 40
Rwanda 32 45 0 47 72 34 0 63 0 7 5 0 0 2 0 4 0 1
St Helena 0 0 86 0 0 26 100 0 75 55 0 0 0 0 28 0 15 13
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0 86 96 0 66 57 100 0 100 66 0 100 0 27 61 15 0 22
St Lucia 76 85 80 0 76 66 100 0 100 66 11 0 0 3 31 40 0 23
Saint Pierre and
Miquelon
0 0 90 0 0 27 100 0 100 66 0 0 0 0 66 0 0 18
St Vincent and The
Grenadines
70 79 85 0 67 64 100 0 92 62 5 100 0 29 19 53 0 25
Samoa 47 79 0 0 86 38 100 0 100 66 5 1 0 2 9 24 20 18
San Marino 0 0 97 0 0 29 100 0 100 66 0 5 0 1 68 35 84 62
Sao Tome and
Principe
0 66 0 0 85 27 100 0 100 66 0 0 0 0 4 9 2 5
Saudi Arabia 38 86 91 47 57 68 93 54 100 81 48 46 0 28 14 61 2 27
Senegal 37 52 52 47 0 40 61 62 72 61 5 0 0 2 2 20 0 8
Serbia 37 85 81 47 78 68 100 60 99 86 0 0 0 0 28 51 0 26
Seychelles 52 86 98 0 68 66 100 0 0 22 5 6 0 3 27 57 1 29
Sierra Leone 20 34 0 47 67 29 0 72 98 52 5 100 0 29 0 8 0 3
Singapore 99 95 98 100 56 91 100 80 100 93 5 100 100 69 39 74 69 62
Slovakia 54 90 92 100 74 84 100 84 99 94 5 40 0 12 20 68 50 48
Slovenia 72 95 93 100 76 89 100 92 100 97 11 23 0 10 41 58 14 38
Solomon Is 31 61 0 0 80 30 100 0 97 65 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2
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C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14
Weighting factors 0,16 0,2 0,3 0,17 0,16 0 0,3 0,38 0,3 0,31 0,39 0 0,28 0,36 0,36
Somalia 11 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 5 1 0 2 1 4 0 2
South Africa 53 69 78 73 36 65 77 46 0 30 100 2 0 33 9 53 10 25
Spain 70 98 86 93 79 86 88 82 100 89 100 100 0 60 44 73 30 50
Sri Lanka 34 77 95 73 79 75 0 35 0 0 5 21 0 7 13 23 0 12
Sudan 17 54 81 27 66 53 0 13 47 10 5 2 0 2 1 11 0 4
Suriname 39 80 91 0 66 60 100 0 58 47 5 1 0 2 17 41 0 19
Swaziland 39 56 60 47 44 51 100 65 0 45 11 0 0 3 4 20 1 9
Sweden 100 99 94 100 79 95 100 93 100 98 100 100 0 60 59 70 100 78
Switzerland 97 99 97 100 72 94 100 89 99 96 37 28 0 20 64 65 100 77
Syrian Arab Rep 23 76 91 33 74 64 100 51 57 65 11 61 0 20 17 21 0 12
Taiwan 61 0 96 93 0 55 100 79 100 93 0 81 0 22 60 65 86 71
Tajikistan 22 71 98 0 86 61 100 0 0 22 5 0 0 2 4 2 0 2
Tanzania Uni Rep 32 52 0 66 75 39 98 71 18 53 11 7 0 5 0 14 0 5
Thailand 38 81 99 40 71 71 60 46 0 23 37 100 100 80 10 48 6 23
Timor-Leste 24 50 80 0 81 51 100 0 99 66 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 1
Togo 29 49 0 0 77 27 100 0 81 57 5 8 0 4 1 12 0 5
Tokelau 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100 66 0 0 0 0 20 0 72 31
Tonga 26 80 87 0 94 62 100 0 12 27 5 10 0 4 17 24 61 35
Trinidad and Tobago 39 86 95 73 0 65 100 59 99 86 11 7 0 5 25 50 48 42
Tunisia 47 79 86 58 66 70 100 78 98 92 21 6 0 9 12 46 0 20
Turkey 49 82 92 53 61 71 54 44 95 61 32 100 0 37 25 52 14 31
Turkmenistan 19 75 40 20 66 44 100 50 100 83 0 6 0 2 9 10 0 6
Turks and Caicos
Islands
0 0 90 0 0 27 100 0 100 66 0 1 0 0 25 5 40 23
Tuvalu 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100 66 0 63 0 17 7 6 100 40
Uganda 28 51 0 47 76 35 0 56 35 19 5 0 0 2 0 8 0 3
Ukraine 27 81 97 33 79 68 100 58 91 82 21 100 0 34 27 73 4 36
United Arab Emirates 0 93 98 47 53 65 100 61 100 87 0 46 100 53 29 100 31 56
United Kingdom 83 97 95 93 72 89 100 80 96 91 100 100 100 100 53 72 51 59
United States 74 98 93 100 66 88 77 75 57 64 100 100 100 100 52 51 100 69
Uruguay 78 89 92 86 85 87 100 83 77 84 5 13 0 5 27 53 52 45
Uzbekistan 19 72 99 27 81 65 100 52 86 78 16 0 0 5 6 23 1 10
Vanuatu 31 71 98 0 69 60 100 0 0 22 11 43 0 15 4 7 2 4
Venezuela 20 85 92 40 72 66 96 46 97 79 32 49 0 24 19 55 2 26
Viet Nam 29 74 95 53 82 71 100 77 0 49 11 100 0 30 12 23 0 12
Virgin Is (US) 0 0 94 0 0 28 100 0 100 66 21 1 0 7 63 44 16 39
Wallis and Futuna 0 0 85 0 0 25 100 0 100 66 0 6 0 2 12 0 0 3
Palestine (West Bank) 0 76 84 0 91 55 100 0 100 66 0 0 0 0 14 26 0 13
Yemen 25 59 65 27 66 51 100 38 99 78 11 3 0 4 4 8 0 4
Zambia 30 47 50 58 63 50 100 72 0 47 27 0 0 9 1 14 0 5
Zimbabwe 19 0 20 33 0 15 100 33 0 34 48 0 0 16 3 7 1 3
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The list of sub-criteria has been chosen thanks to the principal component analysis (see
section 14.3 on page 152). The list below provides all sub-criteria analysed. Given the size of
the table (50 columns x 235 rows), we did not detail all values. Other combinations of those
criteria, such as values divided by the surface or the number of inhabitants were also looked
at.
• Total number of natural crisis over 10 years (EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International
Disaster Database – www.emdat.net – Université Catholique de Louvain – Brussels –
Belgium)
• Total number of affected by natural crisis over 10 years (EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED
International Disaster Database – www.emdat.net – Université Catholique de Louvain –
Brussels – Belgium)
• Total number of natural crisis over 10 years per surface
• Total number of affected by natural crisis over 10 years per inhabitants
• GDP (current US dollar) (World bank group)
• Improved sanitation facilities urban (% of urban population with access) in 2006 (World
bank group)
• Improved water source (% of population with access) in 2006 (World bank group)
• Roads paved (% of total roads) in 2000 (World bank group)
• Agricultural land (% of land area) in 2005 (World bank group)
• GDP growth (annual %) (World bank group)
• GNI per capita PPP (dollar) (World bank group)
• GNI PPP (dollar) (World bank group)
• Perceived corruption index (http:
//www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008)
• Conflicts "one sided" over 20ans (ucdp)
• Civilian victims of conflicts over 5ans (ucdp)
• Conflicts "one sided" over 20ans per inhabitants
• Civilian victims of conflicts over 5ans per inhabitants
• Human Development Index Value
(http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI_2008_EN_Tables.pdf)
• Life Expectancy at birth (years)
(http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI_2008_EN_Tables.pdf)
• Adult Literacy Rate (%aged 15 and above)
(http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI_2008_EN_Tables.pdf)
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• Combined gross enrolment ratio in education (%)
(http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI_2008_EN_Tables.pdf)
• GDP per Capita (PPP US dollar)
(http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI_2008_EN_Tables.pdf)
• Life Expectancy index
(http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI_2008_EN_Tables.pdf)
• Education index (http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI_2008_EN_Tables.pdf)
• GDP index (http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI_2008_EN_Tables.pdf)
• GDP per capita rank minus HDI rank
(http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI_2008_EN_Tables.pdf)
• GDP - per capita (PPP) USdollar (CIA)
• Unemployment rate (CIA)
• Ports and terminals (CIA)
• Number of airports per surface
• Ports and terminals per surface
• Number of airports per inhabitants
• Ports and terminals per inhabitants
• Number of airports (http://www.levoyageur.net/aeroports.php)
• Telephone main lines 2005 per 1000 inhab (Human Development Report 2007/2008
http://www.hdr.undp.org)
• Cellular phones subscribers 2005 per 1000 inhab (Human Development Report
2007/2008 http://www.hdr.undp.org)
• Internet users 2005 per 1000 inhab (Human Development Report 2007/2008
http://www.hdr.undp.org)
• Telephones-mainlinesinuse (CIA)
• Telephones - mobile cellular (CIA)
• Internet hosts (CIA)
• Internet users (CIA)
• Telephones - MAIN LINES per 1000inhab (CIA)
• Telephones - mobile cellular per 1000inhab (CIA)
• Internet hosts per 1000inhab. (CIA)
• Internet users per 1000inhab. (CIA)
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• Latitude (http://www.mobilgistix.com/Resources/GIS/Locations/average-
latitude-longitude-countries.aspx)
• Longitude (http://www.mobilgistix.com/Resources/GIS/Locations/average-
latitude-longitude-countries.aspx)
• Superficie
• Population total (World bank group)
• Population (CIA)
• Urban growth rate 2005-2010 (http:
//web.unfpa.org/swp/2007/english/notes/indicators/e_indicator2.pdf)
• % Urban population (http:
//web.unfpa.org/swp/2007/english/notes/indicators/e_indicator2.pdf)
• Annual cargo traffic 2008 (Airports Council International)
• Merchant lines (CIA)
• Navigable waterways (CIA)
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